


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RUSKIN HOUSE, 40 MUSEUM STREET, W.C. 1

First published in 1924

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Printed in Great Britain by
UNWIN BROTHERS, LIMITED, LONDON AND WOKING

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INTRODUCTION

DURING the war, the armchair patriots took delight in writing bellicose articles, designed to stimulate the courage of the soldiers in the trenches. One of the latter ventured a retort. He compared these fighters with the pen to a person who should see a man drowning, and who, instead of jumping into the water in the attempt to help, should sit down on the bank of the river and read to the drowning man the directions contained in a handbook on swimming. Many who are ready to give advice, a great many moralists, are like such a sage.

They tell us what we ought to do, but not how to do it. Moral theories are apt to suffer from this defect. Many of them, indeed, are not even as useful as a handbook on swimming, which at least gives us some sort of theoretical idea of the way in which we might get across the river. The moralists often remind us of the man who dwelt on the bank of a stream. A wayfarer asked how he could get across. "The only way is to swim."—"I can't swim."—But the other had already shut the door in the traveller's face.

Moralists of all complexions utter a number of excellent precepts. But in too many instances they disclose to us, or urge us to attain, desirable

ends without telling us the way to these ends. Now we are not enabled to do something merely because we know that it would be a good thing to do.

"*Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor*," wrote Ovid.

I see the right, and I approve it too,
Condemn the wrong, and yet the wrong pursue.

A yet more familiar incorporation of the same idea is the adage: "The road to hell is paved with good intentions."—"Who wills, can," is a fine maxim, but somewhat pretentious; it sounds a trifle hollow, and the wisest of those who utter it add prudently that we must first master the secret of will. It would be a great thing could we learn how to do what we regard as desirable, how to carry out our own decisions, how to use our good intentions in paving roads that lead elsewhere than to hell.

The author's aim in this book has been to collect and juxtapose some of the doctrines which offer the most abundant instruction concerning this inner discipline.

Part One deals with philosophical and religious teachings. We dwell not so much upon the exposition of these teachings, as upon the moral outlooks and methods propounded to enable us to attain our ends. Our study is not concerned with morality per se, but with the technique of the means whereby we act on ourselves. Of course we do not ignore the moralists' advice as to what we ought to do, but our main attention

is given to their attempts to teach us how to do it. This explains our choice of the doctrines to be considered. We have dealt with those only which have seemed to us typical in the foregoing respect. That is why we say nothing of the greatest among modern philosophers, not even of Descartes or of Kant, because their philosophy is preeminently theoretical. On the other hand, we dwell at considerable length—some may even consider at undue length—on such doctrines as Christian Science and New Thought, which are neither strikingly original nor endowed with much vigour as systems. But they enter into our scheme because they are wholly designed to furnish practical rules, and because a great many persons have found these rules helpful.

Part Two, though it contrasts strongly with Part One, seems to us a necessary complement. It deals with psychotherapeutics, with the methods which modern science has elaborated for the treatment of nervous disorders. These methods are certainly in place here ; for nervous disorders may, from one angle, be looked upon as maladies of the inner discipline. It is in the case of nervous disorders that our own individuality is especially rebellious ; and the best philosophy in the world will rarely enable us, if we are suffering from nervous disorder, to regain self-mastery. But when a method is competent to restore discipline in these most difficult of all cases, we cannot doubt that the method is worthy of attention. We have to ask ourselves whether it may not be applied or adapted to the most normal instances.

Thus we shall not be surprised to find that the leading psychotherapeutic methods actually in use—rational persuasion, psychoanalysis, and autosuggestion—have been employed as educational methods, and above all as methods of self-education.

We consider that anyone who attempts at this date to found a system for the education of the will must turn to these philosophical and religious doctrines, on the one hand, and to these psychotherapeutic methods, on the other. But in the present volume, the authors have not attempted a synthetic exposition of such a kind, although one of them has elsewhere endeavoured to trace the outlines of such an exposition.¹ In this book each doctrine is separately considered, so as to leave its essential spirit and its peculiar originality intact. Thus every reader, according as his temperament and his needs vary, will be able to select the one he finds most congenial, and will perhaps be induced to study it more closely in a more detailed treatise.

Nevertheless, the separate exposition of a number of doctrines may leave in the reader's mind a sense of confusion and surfeit. We therefore add a Conclusion, designed to show how the various doctrines are interrelated; and also to emphasise and coordinate the truths that are thoroughly well established, the truths which, in all ages, have been common to all the doctrines in question.

Throughout, conciseness and simplicity have been our leading aims, and therefore the book

¹ Charles Baudouin, *The Power within Us*.

makes no claim whatever to be exhaustive. It is written as a handbook for readers with good sense and good will, and is penned so that such readers may be able to understand it without any special knowledge of philosophy, psychology, or medicine. There seemed room for a book which could find a place between the technical treatises comprehensible only to experts and the popular handbooks characterised by all the blemishes of a shoddy civilisation—a manual which might prove a really helpful guide to its readers. Time will show whether we have been successful.

C. B.

A. L.

TERRITET, SWITZERLAND,

December, 1922.



PART ONE

MORAL METHODS

CHAPTER ONE

WILL AND TENDENCIES

WE do not always do what we want to do, even when there is no external hindrance. Does not this imply that there must be internal hindrances?

Such internal hindrances do, in fact, exist; for we have a "nature" which cannot be instantaneously modified by a mere fiat of the will. A joint product of environment and heredity, a living summary of our individual past and of the past of the race, this "nature" is at one and the same time that which makes us what we are and that which restricts us. In this respect it resembles our body, which is certainly our self, but is at the same time a weight which we have to carry about and which chains us to the ground. Many persons have thought they would like to fly; but centuries have been needed for the discovery of the way to fly, for the discovery of the admirably designed mechanisms by which we have been enabled to overcome the effects of gravity. Now, between "will" and "can" there is the same distance as between the longing to fly and aviation.

In psychological terminology, our "nature" is the sheaf of our *tendencies*, that is to say, of all the needs, of all the tastes, which lead us to seek certain objects and avoid others, often in defiance of reason or duty. Every tendency may be intensified to become a passion, then acquiring the characteristic of inevitability which has been so often described. No matter whether the passion be that of the drunkard, the lover, or the man whose foible is ambition, reason and precept have very little influence upon action, and have about as much effect as a few drops of holy water on a conflagration. But, short of these ruling passions, our "leanings" carry us away; and the imagery of this term "leaning" is expressive. We may say that passion opens a gulf at our feet, and that, on the edge of this abyss, giddiness seizes us so that we fall into the depths. We may compare our leanings to slopes which invite us to glide down them, and the attraction is at times all the more insidious because it is so gentle. Pleasure is no less seductive than love and the *dolce far niente* is more to be dreaded than overwhelming despair.

Our tendencies strike deep roots. Following up these roots, we discover *instincts*, and, first of all, the primordial instincts which are concerned with the preservation of the individual or the species—eating and drinking, sex, fighting, anger, fear. In a word, we find the "human animal," and we find it in prime condition.

Upon this common stock are grafted the tendencies which are spoken of as derived, those

more or less peculiar to the individual. They are but an elaboration of the others, and draw their life from the same vigorous sap. They constitute our character, as it has been determined by disposition, environment, and education. They comprise our personal tastes, our peculiar needs (or what we believe to be our needs) : a love of sport, gambling, dress ; a fondness for dancing, tobacco, travelling. We say we have a "weakness" for this, that, or the other. They are, in very truth, our weak points, the flaws in our armour. Leanings that seem quite harmless may, under certain conditions, become faults or dangers.

All this which we speak of as "our nature" is strongly reinforced by *habit*, termed "second nature." Every action when repeated tends to become a habit ; and the habitual action grows continually easier, and may ultimately be irresistible. *Since we are naturally inclined to repeat the actions towards which we are impelled by our instincts and our tendencies, the result is that all our instincts and tendencies induce habits, which reinforce the instincts and tendencies and fuse with them.* In the case of any given action it is often difficult to ascertain to what extent it is determined by a natural tendency and to what extent by habit. In many instances, habit has the larger share, as with smoking and drinking. Indubitably, habit lends powerful aid to tendency, and our "second nature" joins hands most amicably with our first nature in order to enslave us.

Fortunately it is in our power to oppose one habit by another, to acquire new habits by the

voluntary repetition of certain actions ; and it is mainly by this indirect route that the will can master and guide tendency. In a sense, all education is the acquirement of habits, and that is why education is a form of training or exercise. Experimental psychology has made it possible to detect a " law of exercise," which can be expressed in curves and formulae showing exactly to what extent training makes an action speedier, that is to say, easier. The education of the will is subject to this law, and one of the best established among the moral precepts bearing on the question is the one which recommends the regular repetition of an exercise. This precept underlies all the others, and we shall meet it at every turn.

But not only do we not always do what we want ; we do not always think what we want. Nothing is more fugitive than the thread of our ideas. This is where the law of the association of ideas plays its part. Every idea, every mental image, calls up another ; the second calls up a third ; and so on. The sequence is interminable, and goes on independently both of our reason and of our will. Hard as we may try to fix our mind upon one idea, it continually eludes us ; we may as well try to hold water in the hands ; there is always a leakage going on.

We are often told that the guidance of our thoughts is the key to self-mastery and to the control of our actions. But those who say this do not tell us clearly enough how we are to guide our thoughts. Moreover, they are apt to ignore

a truth which contemporary psychology has revealed. *The forces which enable our actions to escape our control are also the forces which have this effect on our thoughts.* Psychoanalysts have discovered a fundamental law of the association of ideas ; they have learned that undirected thinking rolls down a slope formed by our sentiments, our hidden wishes, in a word, our tendencies. To put the matter succinctly, our tendencies lead our thoughts just as much as they lead our actions. That is why, in our day-dreams, we build castles in the air ; our imagination realises our wishes, and, in many cases, wishes of which we are unaware.

No doubt it sounds well to say that the key of our actions is in our thoughts ; but this only thrusts back the problem a stage ; we have not reached a solution, so long as we do not know how to guide our thoughts.

Besides, we form habits of thought as well as of action. It follows that the laws of habit and training apply to the guidance of thought as well as to the guidance of action.

Our associations of ideas likewise become habitual through repetition. Those who tell us to perform this or that exercise every day *at the same hour*, and if possible *in the same place*, wish us to take advantage of this fact. The recommendation is, therefore, more important than it seems at first sight. It is based upon good psychological reasons, and applies to exercises of all kinds, but is especially valid for exercises of thought. In the familiar environment, our associations of ideas are repeatedly launched upon the same trail, which

soon becomes well broken ; our exercise is thereby rendered easier, and we are less likely to forget to do it.

Nothing is really gained by substituting the formula " Who thinks, can " for the formula " Who wills, can." In the realm of thought, just as much as in the realm of will, training is indispensable.

In every moral system we find, as a primary aim, the regulation of our tendencies by our will. In some of these systems an attempt is made to ascertain the means by which this may be done, to discover the best way of training the will, and to point out the artifices that will enable us to take the enemy by surprise.

In the great philosophical and religious systems, Buddhism, Stoicism, and Christianity, these problems are envisaged from various angles. Certain modern doctrines, Christian Science and New Thought, have contributed novel elements to the discussion, but elements of varying worth. Each system offers its own method of subjecting our nature to discipline. Although most of these methods are of venerable antiquity, they contain a truth which age cannot wither, a truth which we shall do well to contemplate from time to time.

CHAPTER TWO

BUDDHISM

SOME truths are as old as the world, but they are rediscovered from time to time by persons whose vanity is tickled by the belief that they have found a new continent. Buddha lived in the sixth century before the Christian era. In the utterances and in the traditions of this marvellous civilisation of Hindustan, whose spirit he rejuvenated, we can find precepts which are still of value to us to-day—some of them precepts towards which western science is leading us back. More than all, the Hindus are past masters in the art of the inner discipline.

In the last chapter we learned that the nature against which our will jostles, and which we have to control, is rooted in our tendencies. This was presented to the reader as a discovery of modern psychology. But, in Buddha's eyes, desire was the source of all evil. Consequently: "The disciple who is fully awakened finds no satisfaction even in heavenly pleasures; he delights only in the destruction of all desires."¹

This destruction of desires is nirvana, but nirvana must not be identified (as it so often is in the West) with the annihilation of all inner life.

¹ Dhammapada, 187.

On the contrary, in Buddhist thought the true life blossoms upon the mastery of desire. How far does this "desire" of which Buddha speaks correspond to what we now understand by the term? What reserves are necessary before we can accept the Buddhist injunction that desire should be annihilated? These are doctrinal questions, and they cannot be discussed here. But there can be no doubt that in his implacable condemnation of desire, Buddha was especially thinking of egoism. Most of our desires are, to some extent, manifestations of egoism; and the demand that desire should be controlled is common to the moral systems, although the terminology is different in each case. The source of all the other desires, and the foundation of egoism, is the desire "of the individual life," and this is the desire which Buddha denounces with especial vigour:

"Hear the sublime truth concerning the origin of pain: it is the desire for the individual life; . . . it is the thirst for the individual life; for personal happiness in this life or in another.

"Hear the sublime truth concerning deliverance from pain: it is the extinction of this thirst, the annihilation of desire, deliverance from desire."¹

Our task in this chapter is to consider the means Buddha recommends for effecting this deliverance.

To cure a disorder, we must know its cause. The cause of our passions lies within us, and there-

¹ Mahavagga.

fore the first thing we have to know is ourselves, ourselves and our weaknesses :

“ Not the perversities of others, not their sins of commission or omission, but his own misdeeds and negligences, should a sage take notice of.”¹

Looking at the matter in a more general aspect, we see that the cause of the disorder (the desire or the passion) is always a form of ignorance, and that the remedy is accurate knowledge :

“ Bad conduct is the taint of woman, niggardliness the taint of a benefactor ; tainted are all evil ways, in this world and the next.

“ But there is a taint worse than all taints—ignorance is the greatest taint. O mendicants ! throw off that taint, and become taintless ! ”²

Why is ignorance so fateful ? The reason is plainly stated :

“ All the passions issue from ignorance, and the destruction of ignorance will destroy all the passions.”³

The same principle is illustrated by the allegory of the rope and the snake :

“ It sometimes happens that a man who is going down to the river to bathe steps on a wet rope and fancies it to be a snake. Horror-stricken, and seized with terror, he suffers in anticipation all the pains caused by snake-bite. But how great is his relief when he perceives that it is a rope and not a snake. His fright arose from his mistake, his ignorance, his illusion. As soon as he perceives the true nature of the cord, he feels

¹ Dhammapada, 50.—We are reminded of “ the beam ” and “ the mote ” of the Gospels.

² Dhammapada, 242 and 243.

³ Magghima Nikaya.

well again, and regains happiness and peace of mind.”¹

A deep knowledge of things is what we mean by philosophy. Buddhist philosophy is an expression of that form of pantheism according to which individual beings are mere appearances, and according to which the sole reality is the unique entity in which the individuals are con-founded. Thus the allegory of the snake and the rope ends with the words :

“ Such is the state of mind of one who has realised that there is no self, and that the cause of all his troubles, his cares, and his vanities is a mirage, an illusion, a dream.”

Elsewhere we read : “ ‘ All created things perish,’ he who knows and sees this becomes passive in pain ; this is the way to purity. . . .

“ ‘ All forms are unreal,’ he who knows and sees this becomes passive in pain ; this is the way that leads to purity.”²

Now, the sense of the fundamental identity of beings naturally resolves itself into love :

“ Rediscovering himself everywhere and in everything, the sage embraces the whole world in a sentiment of peace, compassion, intense and boundless love.”³

This is not the place for a discussion of the Buddhist theory of being, or of the theory of nirvana. It is certain, however, that even if our

¹ Mahavagga.

² Dhammapada, 277 and 279.—By “ forms ” is meant beings and things, as they appear to the senses. The word signifies here much the same as “ phenomena ” in western philosophy.

³ Magghima Nikaya.

western philosophy does not lead us to such conclusions, nevertheless, knowledge enables us to master many misleading desires and many deceptive passions. In like manner, a child which has been frightened by the illusion of a goblin is no longer afraid when it has touched and recognised the familiar object which has aroused the illusion. Besides, even those for whom Buddhist metaphysics has no attraction will agree that the principle of love or of altruism may help us to attain an inner harmony.

In any case, for Buddha himself, metaphysics is no more than a secondary matter. He is not troubled by his ignorance of what we call "the beyond," and his philosophy is rigidly practical:

"The problems we should dismiss from consideration are such as these: Is the universe eternal? Is it finite? Are body and soul one and the same? Is the soul distinct from the body? Does a buddha exist after death? Does he not exist after death? Does he simultaneously exist and not exist? Buddha refused to answer these questions when his disciple asked them. Why should we dismiss them from consideration? Because they are of no moment." †

Perhaps these questions are unanswerable, and in any case they are of minor importance. What really matters is that we should know what to do, and how to free ourselves from desire:

"Do not let your thoughts dwell on such matters as these: the world is eternal; the world is not eternal; the world is infinite; the world is finite.

† Milindapanha,

But let your thoughts dwell on such matters as these : this is what pain is ; this is what puts an end to pain ; this is the way leading towards the cessation of pain.”¹

For our present purposes, the main interest of Buddhism is to be found in the stress it lays on the *means* of deliverance, that is to say, self-mastery. Buddhism cannot be classed among the doctrines in which we are advised to cross the river without being told how ; or in which trust is placed in miraculous intervention :

“ ‘ Again, Vasettha, if this river Akiravati were full of water even to the brim, and overflowing. And a man with business on the other side, bound for the other side, should come up, and want to cross over. And he, standing on this bank, should invoke the farther bank, and say. “ Come hither, O farther bank ! come over to this side ! ”

“ ‘ Now what think you, Vasettha ? Would the farther bank . . . come over to this side ? ’

“ ‘ Certainly not, Gotama ! ’

“ ‘ In just the same way, Vasettha, the Brahmans, . . . omitting the practice of those qualities which really make a man a Brahman, . . . say thus : “ Indra, we call upon thee ; Varuna, we call upon thee ; Brahma, we call upon thee.” . . . But it is not possible that, by reason of their invoking and praying and hoping and praising, they should, after death and when the body is dissolved, become united with Brahma.’ ”²

¹ Samyutta Nikaya.

² Teviggā Sutta, I, 24, 25.

Hindustan has bequeathed to the world a discipline which is thoroughly practical, ingenious, and admirably adapted to the needs it is designed to meet. It is known by the name of *yoga*.

The preeminent tendency of this discipline is to promote mental *concentration*. Indeed, we are given to understand that the two terms, "yoga" and "concentration," are to a considerable extent synonymous.

"To give a provisional definition, yoga is concentration."¹

In their description of this state, the Hindus manifest remarkable psychological insight. They tell us that the mind is a perpetual flux of ideas, sentiments, and images; primarily, concentration is the operation which arrests the current, and maintains a single object—a single idea—in the focus of attention. A proverbial symbol for concentration is, among the Hindus, the work of the arrow-maker, whose mind is wholly engrossed by his task.

But this is merely the first step. Yoga presents numerous forms and stages, and its adepts revel in the description of these.

We must first of all distinguish different types of concentration, according as the objects to which the concentration is applied may be classed as "coarse" or "subtle." In the former case, the concentration is "deliberative"; in the latter case,

¹ The Yoga-System of Patanjali, or the ancient Hindu Doctrine of the Concentration of Mind, translated from the original Sanskrit by James Haughton Woods, Professor of Philosophy in Harvard University, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1914, p. 3.

it is "reflective."¹ Concentrations may also be classed according to their form. At first, concentration is conscious of its object, but it may end by ceasing to be conscious of it. This second state, whose nature we can best grasp by roughly comparing it to the hypnotic state, is that to which the yogin, the initiate, attains.² In this condition, concentration masters even the subconscious.³ The adepts of yoga go so far as to claim that the mental state characteristic of sleep can be brought under the control of concentration. In a word, we are told that, whatever the nature of our thoughts, and whether they occur in the waking hours or during sleep, we become enabled through concentration to arrest their flow, to restrict their "fluctuations."

There are, then, various degrees of concentration. Later, we are given a somewhat different classification, the main purpose of which is to exhibit a graduated scale.—The lowest stage is the mere fixation of attention upon a given object which is to occupy our thoughts in such a way that we shall have only one idea in the mind ("fixed-attention").—In the next stage, the aim is to make an idea the centre, the focus, of a connected series of thoughts which are all related to a central idea ("contemplation"). Now, it is unquestionably easier not to allow the mind to move at all, than to allow it to move in certain directions while restricting its movements in other

¹ Woods, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-92.

² Woods, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-47.

³ Woods, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-43.—See below, Part Two, Chapter One, "The Conscious and the Subconscious,"

directions.—Finally, in the third stage, the distinction between contemplation and the object of contemplation vanishes; the two become fused into one ("concentration properly so called").

We are doubtless justified in assimilating this third stage to the condition to which the Christians give the name of "ecstasy." We know, moreover, that many artists have described aesthetic contemplation as a state analogous to ecstasy, and as one in which all distinction between subject and object disappears. The same analogy was apparent to the Hindus.

A contemporary Indian writer — Ananda Coomaraswamy — reminds us that the aim of yoga is concentration of mind pushed to such an extreme that the distinction between the contemplative subject and the contemplated object no longer exists; thus a harmony, a unification, of consciousness is attained. At an early date, the Hindus realised that the concentration of the artist was of like nature, and such texts as the following were penned :

"Let the imager establish images in temples by meditation on the deities who are the objects of his devotion. For the successful achievement of this yoga the lineaments of the image are described in books to be dwelt upon in detail. In no other way, not even by direct and immediate vision of an actual object, is it possible to be so absorbed in contemplation, as thus in the making of images." ¹

¹ Sukracharya, quoted by Ananda Coomaraswamy, *The Dance of Siva*, New York, 1918, p. 21.

But the second of the three stages or degrees of contemplation is likewise of great interest.

"Contemplation," as above defined, is a sort of meditation in which a persistent endeavour is made to avoid wandering from a given theme. We may describe it as a dynamic concentration, whereas the first degree of concentration (fixation of attention upon a single object) is a static concentration. In dynamic concentration, the mind no longer arrests the stream of thought, but directs it.

Yoga is a formal school of meditation. The pupil must meditate daily. For a fixed time each day, short at first but gradually increased, he must guide his thoughts towards all the aspects of a given question, never allowing his mind to stray from this question, and without having recourse to the aid of the written word. Such a discipline is advocated for the training of the memory. Every evening, the happenings of the day are to be recalled to memory, beginning with the most recent, and tracing them back in strict serial order. When the habit of imaginatively reproducing the events of a single day has thus been acquired, the memory, gathering strength, will become enabled to cope with longer periods.

Concentration has to overcome numerous obstacles both bodily and mental. Sickness and languor are two of these. Doubt is another, for doubt is a condition in which the mind perpetually oscillates between two ideas, without being able to achieve fixation, whereas concentration presupposes fixation. (We may note, in passing,

how sagaciously the psychology of doubt is sketched here in a few lines.)¹ Another obstacle is incontinence, which squanders the energy of the mind.² Indeed, the obstacles are innumerable, and the most universal is the very nature of the mind, which is continual "fluctuation."

The only way of overcoming all these obstacles is to have recourse to regular training, and to be unceasingly watchful. Buddha himself is continually exhorting us to "vigilance."

"Indolence is a weakness, sloth is a taint. Pluck out this poisoned arrow of indolence."³

"The thirst of a thoughtless man grows like a creeper; he runs from life to life, like a monkey seeking fruit in the forest."⁴

This insistence on the need for vigilance is accordant with the demand for persistent training which is reiterated in the yoga system. We find, moreover, that the yogin is advised to practise his exercises daily at the same hour and in the same place.

The "restriction" of the "fluctuations" of thought, we are told, can only be effected by a calm and patient "practice." The "practice" is defined as an "exercise" the aim of which is to make the state of concentration more lasting. We read: "But this practice becomes confirmed when it has been cultivated for a long time and uninterruptedly and with earnest attention."⁵

We have spoken of daily training in meditation,

¹ Woods, op. cit., pp. 63-66.

² Woods, op. cit., p. 187.

³ Uttara Suttanta.

⁴ Dhammapada, 334.

⁵ Woods, op. cit., pp. 34-35.

but yoga also recommends certain forms of bodily training.

Much stress is laid on *breathing exercises*, like those which have become fashionable to-day as part of physical culture. By the yogin, however, they are practised as an aid to mental culture, as a means of developing concentration. Modern science has taught us that there are intimate ties between breathing and attention,¹ thus showing that there was good ground for the breathing exercises of the yogin.

The yogin "gains stability by expulsion and retention of breath."² The reference here is to slow and deep breathing, each breath consisting of the three successive phases of inspiration, pause, and expiration. It is needless to recount the directions given concerning tempo and number, but the essential principle is a gradual increase in the duration of the phases and in the number of successive acts of breathing thus controlled.³ We are told that, thanks to this practice, "for fixed attentions also the central organ becomes fit."⁴

Other recommendations deal with diet, the extremely rational basis of these recommendations being that the yogin must avoid stimulants of all kinds.

Some importance is attached to the state of the body and to its position during such exercises. Ananda Coomaraswamy quotes from the Bhagavad Gita the following passage describing the yogin :

¹ Cf. Ribot, *Psychologie de l'attention*, Paris, 1889.

² Woods, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

³ Woods, *op. cit.*, pp. 193-195.

⁴ Woods, *op. cit.*, p. 197.

“ Abiding alone in a secret place, without craving and without possessions, he shall take his seat upon a firm seat, neither over-high nor over-low, and with the working of the mind and the senses held in check, with body, head, and neck maintained in perfect equipoise, looking not round about him, so let him meditate, and thereby reach the peace of the Abyss : and the likeness of one such, who knows the boundless joy that lies beyond the senses and is grasped by intuition, and who swerves not from the truth, is that of a lamp in a windless place that does not flicker.”¹

These few lines sum up admirably the complex physiognomy of yoga, the aim of which is a complete philosophical and mystical education, but which, in pursuit of this lofty aim, by no means neglects extremely realist prescriptions, such as those which concern the bodily condition. The principle underlying these prescriptions is that the body must have “ a stable-and-easy posture.” Various postures are described as coming within this category. We have, for example, the classical attitude of the fakir, who sits with crossed legs in what we call tailor-fashion (the “ lotus-posture ”). Here is another posture : “ A man settled down rests one foot on the ground and the other is placed over the partially contracted knee—this is the hero-posture.” A number of alternative postures are described, and this shows that yoga does not attach superstitious importance to any particular posture. A posture is good when it conforms to the twofold principle of stability and ease.²

¹ Coomaraswamy, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

² Woods, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

But stability and ease are not sufficient. The posture must be truly reposeful ; must be, as we say to-day, a position of muscular relaxation. The foregoing descriptions of postures are supplemented by a recommendation that there shall be "relaxation of effort."¹ The breathing exercises and the exercises of attention are to be practised in a posture which is simultaneously stable, easy, and relaxed.

In such a posture, the body may be said to be no longer felt, and it is therefore no longer an obstacle to concentration of mind. But if the mind is to become perfectly independent, the mastery of the body must be carried a great deal further than this. Such mastery is simultaneously an effect of yoga and a cause. The mastery of the body renders concentration easier, and is in its turn rendered easier by concentration. Progress in one helps progress in the other, and conversely.

The body of the yogin will thus be rendered insensitive. "Thereafter he is unassailed by extremes"—the extremes of cold and heat, for instance.¹ The attention will be withdrawn from the organs of sense as well as from the internal organs ; or can be concentrated, at will, on one of the organs of sense. Such power of concentrating sensorial attention is depicted as resulting from the habit of mental concentration. The one is a necessary sequel of the other, and this sequence is expressed in vigorous imagery : "it is just as when the king-bee flies up, the bees fly up after him ; and when he settles down, they settle down

¹ Woods, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

after him." As a result, "there is complete mastery of the organs."¹

Concentration of sensorial attention may, in its turn, help to reinforce mental concentration. Among the first exercises, we are recommended to fix the eyes on a lamp, on a precious stone, on a star, or on some other specific object.² The adepts of yoga have realised the advantages that may be derived from visual fixation upon a bright point—in a word from that which has become one of the leading methods of inducing the hypnotic state to-day. The Hindus enumerate a number of procedures which we of the West should regard simply as methods of hypnotising: fixation of the gaze upon a vessel containing water; looking intently at a small metal sphere held close to the eyes; looking through a pin-hole at the glowing charcoal in a brazier. Which procedure happens to be adopted is a mere matter of detail; the important thing is the underlying principle.

A combination of muscular relaxation and hypnotic procedures induces a peculiar condition of physical and mental stability. Yoga has grasped the value of this condition of tranquillity, receptivity, suspension of effort, which modern disciplines likewise recommend, though not always with the competence of these old masters. The adepts of yoga are aware that the condition is not purely passive and negative, but that the "power of repose," the power of suspending mental

¹ Woods, *op. cit.*, pp. 197-198.

² Woods, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-77.

activity, is a positive action, and that its mastery can only be gained by prolonged training.

This "power of repose" is closely akin to "mental control," which is the art of preventing our thoughts from being occupied with undesirable matters. He who is able to suspend thought, to make his mind a blank, will probably have the power also of changing the current of his thoughts at will. Here we have two different aspects of the same faculty. Napoleon, whose example always occurs to us when we think of concentration, had a remarkable power of keeping one idea before his mind to the exclusion of all others. He tells us that his ideas were arranged in his head as if in a wardrobe, and he adds: "Do I want to sleep? I close all the drawers." The two phenomena belong to the same category, and it is obvious, therefore, that the "power of repose" is positive in character. It is a form of the power of "inhibition," which is now generally recognised to be the foundation of the will.

The control we thus gain enables us, for instance, to refrain from giving way to an angry impulse, to check an undesirable emotion when one or other may tend to arise. We divert the shock induced by a physical discomfort, a thwarting, an injustice, any distressing event. We do not directly resist, but we suspend our thought in order to change its direction. In the same way we can overcome sensual impulses, not so much by repelling the objects of desire, not so much by bracing ourselves against temptation, as by knowing how to veto the activity of our imagi-

nation when it tends to stray into undesirable paths.

Such control can only be gained by daily training. According to the advocates of yoga, we shall be aided by philosophical meditations concerning the essential vanity of the objects of desire ; we have to bear in mind that all the "forms" (see footnote to p. 22) which we call beings or things are but the happenings of the moment, appearances devoid of reality ; the sole reality is the unique being that underlies these appearances.

Doubtless mental control is possible quite apart from such speculations. But for minds of a certain bent they are unquestionably helpful in enabling them to resist impressions from without. We shall see that the Stoics practise similar reflections. In a more modern terminology, Tolstoy advocates the same thing :

"In moments of passion, the only way to conquer is to destroy the illusion that it is oneself that suffers and desires ; to detach the true self from the stormy waves of passion."¹

But it is above all by methodical, tranquil, and persistent concentration that yoga claims to bring deliverance to its disciples : "Seeing that for him who has no concentration, there is no tranquillity."²

¹ Journal of Leo Tolstoy, 1895-1899, translated from the Russian by Rose Strunsky, Knopf, New York, 1917.

² Bhagavad Gita, II, 66.

CHAPTER THREE

STOICISM

ONE of the most essential characteristics of classical philosophy—the philosophy of Greece and Rome—is the supreme importance attached, in ethics, to reason and to knowledge. Wisdom and science are regarded as identical, or at least the former presupposes the latter. We must know the labyrinth of the universe in order to find our way through it. The reader will remember that this demand for knowledge was likewise formulated by the Hindus, but less emphatically than by the Greeks and the Romans. “Sophos” in Greek and “sapiens” in Latin mean both “the sage” and “the knower.”

Socrates was especially insistent upon the close affinity between wisdom and knowledge. Every man, he tells us, is naturally inclined to desire and to seek that which he thinks will be good for him, to desire and to seek happiness. Now, the man who is enlightened concerning his own nature and concerning the nature of things will easily realise that his own true good is identical with the Good, with that which religion or philosophy discloses to us as such. Consequently, the man

who does ill, who seeks immediate pleasure instead of doing his duty, is simply an ignorant man, one who deceives himself. He has mistaken an illusory or secondary good for a real good. When we show him that he is mistaken he will change his mode of being and mode of action. One who gains a proper knowledge of things will thenceforward act properly. Evil is nothing more than error. He who knows, not superficially and verbally but truly, he whose being is permeated with the knowledge of things, will necessarily be a good man.

We have already had occasion to point out that this charming idea cannot be accepted without reserve. It does not always suffice that we should know what is our true good. This is a familiar experience, incorporated in popular sayings, such as: "I know and love the good, yet, ah! the worst pursue." Socrates hardly produces conviction when he tells us that if our actions run counter to our knowledge it is because our knowledge is imperfect.

It is needless to insist on this objection here, for, in the next chapter, Christianity will take up the parable. But it will be well to point out the fruitful elements in the Socratic outlook. The ideas of Socrates are akin to the idea expressed long afterwards by Bacon: "Knowledge is power." Bacon was thinking of science, and of the power it gives us over matter. The supreme merit of Socrates and other classical thinkers was their recognition that we must know our own moral nature as well as the material world which sur-

rounds us. We must know our own moral nature if we are to master it, if we are to guide it in accordance with our good. We have a stock phrase to-day that a knowledge of the laws of things must be secured before we can act on them effectively. Too often, however, those who use the phrase are thinking only of material things, of the great modern discoveries and inventions by which the control of material things has been secured—of steam-engines, electricity, aviation. We are too ready to forget that a science of our own nature, a psychology, let us say, is no less indispensable if we wish to act effectively on ourselves. Thus the famous Greek maxim, "Know thyself," comes into its own once more.

It is, however, just as well to remember that we human beings do not exist apart from nature. We are in and of the universe, subject to its laws; and we cannot acquire an integral knowledge of ourselves unless we have a sound knowledge of the universe. Substantially, this is what we recognise to-day when we contend that there cannot be a trustworthy psychology that is not sustained by the concrete sciences, and especially by biology, sociology, physiology, and pathology.

In the classical era, the Stoic school laid especial stress upon this solidarity between man and the world.

We are citizens of the city of the world. We are tiny organs in the great body of the universe:

"Light is but one, though we see it dispersed over walls, mountains, and numberless other

things. There is but one common substance, though it is distributed among millions of separate bodies. There is but one soul, though it is divided among an infinity of bodies and individuals. There is but one intelligent soul, though it seems to be divided.”¹

Thus, since we are but parts of a whole, right action presupposes an intimate knowledge of the whole. But it also presupposes something which Socrates seems to have overlooked, something on which the Stoics are always insisting, namely, an apprenticeship during which we learn how to act in conformity with our knowledge. Marcus Aurelius writes: “Thou couldst not read or write until after thou hadst learned to do so. There is all the more reason for learning how to live well.”²

One of the most original characteristics of Stoicism was the stress it laid upon a vigorous discipline, upon the education of the character. That is why, in the present handbook, we select Stoicism for special consideration from among the classical philosophies. The essence of the Stoic doctrine is to be found, first of all in the *Encheiridion* of the slave Epictetus, and secondly in the *Thoughts* of Marcus Aurelius—the imperial disciple whose method of philosophising inevitably suggests, from time to time, that the writer was a man in easy circumstances, but whose meditations are none the less instructive. Emperor and slave join hands in affirming the same truth.

¹ The *Thoughts* of Marcus Aurelius, XII, 30.

² *Ibid.*, XI, 29.

One of the first of these philosophers' precepts is that we must thoroughly grasp the distinction between the things which are in our power and the things which are not in our power. The *Encheiridion* or *Manual* begins as follows :

"Of all the things that exist, some are in our power, and others are not in our power. In our power are opinion, impulse, desire, and aversion—in a word, everything that is our own doing. Not in our power are the body, property, reputation, office—in a word, everything that is not our own doing. Things in our power are by nature free, unconstrained, unhampered ; things not in our power are weak, enslaved, subject to hindrance, dependent on others." ¹

Science, a philosophical knowledge of the world, discloses the existence of universal determinism, discloses the never-ending chain of causes and effects, and thus proves to us how numerous are the things which are not in our power :

"Whatever may happen to thee, it was prepared for thee from all eternity ; and the implication of causes was from eternity spinning the thread of thy being, and of that which is incident to it." ²

Let us add that, according to the view of these philosophers, this universal determinism is not due to the working of an unintelligent and aimless mechanism : it is providential, that is to say, it acts with foresight ; it issues from the reason which governs the world :

"Let us accept what happens just as we accept

¹ Epictetus, *Encheiridion*, 1.

² The Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius, X, 5.

a doctor's prescriptions. Doctors often order us to do distasteful things, but we do them with a good grace, in the hope of regaining health. Look upon the accomplishment of such things as nature prescribes for you, just as you look upon a doctor's prescriptions for the good of your health. In like manner accept everything which happens, however disagreeable it may seem, seeing that it is something which ministers to the health of the universe." ¹

This view of things is a consoling one ; but the sage does not seek consolation so much in his faith in the reason of the world, as in the simple recognition of an inflexible determinism. Again and again, Marcus Aurelius tells us that there are two alternative hypotheses. We may suppose that the world is the expression of a purposive and rational development, or that it is nothing more than a blind jostling of material atoms. Confident though he may be that the former hypothesis represents the truth, he insists that, were it otherwise, were the world purposeless and non-rational, the sage could be no less tranquil. As soon as we have fully accepted the notion of inevitability, all our childish revolts are quelled.

Certain things, then, are not in our power, inasmuch as they proceed from the gods or are the outcome of the movements of the atoms ; others are in our power. Our desires must be regulated in accordance with the recognition of these primary facts. Epictetus is continually returning to this point :

¹ The Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius, V, 9.

“ Ask not that events shall happen as you will ; but will, rather, that events shall happen as they do ; then your mind will be at peace.” ¹

“ You will be a fool if you wish your children, your wife, and your friends to live for ever, for then you will be wishing things not in your power to be in your power, and things not your own to be yours. . . . Exercise yourself upon what lies in your power. Our master is the man who wields authority over what we desire to have or avoid. . . . He who would be free must refrain from wishing to have or to avoid things that are in others’ power. Failing this, he will be a slave.” ²

In like manner Marcus Aurelius writes : “ It is absurd that thou dost not strive to rid thyself of thy bad tendencies, which are in thy power, while striving to escape the working of the bad tendencies of others, which are not in thy power.” ³

If we attune our wishes to this distinction, our actions will likewise be attuned thereto—our actions or our abstention from action. For, as concerns things which are not in our power, there is but one manly attitude, that which is summed up in the Stoic maxim “ *sustine et abstine* ”—be steadfast, and forgo :

“ If the thing is in thy own power, why dost thou do it ? If it is in another’s power, of whom or what dost thou complain ? Of the atoms, or of the gods ? Either complaint is equally foolish. Blame no one. If thou canst, correct thyself ;

¹ Epictetus, *Encheiridion*, 8.

² *Ibid.*, 14.

³ The Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius, VII, 71.

if thou canst not do this, correct the thing ; but if this too is beyond thy power, why complain ? Nothing should be done without a purpose.”¹

Nothing should be done without a purpose. We must not wish for the impossible, or try to do what is impossible. We must not run our heads against a wall, for we shall only injure ourselves without breaking down the wall. If we follow these recommendations, we shall certainly economise our energies ! This principle of economy of effort (“abstine”) pervades the Stoical doctrine. In modern terminology we may say that the Stoics recommend us to taylorise our moral energy :

“How much time we can gain by paying no heed to what our neighbours say, do, or think ; and by being concerned only about our own actions, that they may be just and pure. As Agathon said, we should never look round at the evil ways of others, but should follow a straight line of our own, without looking to the right or to the left.”²

This economy must not be based solely upon the crude distinction between the possible and the impossible, but must also have reference to the comparative value of actions :

“It is essential to remember that the attention given to any object should be proportional to its merit. If thou dost bear this in mind, thou wilt not be dissatisfied by having paid undue heed to matters unworthy of so much attention.”³

In like manner, we must not play the prodigal

¹ The Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius, VIII, 17.

² Ibid., IV, 18.

³ Ibid., IV, 32.

with our energies, must not squander them inconsiderately :

“ How foolish are they who have throughout life wearied themselves by vain activities, with never an object towards which to direct all their movements and all their thoughts.” ¹

As for regret and remorse, as for the tortures we inflict on ourselves on account of a past which we cannot change, these also fall within the category of the wishes that relate to things which are not in our power. They involve a futile expenditure of energy. Let us see to it that we do better in future, but let us cease to deplore having done ill in the past. Phocylides, the poet and sage who lived in the sixth century B.C., wrote : “ Do not let past evils disturb you, for what is done cannot be undone.”

In the same spirit, Marcus Aurelius penned the following exhortation : “ Be not vexed or discouraged, despise not thyself, if thy actions do not always conform to thy principles. Hast thou abandoned thy principles ? Return to them, and be glad that thou hast often been able to perform actions worthier a man, and to love always that philosophy thou professest.” ²

The same notion of economising effort must be applied to the control of the imagination :

“ Let us ask ourselves on all occasions, Is this one of the needless things ? Nor must we curtail needless actions only, but also needless thoughts

¹ The Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius, II, 7.

² Ibid., V, 9.

[imagination], for then needless action will not follow needless thought.”¹

Imagination and opinion are preeminently to be classed among the things which are within our power. There is a familiar adage: If we can't get what we like, we must like what we have. The Stoics held the same view, though on a somewhat higher plane. Instead of lamenting because we cannot change our lot, let us learn to love it. Happiness and unhappiness are, to a great extent, matters of imagination and opinion:

“What troubles men's minds is not the things that happen, but what they think about these things. Death, for instance, is not dreadful. Were it dreadful, Socrates would have thought it so. What makes people fear death is their opinion that death is terrible.”²

“Bear in mind that insults or blows are not in themselves an offence to you; what disturbs you is your belief that they are an offence. If what any one says or does makes you angry, realise that what angers you is your own thought about the matter. It should, therefore, be your first endeavour to avoid being misled by the working of your own imagination. If you can gain a little time, you will find it easier to control yourself.”³

Man's supreme privilege is his power of controlling his opinions, of guiding his imagination:

“Do not pride yourself upon a merit which is not really your own. If a horse were to say: ‘How handsome I am,’ we could put up with it.

¹ The Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius, IV, 24.

² Epictetus, Encheiridion, 5.

³ Ibid., 20.

But when you proudly say 'I have such a fine horse,' do not forget that it is the horse which is fine, not yourself. 'What is my own, then?' The use of your imagination. When you guide its workings according to nature, you may indeed be proud, for your pride will relate to something which is really your own."¹

Our troubles are caused, not so much by events as such, as by what we think of them :

"Add nothing to the first testimony of thy senses. Thou hast been told that some one has spoken ill of thee? Well, thou hast been told it; but thou hast not been told that thou hast been injured thereby. I see that my child is ill? I see it, but I do not see that there is danger. Hold fast, therefore, to the simple testimony of thy senses, adding nothing within thyself, and then there will be nothing more."²

"Consider how much more suffering we endure from our own anger and vexation at the acts of others, than is directly occasioned by the acts themselves."³

"Bear in mind that all is opinion, and that opinion is in thy power. Thou art free to change thy opinion, and then, like a mariner who has rounded a cape, thou wilt find calm, steadfastness, and an untroubled bay."⁴

Thus the control of opinion is the key to our deliverance. This theory is expressed even more laconically in the following formula :

"Suppress thy opinion, and thou suppressest

¹ Epictetus, *Encheiridion*, 6.

² The Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius, VIII, 49.

³ *Ibid.*, XI, 18 (eighth rule).

⁴ *Ibid.*, XII, 22.

the feeling, I have been injured. Suppress the feeling, I have been injured, and thou dost suppress the injury." ¹

A frequent manifestation of this fanciful embroidery of untoward happenings is the way we have of forecasting the possible consequences. But these consequences are merely "possible"; they belong to the uncertain future; they are not part of the happening in itself. In any case, they are not actually present. Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof:

"Do not vex thyself by thinking of the remainder of thy days. Avoid letting thy mind dwell upon all the hardships that may befall thee in time to come. But when anything does happen, ask thyself, Is there in this anything past bearing? Thou wilt be ashamed to answer, Yes. Next, recall this truth, that neither the future nor the past can cause thee present pain, but only the present. But the present object is merely a little thing, if thou dost keep it within due bounds, and if thou dost chide thy mind for its inability to bear so trifling a burden." ²

The various considerations which have been enumerated, if we know how to keep them present to our mind at a time when we are inclined to be unduly disturbed, will restore us to tranquillity:

"When thou art troubled about anything, it is because thou hast forgotten that all things happen in accordance with the universal nature; and that the wrongful acts of others are hurtful

¹ The Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius, IV, 7.

² Ibid., VIII, 36.

to themselves alone ; and that everything that happens, has always happened thus, and will always happen thus, and happens everywhere. . . . And thou hast forgotten that every man's mind is a god, an emanation from the supreme being ; and thou hast forgotten that nothing that we have is our own, for our children, our bodies, and our very selves are but emanations from this supreme being. Lastly thou hast forgotten that each one of us can live only in the present, and that we cannot lose more than this." ¹

Can we change our opinion of a thing simply by an act of will ? It is not always easy, when the grapes we have been trying to get are out of our reach, to say with genuine conviction that they are sour.

But this is the aim of the Stoic discipline. The Stoics wish to persuade us in such a case that the grapes really are sour—that the unattainable object of desire is not worth the trouble, after all ; or that something which hurts or vexes us is really not worth bothering about. We must learn to feel, as well as to say, " No matter ! " or " 'Tis a thing of no consequence."

The principle that underlies the method may be described as depreciation by analysis. When we decompose into its constituent parts the object which has been of so much concern to us, we shall realise that it is a matter of no moment (much as a child which has pulled a toy to pieces is disillusioned, and says, " Is that all it is ? ") :

¹ The Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius, XII, 26.

"Look well into the inwardness of things. Fail not to see the peculiar quality and the true worth of everything." ¹

"What are we to think of the meat and the other articles of food set before us? This is the dead body of a fish; that is the dead body of a bird or a pig; this wine is merely a little grape-juice; that purple robe is but sheep's wool stained with the blood of a shell-fish." ²

"Make it thy habit, as far as may be, to analyse all thy impressions, according to the rules of physics, moral science, and logic." ³

"Let me make it a rule to define or describe the object which presents itself to my experience, that I may clearly perceive what it is in its essential substance, in its nudity and in its totality and in its constituent parts, that I may be able to tell myself its true name, and the names of the parts out of which it has been compounded and into which it will be resolved." ⁴

"Lest thou shouldst be carried away by hearing a song, by witnessing a dance, or by the sight of athletes engaged in a trial of skill or strength, analyse them severally. Ask of the song, Is it this tone which charms me? And of the dance, ask, Is it such or such a step, or such or such a gesture, which thus ravishes me? Thou wilt be ashamed to confess it to thyself! Consider the athletes in like manner." ⁵

Marcus Aurelius reiterates these precepts with a persistency which suggests the obstinacy of a

¹ The Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius, VI, 3.

³ Ibid., VIII, 13.

² Ibid., VI, 13.

⁴ Ibid., III, 11.

⁵ XI, 2.

man to whom the need for exhorting himself to be indifferent is one that is ever recurring. Especially do we note such reiteration where fame is concerned, as if the emperor were well aware that an itch for fame was his besetting sin :

“ Is it the desire for fame that torments thee ?

“ See how soon everything is forgotten ; remember the infinity of time which was before thee, and will be after thee ; note the vanity of praise, and the instability and the folly of those who form opinions concerning thee ; recall the pettiness of the region through which fame can extend, seeing that the whole world is no more than a point in the universe ; how small a corner of the world is this thy dwelling, and how few will praise thee, and those of little worth.” ¹

Such arguments embody a tactic of persuasion akin to that characteristic of one of the modern methods of psychotherapeutics. The aim is to keep before the mind the considerations tending to convince us that the objects we so ardently desire are worthless. The Stoical method of depreciation is undoubtedly effective—perhaps too effective. It gives the world the appearance of having been steeped in a dyeing vat. The Stoic advocacy of ataraxia, of philosophical indifference, has often been criticised on this ground, and we shall have occasion to voice the criticism more than once in the sequel. It may at times be desirable to convince ourselves of the vanity of things ; but at other times it is no less essential to convince ourselves of their beauty.

¹ The Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius, IV, 3.

Still, we are indebted to the Stoics for having shown that opinion is the key to worth—that the value of things lies in our own minds.

“Before the rise of the Stoic philosophy,” writes Fouillée, “the general tendency had been to find the Good in the *objects* of the intelligence, in the arch-intelligence, or in the supremely desirable; but the Stoics, turning back to the moral *subject*, to the self-controlled personality, held that the Good was to be found in the will and nowhere else. Epictetus expressly declares that good and evil exist only in our will.”¹

Upon such views there is founded a discipline independent of circumstances and of the bodily condition. We have, indeed, seen that Epictetus classed the body among “things which are not in our power”; and the Buddhists, who were bolder than the Stoics in this respect, would certainly have thought Epictetus too ready to give up the game. But the Stoics, even though they failed to recognise how much power the mind can have over the body, were at least ready to insist that the mind must not regard itself as the slave of the body:

“Hindrances can only affect the body, this corpse which the soul drags about with it; they cannot influence the soul, or harm it—unless the soul should falsely imagine them to be hindrances to it likewise, and should allow itself to be mastered by this error.”²

Man, as Tolstoy says, has the faculty of “turn-

¹ Alfred Fouillée, *Histoire de la philosophie*, Delagrave, Paris, 1875, Book I, Chapter 7.

² The Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius, X, 33.

ing away his thoughts from that which troubles him." Consequently, one who has learned how to control his mind has thereby also learned, to a certain extent, how to control his body. Marcus Aurelius, in this connexion, quotes the example of Epicurus, who, when he was ill, would never talk to anyone about what he felt in this "wretched body."¹ We must never make our bodily state an excuse :

"If you wish well to yourself, you can instantly find the true sources of the happiness you desire. . . . Let nothing hinder you, neither the misconduct of others, nor opinions, nor what others say, nor even the suffering they can inflict on the mass of flesh you nourish—for that is what suffers, and let that look to it."²

Such mastery can only be acquired by daily training. Moreover, day after day, the first hour especially demands our attention, for the attitude we adopt at this time sets the course for the day. Pythagoras was well aware of the fact, for he recommended silence and meditation during the first hour after waking :

"The Pythagoreans would have us lift our eyes heavenward on rising in the morning."³

Marcus Aurelius, in his turn, tells us that the opening hour of the day is the one in which good resolutions can be made with the best effect :

"Begin the morning by saying to thyself, To-day I shall encounter busybodies, the ungrate-

¹ The Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius, IX, 41.

² Ibid., XII, 1.

³ Ibid., XI, 27.

ful, the proud, the deceitful, the envious, and the unsocial. . . . I, who know the nature of him who would wrong me, and who know him to be akin to me, not only by flesh and blood, but because his spirit like mine emanates from God, . . . cannot be angry with this kinsman of mine." ¹

He also tells us that it is good, at this hour, to dwell upon the thoughts that may help us to overcome slothful inclinations :

" In the morning, when reluctant to rise, think instantly : I wake in order to do a man's work ; am I to be vexed because I am summoned to do that which I was born to do, that which I was sent into the world to do ? Was I made only for this, that I might snuggle under the bed-clothes and keep warm ? " ²

This initial victory will pave the way for the victories of subsequent hours. Through such minor daily conquests we shall be enabled to acquire good habits. A number of these good habits must be acquired ; our energies must be ever on the watch ; all our moral faculties must be duly exercised :

" In the putting of good principles into practice, thou shouldst be like the boxer, and not like the mere gladiator ; for when the gladiator drops his sword he is defenceless, and is killed ; but the boxer has his fist ever ready, and need merely use it." ³

Thanks to the suppleness acquired by this

¹ The Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius, II, 1.

² Ibid., V, 1.

³ Ibid., XII, 9.

course of moral gymnastics, the mind will be enabled to overcome all obstacles :

“ The power within us, when it encounters an obstacle, makes of that obstacle a means for training, just as a fire consumes whatever falls into it. That which may extinguish a little lamp, becomes fuel for a vigorous blaze.” ¹

¹ The Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius, IV, 39.

CHAPTER FOUR

CHRISTIANITY

CHRISTIAN theory has been greatly influenced by classical philosophy. For the medieval theologians, Plato and Aristotle, the two great successors of Socrates, had an authority equal to that of the prophets; and it is in the writings of these Greek philosophers that we must look for the source of the rational elements of medieval philosophy. In this respect, Christianity continues the tradition of classical wisdom. But in one matter Christianity is sharply distinguished from classical philosophy. The rational elements in Christianity are of secondary importance. Christianity is not a philosophy but a religion—and it is a religion whose appeal is to the forces of the heart rather than to those of the brain. Whereas Buddha taught that the disciple who was fully awakened would find no satisfaction even in heavenly pleasures and would seek happiness only in the annihilation of desire, and whereas the Stoics advocated a discipline whose main object was to ensure impassivity, the essence of Christianity is sentiment, ardour, impetus. The dominant note of Christianity is that of the up-rushing fountain of the fervent soul.

“ But the water that I shall give him shall be in him a well of water springing up into everlasting life.” ¹

Superadded to this, we have the atmosphere of tenderness and of loving submission which breathes through all the Gospels. Is not the Sermon on the Mount an apotheosis of simplicity of heart, humility, and gentleness ?

This was the new note sounded by Christianity. This is the note to which we must listen here, deliberately ignoring the rational aspect of Christian doctrine. We shall not study the decisions of the councils, the utterances of the fathers of the church, or the writings of learned theologians, but shall turn to the *Imitation of Christ*, which is the textbook of this Christianity of the heart, and aspires to be its guide.

But there is one point of doctrine which must detain us for a moment, since it has considerable practical importance.

Socrates, as we have seen, regarded reason and the will as identical, and assumed knowledge to be the same thing as action. Evil was the outcome of error, and it was only necessary to know good in order to do it. The Stoics, likewise, were guided (more or less) by this notion.

Christianity is much less optimistic. The Christians tell us that the spirit is willing but the flesh is weak. Just as, in Christian doctrine, a great gulf is fixed between the spirit and the flesh, so a gulf is fixed between knowledge and action.

¹ John, iv, 14.

These are twin distinctions, for knowledge is in the domain of pure spirit, whereas action can only be effected by overcoming the resistance of the body. The struggle thus outlined is the supreme Christian drama. Far from agreeing with the ancients that the problem of action is solved as soon as the mind has attained to true knowledge, Christian thinkers hold that that is when the real difficulty begins.

How are we to explain this acuteness of vision? Were the Christians endowed with a special faculty for psychological observation? Are we to suppose that the classical philosophers were only interested in "the sage," in the man who was already disciplined and strong, and in his rare disciples; whereas the Christians, whose aim was the salvation of humanity-at-large and not that of a few sages merely, extended their sympathy to the multitude of weaklings? Or, finally, are we to suppose that, after the fall of classical civilisation, there was a decline in human energy; and that the members of the new European stocks, the hybrid offspring of decadents and barbarians, were really less able than had been the men of the classical age to act in conformity with reason? Perhaps all the causes named were at work, but this is a historical problem beyond our present scope. The undoubted fact is that there was a radical change of outlook. The rational will, which to the Stoics seemed all-powerful, now came to be considered the archetype of impotence. That is why the Christians appealed to the heart and to mystical energies.

According to the dogma of original sin, human nature is fundamentally vicious :

" Lord, I am nothing, I can do nothing, I have nothing of myself that is good ; but in all things I come short, and ever tend to nothing." ¹

This fallen nature is essentially powerless :

" I will confess to thee, O Lord, my infirmity.

" It is oftentimes a small thing which casts me down and troubles me.

" I make a resolution to behave myself valiantly ; but when a small temptation comes I am brought into great straits.

" It is sometimes a very trifling thing whence a grievous temptation springs up.

" And when I think myself somewhat safe, while I have no feeling, I sometimes find myself almost overcome by the merest puff of wind.

" Behold, then, O Lord, my low estate and my frailty. . . .

" This it is which often drives me back and confounds me in thy sight, that I am so prone to fall, and have so little strength to resist my passions.

" And although I do not altogether consent, yet their pursuit of me is troublesome and grievous, and it is a weariness to live thus daily in conflict.

" Hence my infirmity is made known to me, because loathsome imaginations always much more easily rush in upon me than they depart." ²

There is a chapter of the *Imitation* entitled

¹ Of the Imitation of Christ, by Thomas à Kempis, Book III, Chapter 40 (p. 181).—The page references are to the Parchment Library edition published by Kegan Paul in 1881, all the English renderings of à Kempis being from that version.

² Imitation, Book III, Chapter 20 (pp. 140, 141).

“ That there is no Security from Temptation in this Life,” and in it we read the following words :

“ Son, thou art never secure in this life ; but as long as thou livest thou hast always need of spiritual arms.

“ Thou art in the midst of enemies, and art assailed on the right and on the left.” ¹

Owing to this essential impotence of our nature and our will, we are compelled to rely upon a higher power, a power outside ourselves. We are sinners, we are sick, and that is why, like the palsied, the possessed, and the blind of Judea, we have need of the divine healer. Are we not, indeed, palsied in our will, possessed by passion, blind to the truth ? Does not Jesus himself tell us that he is the physician of souls ?

“ And when the Pharisees saw it, they said unto his disciples, Why eateth your master with publicans and sinners ?

“ But when Jesus heard that, he said unto them, They that be whole need not a physician, but they that are sick.” ²

Human nature is weak and evil ; the human will would be powerless but for the aid of the divine grace. The sentimental and mystical edifice of the *Imitation* is entirely based upon this opposition between nature and grace—an opposition which is made even more conspicuous in the writings both of the Calvinists and the Jansenists. But for the present we are concerned only with à Kempis :

¹ Imitation, Book III, Chapter 35 (p. 173).

² Matthew, ix, 11, 12.

“ O Lord my God, who hast created me after thine own image and likeness, grant me this grace which thou hast shown to be so great and so necessary to salvation, that I may overcome my very evil nature, which draws me to sins and perdition.

“ For I perceive in my flesh the law of sin contradicting the law of my understanding, and leading me captive to obey my senses in many things ; neither can I resist the passions thereof unless aided by thy holy grace, glowingly infused into my heart.

“ I need thy grace, and great grace, to overcome nature, which is always prone to evil from her youth.

“ For she, having fallen through the first man, Adam, and having been corrupted by sin, the penalty of this stain has come down upon all mankind ; so that nature herself, which by thee was fashioned good and upright, now stands for the vice and infirmity of corrupted nature ; since she tends, when left to herself, to evil and to things below.

“ For the little strength which remains is but as a spark hidden in the ashes.

“ This is our natural reason itself, wrapped around with a great mist, still able to judge between good and evil, and to discern the true and the false, though it be unable to fulfil all that it approves ; and does not now enjoy the full light of truth, nor a healthy state of its affections. . . .

“ And yet with the flesh I serve the law of sin, while I rather obey my senses than my reason.

"Hence it is that to will good is present with me, but how to accomplish it, I find not.

"Hence I often make many good resolutions ; but because I lack grace to help my weakness, through a slight resistance I recoil and fall off.

"Hence it comes to pass that I recognise the way of perfection, and see clearly enough what it is I ought to do ; but being pressed down with the weight of my own corruption, I rise not to those things which are more perfect.

"Oh, how exceedingly necessary is thy grace for me, O Lord, to begin that which is good, to continue it, and to perfect it ! . . .

"O grace truly of heaven, without which we have no merits of our own, neither are any of the gifts of nature to be valued ! . . .

"If I be tempted and afflicted with many tribulations, I will fear no evil while thy grace is with me.

"She is my strength ; she gives counsel and help.

"She is more mighty than all mine enemies, and wiser than all the wise." ¹

We are at the very antipodes of Stoicism ! The contrast is displayed in every detail of practice. Christian humility is the antithesis of the lofty pride of the Stoic. We read in the New Testament :

"But so shall it not be among you : but whosoever will be great among you, shall be your minister :

"And whosoever of you will be the chiefest, shall be servant of all." ²

¹ Imitation, Book III, Chapter 55 (pp. 218-221).

² Mark, x, 43, 44.

Moreover, Jesus displayed the same spirit in a parable of action when he washed the feet of his disciples. But we have to remember that these concrete acts of humility which Christians are recommended to perform are intended to symbolise the inner humility which must always characterise the mind of the Christian.

The moral attitude of the Stoic was that of a fighter. He believed in his own will. The Christian is convinced that his will is part of a depraved and powerless nature. He must never miss an opportunity of humiliating this proud will, and outward acts of humility are especially useful here. The Christian must follow a discipline of humiliation ; he must break within himself the pride for which he censures the pagan philosophers ; he must force his will to pass beneath the yoke. Hence the following remarkable precept, acclaimed by the author of the *Imitation* :

“ Make this thine aim, my son, rather to do the will of another than thine own.”

Thereupon à Kempis rephrases the command just quoted from the Gospel according to Mark, writing :

“ Always seek the lowest place and to be under the authority of every one.”

From this the writer passes immediately to the following precept :

“ Always wish and pray that the will of God may be wholly done in thee.”¹

In fact, the foregoing recommendations were intended merely to lead up to the recognition that

¹ *Imitation*, Book III, Chapter 23 (p. 149).

submission to men is no more than an exercise by which we are prepared for submission to God. If we surrender our will into the hands of a leader, we are learning how to surrender it to the divine grace. That is why it is better to obey than to command.

Now we can understand the significance of the disciplines of humiliation and submission imposed by the religious orders. We can understand, likewise, why Roman Catholicism demands absolute submission to the dogmas and the commandments of the Church; this submission both of thought and action is regarded as morally hygienic. From the outlook of practical morality, such demands have a twofold significance. In the first place, those who comply with them must systematically take advantage of the working of the law of habit. If we wish to tame the animal within us, we cannot do so more effectively than by imposing rules of thought and action, daily rules which we blindly accept. What matter, even if we think that these rules are sometimes absurd? The contents of the rule are of little importance so long as we have a rule to be obeyed whatever happens. But the rule has a second significance, which the reader will readily divine from the foregoing quotations. It is a means for systematic humiliation. We have to tame, not only our lower nature (our instincts), but also our higher nature (reason and will)—for this, too, being “nature” is tainted at the source. The *habit* of surrendering our own will is essential.

We see plainly enough to-day, and many people

have seen ever since the Reformation, that such a tendency brings great dangers in its train ; we understand that it can be made the pretext for a terrible abuse of power. Nevertheless, as a discipline it is potent, ingenious, and well adapted to secure its ends. The monastic rule is a masterpiece, regarded as a means for organising habits. Moreover, though there may be grave objections to the practice of an abdication of will, there is in this practice an element of psychological truth, an element quite independent of dogma. We shall learn that one of the most recent achievements of psychotherapeutics is the discovery that the will is not always our chief resource, and that we must sometimes throw the will out of gear if we wish to act upon ourselves effectively through the intermediation of the subconscious. Such is the essential principle of the discipline of auto-suggestion.

Let us note in passing that many of the practices enjoined by the liturgy, and a number of the methods of Catholic prayer, have a bearing similar to that of the monastic rules, the main difference being that the former act more directly and make an appeal to the senses. The monotonous repetitions of the liturgy, litanies, beads, bright candle flames on a dark background—all exercise a hypnotic and suggestive influence, one strictly analogous to that resulting from the scientific practice of hypnotism. In all cases alike, the aim is to put the reason and the will out of gear, in order to leave a free field for the forces which are to-day spoken of as subconscious.

There can be no doubt that the Catholic Church borrowed many of these procedures from earlier cults, but it has organised them with the mastery, with the supreme constructive faculty, which characterises all its work.

This paradoxical demand for the abdication of the will is carried further, perhaps, in the *Imitation* than in any other book :

“ And he truly is well learned who does the will of God, and renounces his own will.” ¹

Is not the very name of “ Imitation ” significant in this respect ? À Kempis does not preach duty, nor does he advocate either a reasoned course of action or an initiative of the will. He shows us that the Christian must *imitate* ; must renounce everything else in order to follow Jesus without discussion—just as Jesus himself told his disciples to leave all and follow him :

“ But he who ascribes any thing of good to himself, hinders the grace of God from coming into him ; for the grace of the Holy Spirit ever seeks an humble heart.” ²

“ Strengthen me with heavenly fortitude, lest the old man, the miserable flesh not fully subject to the spirit, should prevail and get the upper hand ; against which it will behove us to fight as long as we breathe in this most wretched life.” ³

When exposed to temptation, we can find no help in ourselves, and our only resource is to seek help from God :

¹ Imitation, Book I, Chapter 3 (p. 8).

² Ibid., Book III, Chapter 42 (p. 184).

³ Ibid., Chapter 20 (p. 141).

" May it please thee, O Lord, to deliver me ; for, poor wretch that I am, what can I do and whither shall I go without thee ? . . .

" Help me, my God, and I shall not fear, how much soever I be oppressed.

" And now in the midst of these things what shall I say ? Lord, thy will be done ! " ¹

Thus our attitude must be one of complete self-surrender :

" Whatsoever therefore presents itself to thy mind as to be desired, see that it be always with the fear of God and humility of heart that thou desire or ask for it.

" And above all thou oughtest, with a resignation of thyself, . . . to say :

" Lord, thou knowest in what way it is best ; let this or that be done as thou wilt.

" Give what thou wilt, and as much as thou wilt, and when thou wilt.

" Do with me as thou knowest, and as best pleases thee, and is most for thine honour.

" Put me where thou wilt, and do with me in all things according to thy will.

" I am in thy hand ; twist me about and turn me back again." ²

It seems hardly possible to imagine a more submissive prayer. Nevertheless, a few pages farther on, the tone becomes yet more fervently humble :

" Lord, what thou sayest is true ; thy care over me is greater than all the care I can take of myself.

¹ Imitation, Book III, Chapter 29 (p. 161).

² Ibid., Chapter 15 (pp. 131-132).

“ For he stands at too great a hazard who casts not his whole care on thee.

“ Lord, provided that my will remain right and firm towards thee, do with me whatsoever it shall please thee.

“ For whatever thou shalt do by me, cannot be other than good.

“ If thou wilt have me to be in darkness, be thou blessed ; and if thou wilt have me to be in light, blessed be thou again : if thou vouchsafest to comfort me, be thou blessed ; and if it be thy will that I should be afflicted, be thou always equally blessed.” ¹

But the most notable element in this self-surrender must be trust, which is one of the supreme virtues of the Christian. The Gospels inculcate it :

“ Behold the fowls of the air : for they sow not neither do they reap, nor gather into barns ; yet your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are ye not much better than they ? ” ²

“ Therefore take no thought, saying, What shall we eat ? or, What shall we drink ? or, Where-withal shall we be clothed ?

“ (For after all these things do the Gentiles seek :) for your heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things.

“ But seek ye first the kingdom of God, and his righteousness ; and all these things shall be added unto you.” ³

This virtue of trust does not find a place among

¹ Imitation, Book III, Chapter 17 (p. 135).

² Matthew, vi, 26.

³ Ibid., vi, 31-33.

the three theological virtues, but substantially we may look upon it as subsuming the first two of these. Is not faith, trust of mind; and is not hope, trust of heart?

The third theological virtue is charity, in its Greek signification of love. We know that, in the Gospels, love is regarded as of incomparable importance—that love is presented as the distinguishing mark of Christians:

“These things I command you, that ye love one another.”¹

“By this, shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one to another.”²

Love covers a multitude of sins. Let us remember what Jesus said of Mary Magdalene:

“Wherefore I say unto thee, Her sins, which are many, are forgiven; for she loved much.”³

We may say, indeed, that this virtue comprises all the others, that it is a living summary of the whole of Christian doctrine. Need we recall one of the best-known passages in the Gospels—better known in the word than in the deed.

“And thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength: this is the first commandment.

“And the second is like, namely this, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. There is none other commandment greater than these.”⁴

In the course of the development of Christ-

¹ John, xv, 17.

³ Luke, vii, 47.

² Ibid., xiii, 35.

⁴ Mark, xii, 30, 31.

ianity, this precept was naturally utilised to corroborate the theory of grace. For love is not an act of will, but a state of mind which does not appear to order, and one which is beyond the mastery of our conscious energies. Love, in fact, is a form of inspiration, and can, therefore, be easily regarded as the supreme manifestation of grace.

Through the importance placed upon this precept of love, Christianity is strongly contrasted with Stoicism. No doubt, all the great philosophers have inculcated justice and benevolence towards our fellows. But the Stoics, like Kant among the moderns, proposed to attain this end through impassivity. They considered that all our strength and all our dignity reposed upon the rational will. Christianity, on the other hand, repudiates the rational will. Perforce, therefore, it appeals to sentiment, to the forces of the heart.

We have dealt with the *Imitation of Christ* at considerable length, because it has been the constant companion of so many Christians, and because it describes a favourite method of regulating the inner life. But it would be a mistake to think that mistrust of human nature and the rational will was peculiar to the Catholic Church or to medieval Christianity.

The Reformation was contemporary with the Renaissance—the epoch when the moderns rediscovered classical antiquity and began to draw the waters of knowledge from classical sources. The Reformation, in certain aspects, was an effort to infuse classical rationalism into Christ-

ianity, and to insist upon the individual dignity of the Christian. Still, we must not deceive ourselves upon this matter. The Reformers, although they made a point of favouring human pride in certain respects, often railed against it none the less. Calvin pushed to an extreme the opposition between nature and grace, denouncing nature in terms quite as stringent as those used by à Kempis.

One of the chapters of *The Institutes of the Christian Religion* is entitled "Everything proceeding from the corrupt Nature of Man damnable," and this chapter contains a vigorous attack on the powerlessness of the will :

"When the will is enchained as the slave of sin, it cannot make a movement towards goodness—far less, steadily pursue it. Every such movement is the first step in that conversion to God, which in Scripture is entirely ascribed to divine grace."¹

Calvin is quite uncompromising in this matter. He insists that our acts of will, our works, cannot contribute in the slightest degree to our salvation. Such is the tenour of Chapters XV and XVIII of the third book *Institutes*, which are respectively entitled "The boasted Merit of Works subversive both of the Glory of God in bestowing Righteousness, and of the Certainty of Salvation," and "The Righteousness of Works improperly inferred from Rewards."

¹ Book II, Chapter iii, 5 (Vol. I, p. 253).—The page references are to Henry Beveridge's translation, Clark, Edinburgh, 1863, all the English renderings of Calvin's *Institutes* being from that version.

Guided by an inflexible logic, and desiring to trample on human pride, Calvinism culminates in the harsh doctrine of predestination which is "the eternal election, by which God has predestinated some to salvation, and others to destruction." ¹ On this topic, Calvin writes :

"We shall never feel persuaded as we ought that our salvation flows from the free mercy of God as its fountain, until we are made acquainted with his eternal election, the grace of God being illustrated by the contrast—viz. that he does not adopt promiscuously to the hope of salvation, but gives to some what he denies to others." ²

A century later than Calvin, lived Pascal, whose strictures upon the fallen nature of man and the pride of the philosophers were no less vehement. Consider these lapidary formulas :

"The misery of man without God."

"The happiness of man with God."

"Nature is naturally corrupt."

"The Scripture shows a Redeemer."

"The description of man—dependence, desire for independence, bodily needs."

"The condition of man—inconstancy, weariness, unrest."

Pascal is continually returning to the wretchedness of man's condition. This wretchedness is fundamental and unlimited :

"But when I thought more deeply, and when, having learned the cause of all our misfortunes,

¹ From the title of Chapter XXI, Institutes, Book III.

² Institutes, Book III, Chapter XXI, 1 (Vol. II, p. 203).

I tried to discover the reason of that cause, I found that there is a potent one, namely the natural wretchedness of our weak and mortal state, a condition so wretched that nothing can console us when we think of it attentively."

It is on account of this fundamental wretchedness, this internal void, that man feels so overwhelming a need for "diversion" in the hope of forgetting his natural condition :

"Were our condition truly happy, we should not have to seek diversion before we can be happy."

Human reason shares the fundamental weakness of human nature. Pascal denounces "the absurdity of human science and philosophy." He vents his dislike of Descartes' philosophy in the following terms : "For it is useless, uncertain, painful. And if it were true, we do not think that all philosophy is worth one hour of pain."

To the Christians, therefore, the Stoic attempt to base wisdom upon knowledge, upon science, was at once presumptuous and childish. The only source of wisdom is the divine grace.

The contrast between "nature" and "grace" may, however, be regarded as a contrast between two forms of our nature. From this point of view, even those who reject Christian dogma (be it Catholic or be it Calvinist), can recognise that a universal psychological truth is implicit in the Christian attitude.

We have already hinted at the core of the matter. Whenever the Christians express their mistrust of reason or of will, they appeal to the

forces of the heart ("The heart has its reasons, which reason does not know"¹). But this is an appeal to the forces which we now term "subconscious."²

Modern psychology, as we shall see, is coming more and more to recognise how powerful these forces are and how much help we can derive from them. A contemporary philosopher may perhaps be inclined to see in the antithesis between nature and grace one form of the antithesis between the conscious and the subconscious. Even persons with religious inclinations are prepared to accept this interpretation, holding that the religious life is deeply rooted in the subconscious, and that the subconscious is the channel along which the divine energies flow into us.

There is no paradox in the view that one of the most original and the most fertile among the contributions of Christianity was the demonstration that, as far as self-mastery is concerned, the help we can gain from reason and will is strictly limited, so that for this purpose we must avail ourselves of other forces. That much being granted, divergent views of these other forces may be taken. Some may regard them as superior to those of a natural order, whereas others may consider them to be simply manifestations of a richer form of nature.

¹ Pascal.

² See below, Part Two, Chapter I, The Conscious and the Subconscious.

CHAPTER FIVE

MIND CURE

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE AND NEW THOUGHT

WE have briefly reviewed some of the great philosophical and religious disciplines. In Part Two we shall have to consider the scientific and medical disciplines which comprise what is known as psychotherapeutics. The doctrines we propose to consider in the present chapter are intermediate between the two. Christian Science and New Thought are quasi-religious philosophies. But whereas philosophies in general aim primarily at the moral guidance of man, Christian Science and New Thought are at the same time methods for the cure of disease.

It need hardly be said that this outlook is not an entirely new one. To the primitive mind, illness was a punishment inflicted by supernatural power, a punishment for sin. In Christianity, likewise, we find this approximation of illness to sin, though not, perhaps, in quite so crude a form. When Jesus healed the sick, he did so mainly—to paraphrase his actual words—to prove that he could also remit sins.¹ Certain illnesses typify the conditions in which we are least masters of ourselves ; and it has always been

¹ Matthew, ix, 1-8.

instinctively felt that the doctrines which aimed at enabling us to acquire moral control would be far more influential if they could exhibit their power in intractable cases of illness. But what the teachers of such doctrines have always obscurely felt, they have come to realise consciously to-day, thanks to our extended knowledge of disease, especially of nervous disease, and thanks to our recently acquired understanding of the intimate relationship between illness and the mind. The advocates and practitioners of mind cure are influenced by modern science even when they repudiate it.

Moreover, the doctrines we have now to discuss, Christian Science and New Thought, are the outcome of an evolution parallel to that of scientific psychotherapeutics. Historically, they all derive from the same source, and a glance at the source is requisite if we are to understand the twofold evolution.

The common source was the doctrine of animal magnetism which originated in the eighteenth century under the influence of Mesmer. Born in 1733, Mesmer, having made unsuccessful ventures in his native land of Austria and in other countries, came to Paris. Here, at length, he was successful. "Magnetism" soon became a fashionable craze, one of those crazes which seize all classes of society.

Mesmer enunciated the doctrine of the "vital fluid." This fluid, emanating from the stars, became stored up in living bodies, and especially in the nervous system. (Disregarding the fanciful

hypothesis of its sidereal origin, we may assimilate Mesmer's "fluid" to what we now speak of as "nervous energy.") Mesmer maintained that this fluid could pass from one individual to another. In a word, he believed that nervous energy could be externalised, and that by its instrumentality one individual could act on another.


When such an action took place, the active participant was called the "magnetiser," and the passive participant was called the "subject." Mesmer conceived that illness was the outcome of a faulty distribution of the vital fluid in the different organs, the role of the magnetiser being to effect a proper distribution, and thus to restore health.

Around Mesmer's famous "baquet" (a wooden tub in which the fluid was supposed to be present, and which contained a mixture of water, iron filings, and powdered glass) there occurred the most impressive scenes—convulsions, hysterical crises, and miraculous cures. Finally, in the course of magnetic sittings, a discovery was made which was destined to be of immense importance to the development of psychotherapeutics. Induced sleep was observed, with its corollary, artificial somnambulism.

The learned societies of the day at length became interested in the matter, but were soon disgusted by the charlatanism and hubbub which characterised the mesmerist craze. The result was that the men of science ignored the possibility that magnetism might contain elements of truth, and simply burked the whole affair. This is the customary attitude of official science in such cases.

Nevertheless, mesmerism continued to develop. From it there proceeded two main currents, evolving independently for the most part, but continuing to exercise some influence on one another. In the United States, there sprang from mesmerism the philosophical or religious doctrines of mind cure, the doctrines we are about to consider. In Europe, on the other hand, the affiliations of animal magnetism or mesmerism were the scientific theories of hypnotism, suggestion, and their derivatives, that is to say, the various psychotherapeutic methods which will be discussed in Part Two.

A sort of genealogical tree will give the reader an intelligible picture of this twofold evolution :



The transition from animal magnetism to Christian Science was effected through the intermediation of a man named Quimby, a watchmaker by trade. It was in the middle of the nineteenth century, when mesmerism was fashionable in the States. Quimby became a mesmerist, and was

¹ An unbroken arrow, like that which runs from magnetism to hypnotism, indicates that the latter doctrine is directly derived from the former; a dotted arrow, like that which runs from Persuasion to New Thought, indicates that the former doctrine has exercised some influence upon the latter.

aided by a somnambulist who prescribed for the patients. Being a good observer, Quimby soon came to the conclusion that the conflicting remedies recommended by his somnambulist could only act through the imagination of the patient. After a while, therefore, he dispensed with the services of the somnambulist, abandoned animal magnetism, and gradually elaborated a novel and extremely interesting system of "mind cure." He realised that the important thing was to act on the imagination of the subject, and that the imagination is able either to suppress or to engender maladies. In a word, Quimby might have been the initiator of the methods which we know to-day as suggestion and autosuggestion.

But a very different personality was to give the movement another turn, was to give it a mystical trend by no means characteristic of Quimby's own leanings. We may regret the diversion which falsified and hindered the natural evolution of Quimby's ideas, but there were compensations. This digression into regions where scientific investigators refuse to walk was a powerful factor in the spread of the movement, and appealed to the enthusiasm of those who were susceptible to the influence of the emotion of the supernatural.

The lady who is best known by the name of Mrs. Eddy (her maiden name was Baker, and by marriage she became successively Mrs. Glover, Mrs. Patterson, and Mrs. Eddy) had a chequered career, of which Janet has given a lively account.¹

¹ Pierre Janet, *Les médications psychologiques*, Alcan, Paris, 1919, vol. I, p. 44.

She was born on a New Hampshire farm in 1821, and died in 1910 full of years and honours, having passed through numerous avatars. We find her as a medium, engaged in "a revision of the Bible by the spirits." At another time she is the wife of an itinerant dentist, and we read of his fetching from his wife's paternal home the huge cradle in which Mrs. Patterson had to be rocked to sleep. We are told of various hysterical troubles, such as somnambulism, convulsions, hallucinations, and internal maladies. Finally she became affected with a contracture of the leg and with paraplegia, which were supposed to be due to organic disease of the spine, and by which she was bedridden for several years. Then, in 1862, she made the acquaintance of Quimby, who cured her in a few days. Filled with enthusiasm and gratitude, she could now talk of nothing but her healer; her sole ambition, for a time, was to be Quimby's secretary, to publish his manuscripts, to diffuse his ideas.

But Quimby died in 1866. It was then that Mrs. Eddy began to add her own ingredients to the stew, to feel that she had a mission, to believe that new truths had been revealed to her. She regarded it as her duty to act as a healer but had a greater bent for theory than for practice. Disciples flocked round her, and worked cures in accordance with her revelations. Christian Science was born. Courses of lectures were delivered at Boston; the movement flourished greatly in that city; finally, a "Mother Church" was built there. This building bears the inscription: "The First Church of Christ, Scientist,

erected Anno Domini, 1894 ” ; Mrs. Eddy was its “ pastor emeritus.”¹ Patients and enthusiasts came by thousands. Mrs. Eddy had become the prophetess of a new religion.

She claimed to be no less. The doctrine expounded in her book *Science and Health* was presented as a divine revelation. Consequently, Mrs. Eddy held by the letter of her doctrine as the Church holds by the letter of Holy Writ. In the preface to the German edition, she went so far as to declare that for a long time she had been opposed to the idea of a translation, “ which could not adequately express her revelation of Truth in its primitive strength and purity.”

The revelation is disclosed as a participation of the human mind in the divine mind, and we are told that such a participation should be developed in us all. One of the clearest points in the doctrine of Christian Science (which is not always conspicuous for clarity) is a theory of the divine immanence pushed to an extreme. God is in man, and it is enough for man to recognise this. A better way of putting the matter is to say that the divine mind and the human mind are but one. The mind cannot be limited ; it is necessarily infinite.²

“ The term *souls* or *spirits* is as improper as the

¹ The original Mother Church now forms the front of an entirely new building, dedicated in 1906. The old church is still called the Mother Church, while the new structure, although many times larger than the old, is called the Annex.

² *Science and Health*, Chapter X, Science of Being, p. 284, 4-10.

term *gods*. Soul or Spirit signifies Deity and nothing else. There is no finite soul nor spirit.”¹

Unless we are conscious of this unity of man and God we live in a state of illusion. To dissipate the illusion is to participate in God. Attached to this theory is an interesting practice—a practice acceptable by religiously inclined persons who are not “Scientists.” Prayer is no longer to be regarded as a petition addressed to God as if he were a tax collector, a petition in which we beg him to make us certain concessions, implore him to act in our favour. It is a personal action whereby we raise ourselves to God, and dissipate the illusion which separates us from God. Mrs. Eddy is moved to anger by the ordinary view of prayer :

“How empty are our conceptions of Deity. We admit theoretically that God is good, omnipotent, omnipresent, infinite, and then we try to give information to this infinite Mind.”²

Thus Mrs. Eddy disdains prayer that finds expression in words. True prayer is a state of the soul. Taking the Scriptural text in which we are directed, when we pray, to enter into our closet and shut the door (Matthew, vi, 6), she gives it a symbolical and mystical interpretation, understanding the closet into which we are to retire to be the sanctuary of our own mind :

“In order to pray aright, we must enter into the closet and shut the door. We must close the

¹ Science and Health, Chapter XIV, Recapitulation, p. 466, ll. 19–21 (the page and line references are to the standardised text, to which Albert F. Conant's 1916 Concordance relates).

² Science and Health, Chapter I, Prayer, p. 3, ll. 17–20.

lips and silence the material senses. In the quiet sanctuary of earnest longings, we must deny sin and plead God's allness."¹

Prayer will no longer be a petition for any material goods ; it will be a becoming aware of what is. That is why Mrs. Eddy modifies the Lord's prayer as follows :

" Our Father-Mother God, all-harmonious.

" Adorable One.

" Thy kingdom is come ; Thou art ever-present.

" Enable us to know,—as in heaven, so on earth,—God is omnipotent, supreme.

" Give us grace for to-day ; feed the famished affections.

" And Love is reflected in love ;

" And God leadeth us not into temptation, but delivereth us from sin, disease, and death.

" For God is infinite, all-power, all Life, Truth, Love, over all, and All."²

When we become aware of the divine infinity, our limitations vanish. Matter and evil (sickness, sin, and death) are then recognised to be mere illusions ; by realising that they are illusions, we destroy them. It is here that Christian Science comes into line once more with Quimby's method of mind cure, but we see that it has returned wearing a mystical halo. There can be no doubt that this halo has much to do with the success of the method.

It will readily be understood that Mrs. Eddy,

¹ Science and Health, Chapter I, Prayer, p. 15, ll. 14-18.

² Ibid., Chapter, I, Prayer, pp. 16-17

a dissentient disciple of Quimby, vigorously repudiates her sometime master, and that her harshest strictures are kept for animal magnetism. The fifth chapter of *Science and Health* is entitled "Animal Magnetism Unmasked." She cannot find expressions abusive enough to describe the science of Mesmer :

"The author's own observations of the workings of animal magnetism convince her that it is not a remedial agent, and that its effects upon those who practise it, and upon their subjects who do not resist it, lead to moral and to physical death." ¹

At the time when Mrs. Eddy wrote, hypnotism was beginning to make a considerable noise in the world. Of this remedial method, Mrs. Eddy speaks in terms that are no less severe. She considers that the Gospels contain a formal condemnation of hypnotism, and indeed of all medical treatment, seeing that "Jesus cast out evil and healed the sick, not only without drugs, but without hypnotism." ²

Thus the anathema of Christian Science is extended to the whole field of physical medicine, and the mind is the only legitimate curative agent—the panacea for sickness as well as for sin. No distinction is to be made between nervous and other diseases, between functional and organic disorders. Christian Science applies to all disease, without qualification. There can be no collaboration with other methods ; "it is impossible to

¹ *Science and Health*, Chapter V, p. 101, ll. 21-25.

² *Ibid.*, Chapter VII, Physiology, p. 185, ll. 22-23.

work from two standpoints." ¹ The first thing dyspeptics must do is to give up dieting themselves. No drugs must be administered; "we must abandon pharmaceuticals, and take up ontology,—the science of real being." ²

Once more: "It is plain that God does not employ drugs or hygiene, nor provide them for human use; else Jesus would have recommended and employed them in his healing." ³

"We must pay no heed to the body. The best interpreter of man's needs said: 'Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink.' . . . Jesus healed the sick, and cast out error, always in opposition, never in obedience to physics." ⁴

In a word, the practice of medicine is impious, drug treatment is "unchristian," and "Christian Science exterminates the drug." Here we come in touch with the colossal exaggerations which endanger the very existence of the doctrine. It is called Christian Science, but the majority of Christians deny that it is Christian, and of course all the scientists deny that it is science. (No doubt Mrs. Eddy pays the latter back in their own coin, for the substance of her attack on physiology amounts to the charge that it is unscientific.)

This systematic rejection of medical treatment is the most serious of all the intolerances of the

¹ Science and Health, Chapter VII, Physiology, p. 182, l. 12.

² Ibid., Chapter VI, Science, Theology, Medicine, p. 129, ll. 21-22.

³ Ibid., Chapter VI, Science, Theology, Medicine, p. 143, ll. 5-8.

⁴ Ibid., Chapter VII, Physiology, p. 170, ll. 15-21.

Christian Scientists. Doctors have recorded instances in which patients have been left to die when medical treatment would certainly have saved them. Legal proceedings are sometimes taken in such instances, and this particular form of intolerance has been stigmatised as a social danger.

Criticism of these absolutist claims is so easy that it is superfluous. More fruitful will be an attempt to grasp the positive value of the doctrine and the practice. As regards the latter, whatever we may think of the dogmas of Christian Science (and especially of its negation of evil and of matter), and whatever we may think of the intolerance of the creed, there can be no doubt that in practice it is often remarkably effective.

Christian Science inculcates an affirmative mental outlook, one that shall be resolutely optimistic and confident. This attitude had already been recommended, though less noisily, by Emerson; and its effects upon the organism had been studied by Quimby. Christian Science must be credited with having effected the synthesis of this philosophic thought and this therapeutic method. The Scientists understand very well that the affirmative attitude they recommend cannot be assumed of set purpose on each occasion when we should like to turn it to account, as we put on an overcoat when we have to leave the house in cold weather. They know that the attitude must be persistent, and that our whole being must participate in it. By remaking Quimby's system into a religion, they have made

of it a matter of the inner life, a matter in which the whole mind is concerned. With the same end in view, they have set new forces to work, the forces which a religion can utilise. In especial, they have learned how to avail themselves of that powerful emotional impetus which so enormously enhances the force of ideation.¹ Although they have made the mistake of repudiating physical hygiene, they have recalled us to a true moral hygiene by declaring war on a superfluity of precautions against disease, upon the fear of disease which is one of the potent causes of disease.

The essential notions of Christian Science are rudimentary, and, for that very reason, they have become popular. The confidence with which the Christian Scientists affirm things contradicted by the facts of the phenomenal world (with which, for instance, they affirm the non-existence of matter and of evil) conveys a practical lesson. Since such affirmations, be they true or be they false, are effective against evil, may we not infer that we shall do well, ignoring the extant, to affirm what ought to be in order that it may be? Where Christian Science has gone astray is in its failure to understand that the affirmation of what is and the affirmation of what ought to be are two different acts of the mind; that they occur on different planes, and therefore cannot conflict. The Scientists have confounded these two acts, and have thus involved themselves in contra-

¹ Cf. Baudouin, *Suggestion and Autosuggestion*, p. 114, the Law of Auxiliary Emotion: "When, for one reason or another, an idea is enveloped in a powerful emotion, there is more likelihood that this idea will be suggestively realised."

dictions which can only be avoided by the deliberate repudiation of logic.

But we ourselves shall err if we judge Christian Science by logic. We must look upon it as an attempt to guide mankind towards a new attitude. We may be grateful to it for the endeavour to found a religion freed from all the imagery of the vale of tears, from all the obsessions with pessimism and fear, which the primitive religions have handed down to us. Christian Science is the expression of a revolt against the religions which, as Lucretius said, were born of fear; against the religions which have entailed for humanity the perennial fatality of unwholesome suggestions.

New Thought is an attempt to elucidate the core of the contribution made by Christian Science. Discarding, at the outset, the systematism and the apocalyptic elements of that doctrine, it presents itself as a philosophical movement far more in harmony with common sense.

Julius A. Dresser, another patient cured by Quimby, was familiar with the sources from which Mrs. Eddy had drawn. In 1883 he called attention to these sources, and invited his readers to return to them.¹ We come back, then, to the theories of Quimby, especially as expounded by the Rev. Warren Felt Evans in his works on mind cure.² This was the origin of a split. New

¹ In a letter to the Boston "Post," February 24, 1883; see also Julius A. Dresser, *The True History of Mental Science*, Boston, 1887; new edition, 1899.

² *The Mental Cure*, 1869; *Mental Medicine*, 1872; *Soul and Body*, 1875; *The Divine Law of Cure*, 1881; *The Primitive Mind Cure*, 1885; *Esoteric Christianity*, 1886.

Thought had renounced the dogmatic spirit of Christian Science, and therefore it could not be so simply defined. As presented by its adepts (Leander Edmund Whipple, P. M. Heubner, William Walker Atkinson, V. Turnbull, etc.), it exhibits all the gradations between a Christian Scientist heresy and the freest religious or philosophical thought. Clergymen and doctors are among its advocates. Some of the exponents of New Thought have been definitely influenced by the psychotherapeutics of persuasion expounded by Dubois—a method discussed in Part Two of the present work.

The guiding ideas of the New Thought movement may be studied in the widely circulated books by Ralph Waldo Trine and Orison Swett Marden.

First of all we have a courteously worded and conciliatory protest against the intolerance of Christian Science :

“A recognition and a use of the spiritual realities and spiritual powers potential in each life, does not, as some are inclined to think, preclude the proper use of all natural, material agencies and helps that can in any way aid in a symmetrical and well-balanced life. Take it in the matter of health or healing, for example : while I think the spiritual powers within us are more powerful, and therefore more effective in the healing line, when we are able to use them fully, than the use of any external agencies, as by the use of drugs or any other agencies of *materia medica*, it is nevertheless true that we are not always able at any particular time, on account of not yet having developed

sufficiently the ability to use them, to effect the cure we desire.

"It would seem that when one is sick the important thing is to get well, at least to all sane minds; and to get well in the quickest possible way by the use of whatever agency or agencies will accomplish this result." ¹

We find in Trine no more than the simplified essence of Christian Science metaphysics:

"God in us, the life of us and ever with us every one, working always in conjunction with us for our good, in the degree that we open ourselves to and work in conjunction with it, is the central idea of the New-Old Thought that has brought beauty of life and newness of power to countless numbers already, and will continue to do so to increasing numbers for ages yet to come." ²

"Divine Being, God, then, is the one and only life. We cannot truly say that God has life, for, as God is Life, so we also then are life—life manifesting itself in the form in existence that we denominate by the term body. Thus it is that your life and mine in its reality is one with the life of God.

"One cannot truly say, then, that man has a spirit, because he is Spirit." ³

The foundation of the doctrine is that we must render actual this participation in the divine life and, at the same time, in the divine force which will multiply our individual force. We can retain

¹ Ralph Waldo Trine, *The Winning of the Best*, Bell, London, 1912, pp. 62-63.

² *Ibid.*, p. 70.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

this idea without burdening ourselves with Christian Science postulates concerning the unreality of matter. Trine expounds the idea in his book, *In Tune with the Infinite*, in which we find the comparison of the human mind to a reservoir in a valley which receives its supply from an inexhaustible reservoir on the mountain side. This Infinite Source, this Infinite Spirit of Life is the divine mind.¹ The concreteness of the imagery shows that the philosophy is by no means of a speculative character, but is characteristically American and modern. Its spirituality, perhaps, is not lofty. Nor is New Thought strikingly original, for it no more than Emersonism popularised. Still, we must not be too ready to disdain it on that account, and must avoid being unduly critical. Let us try to understand the practical value of a doctrine whose chief aim is to be practical.

Trine's book, *The Winning of the Best*, is devoted to practical matters.

The author understands that the imagination can produce results which are real, and not imaginary :

"There are those who have exchanged fears and forebodings. gloom, and at least apparent despair, with their many times attendant bodily ailments, for peace and health and strength and newness of power. In other words they have come into a newness of life that is, to speak mildly, most interesting, and in some cases quite

¹ Ralph Waldo Trine, *In Tune with the Infinite*, new and revised edition (831st thousand), Bell, London, 1921.

miraculous both to themselves and their acquaintances.

"Is it pure imagination? Then is imagination rather a good thing to have!"¹

In other words, we must fully grasp the importance of our thoughts, which are forces:

"We are now finding that a definite active thought is a force, the same as electricity is a force, the same as vibration is a force. . . . As we think, so we become—cause, effect. Necessarily is it true, then—as is the inner, so always and inevitably is the outer."²

We must guard against undesirable thoughts, those which embody an image of an ill, and therefore necessarily invoke that ill:

"Then there comes that more pronounced and decided enemy and assassin of human endeavour and happiness—or, rather, two kindred ones, but always closely enough allied to be called twins—fear and worry. The mysterious, or the marvellous, feature of these, to me, is always the fact that by them nothing is ever to be gained, but much is always to be lost. . . .

"To set the face in the right direction, and then simply to travel on, unmindful, and never discouraged by even frequent relapses by the way is the secret of all human achievement."³

In fact, it is within our own power to cultivate the thoughts that shall create good. We may say, in a sense, that happiness is a duty:

"We are now beginning to realise that happi-

¹ Trine, *The Winning of the Best*, pp. 7-8.

² *Ibid.*, p. 15.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 20-22.

ness is a duty, and that the one who is not happy—if not chronically, at least primarily so—has either failed to grasp some of the essential principles and forces in life, or that his courage isn't up." ¹

An important requisite for one who wishes to attain this harmony is that he shall not lose a sense of proportion, shall not forget that life as a whole is what really matters. If we keep this principle constantly present in the mind, we shall no longer concern ourselves with the thousand and one secondary affairs which are the cause of most of our ills :

"I think a great reason why the quality of happiness and contentment is escaping so many lives is that we have lost, to a great extent, the sense of proportion. We are concerned and absorbed with so many things that are mere means to an end, instead of with the end itself. . . . We are concerned more with the 'fixings' of life and the means of ever increasing them, than we are with the life itself." . . . But "we can never get away from the fact that the life is the thing." ²

Apropos of these dangerous accessories, dangerous because we allow them to bulk too largely in our life, Trine quotes an admirable passage from Edward Carpenter :

"Life is an art, and a very fine art. One of its first necessities is that you should not have more material in it—more chairs and tables,

¹ Trine, *The Winning of the Best*, p. 26.

² *Ibid.*, p. 37

servants, houses, lands, bank shares, friends, acquaintances, and so forth—than you can really handle. It is no good pretending that you are obliged to have them. You must cut that nonsense short. . . . If one's life is to be expressive, one does not want lumber in it, it must not be full of things that mean nothing or that mean the wrong thing.”¹

Trine might also have referred to Emerson, according to whom, in the actual state of affairs, a fire or an auction is the luckiest thing that can happen to a property owner.

All this derives from certain scriptural precepts of which the Christian Scientists are so fond (“Is not the life more than meat, and the body than raiment?”—Matthew, vi, 25). But in this matter, as in others, Trine's interpretation is far less dogmatic than that of the Scientists.

Just as all accessories must be subordinated to life, so the body must be subordinated to the mind, but this does not signify that we are to neglect the former :

The body “is to be developed to its highest perfections and powers, and used”—but, Trine goes on to say, it must not be allowed to rule, for this will be to the detriment of one thus ruled.²

Here, once more, we are far removed from the intolerance of the Christian Scientists, although Trine's view of mind cure is closely akin to that of Mrs. Eddy :

“The healing that Jesus did, and that his

¹ Trine, *The Winning of the Best*, pp. 40-41.

² *Ibid.*, p. 60.

followers for many years after him did, and the healing that is done to-day, has been and is done through the operation of the same eternal law—the ability to rouse within the one to be healed, the realisation of the power and perfection and wholeness of the divine omnipotent life within him.”¹

But instead of the oracular and esoteric frenzy of Mrs. Eddy, we have a genial and reasonable tone. There is nothing, perhaps, to arouse our sense of the sublime, but we feel that the author is animated with a benevolent longing to promote health. He speaks with the tongue of an optimist rather than with that of a pythonesse.

Marden shares the faith which Trine expresses by the image of the two reservoirs :

“ One of the great secrets of life is to learn how to transfer the full current of divine force to ourselves, and how to use this force effectively. If a man can find this law of divine transference, he will multiply his efficiency a millionfold, because he will then be a cooperator . . . with divinity.”²

“ Man is beginning to learn that his power, his success, his happiness, are in proportion to the completeness of his consciousness of this divine connexion, and that he is mighty or weak as he keeps it inviolate and sacred, or breaks it.

“ All our troubles come from our sense of separateness from the Infinite Source. . . .

¹ Trine, *The Winning of the Best*, pp. 60–61.

² Orison Swett Marden, *The Miracle of Right Thought*, Cassell, London, 1911, p. 26.

"Fear, anxiety, worry, are positive evidence that we have lost our divine connexion and strayed from home, that we are out of tune with the Infinite, and in discord with principle."¹

Obviously this faith is an offshoot from traditional Christianity; but as far as concerns original sin and the doctrine of grace, it is definitely opposed to the Christian outlook:

"We are crippled by the old doctrine that man is by nature depraved. There is no inferiority or depravity about the man that God made. . . .

"One of the most unfortunate phases of ancient theology is in the idea of the debasement of man, that he has fallen from his grand original estate. . . . It is only his inferior way of looking at himself, his criminal self-depreciation, that has crippled and deteriorated him."²

We have moved a long way from à Kempis and Calvin, who were so insistent in their endeavours to convince us of our own weakness. No doubt the apostles of the New Thought likewise insist upon the need for calling upon the reserves by divine power; but they do not consider the power to be a gift which another may make us as an act of grace; it is our natural heritage. Thus the key to the use of this power is within us.

Marden, like other teachers, tells us that concentration of mind is the most certain guide to the mastery of the power. He also insists upon the important influence which the bent of our thoughts has upon our health:

¹ Orison Swett Marden, *The Miracle of Right Thought*, Cassell, London, 1911, p. 204.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 85-86.

“Never for an instant admit that you are sick, weak, or ill, unless you wish to experience these conditions, for the very thinking of them helps them to get a stronger hold upon you. We are all the products of our own thoughts. Whatever we concentrate upon, that we are.”¹

The bent of our thoughts determines the course of our life :

“Your whole thought current must be set in the direction of your life purpose. The great miracles of civilisation are wrought by thought concentration.”²

“I have never known a man who believed in himself and constantly affirmed his ability to do what he undertook, who always kept his eye constantly on his goal and struggled manfully towards it, who did not make a success of life.”³

Marden, moreover, understands that concentration is not the outcome of cold and abstract thought. All the forces of the heart are involved in it. Concentration can claim kinship with the wish and the dream :

“Our mental attitude, our heart’s desire, is our perpetual prayer which nature answers.”⁴

“There is a tremendous creative, producing power in the perpetual focussing of the mind along the line of the desire, the ambition.”⁵

“All men who have achieved great things have been dreamers, and what they have accomplished has been just in proportion to the vividness, the

¹ Orison Swett Marden, *The Miracle of Right Thought*, Cassell, London, 1911, p. 9.

² *Ibid.*, p. 11.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

energy, and the persistency with which they visualised their ideals." ¹

The same writer also insists that if our efforts run counter to our habitual thoughts and our hidden wishes, we shall probably fail :

" It is fatal to work for one thing and to expect something else." ²

But failure is still more likely, if our habitual thoughts are of a depressing character. Such thoughts render effort futile :

" No one can do his greatest work when his mind is cramped with worry, anxiety, fear, or uncertainty, any more than he can do his best physical work with his body in a cramped position." ³

The first thing we have to do, therefore, is to guard against the onslaughts of such imaginings. Marden, following Emerson, ⁴ distinguishes between positive (or affirmative) and negative character types. " Positives " are people who have learned, once for all, to master such diffident thoughts :

" The positive character is magnetic ; the negative repellent. Victors are always victorious mentally first." ⁵

To free ourselves from undesirable thoughts, we may likewise avail ourselves of the method of philosophical persuasion which the Buddhists and the Stoics advocated long ago in their respective fashions :

" There is only one thing to do with a disagree-

¹ Orison Swett Marden, *The Miracle of Right Thought*, Cassell, London, 1911, p. 13.

² *Ibid.*, p. 28.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

⁴ Cf. Baudouin, *The Power Within Us*, p. 18.

⁵ Marden, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-65.

able, harmful experience, and that is to bury it—forget it.

“Dwelling on unfortunate experiences, mistakes, only makes them bigger, blacker, more hideous. Forget them, thrust them out of your mind as you would a thief from your home. Say to them: ‘You have no power over me. You cannot destroy my peace. You are not the truth of my being. The reality of me is divine. You cannot touch principle, my real self. Only the good and the true are scientific realities, are absolutely real; all else, however real it may seem, is false, because there is only one Infinite Power in the universe.’ ”¹

We may add that the positive character, like every type of character, may be acquired by practice. Marden does not underestimate the importance of persistent and conscientious training. This is the central idea of his booklet, *Do it to a Finish*. Nothing could be more disastrous to the character than the habit of slackness in work; and he who allows himself to work slackly on one occasion has begun to acquire the habit of slackness, has begun to lose his self-respect:

“Botched work makes a botched life. Our work is a part of us. Every botched job you let go through your hands diminishes your competence, your efficiency, your ability to do good work.”²

“We are so constituted that the quality which

¹ Cf. Marden, *The Miracle of Right Thought*, pp. 143-144.

² Orison Swett Marden, assisted by Margaret Connolly, *Do it to a Finish*, Rider, London, 1819, p. 13.

we put into our life-work affects everything else in our lives, and tends to bring our whole conduct to the same level.”¹

“John D. Rockefeller, jr., says that the secret of success is to do the common duty uncommonly well.”²

Marden employs a suggestive little allegory designed to help us against the inclination to botch our work, against a habit of slackness :

“Neglecting or half doing things is as if a general in war time should go through a country with an army, leaving here and there a fortress untaken, and pushing on, only to find later the enemies in these uncaptured fortresses firing on his army and harassing him continually.”³

It is certainly a good thing to insist that honest work regularly performed is an important element in the formation of character, and we must not lose patience with Marden for his reiteration. We may thank both Trine and Marden for warning us against the shoddiness of our civilisation, which is perhaps even more shoddy in the United States than elsewhere. Although their own phraseology is not entirely free from the less desirable characteristics of this shoddy civilisation, they know how, on occasions, to take up their parable against it. Thus Marden writes :

“The trouble with many Americans is that they seem to think they can put any sort of poor, slipshod, half-done work into their careers, and get

¹ Orison Swett Marden, assisted by Margaret Connolly, *Do it to a Finish*, Rider, London, 1819, p. 15.

² *Ibid.*, p. 31.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 63-64.

first-class products. They do not realise that all great achievement has been characterised by extreme care, infinite painstaking, even to the minutest detail.”¹

Trine, again, quotes a passage from Walter A. Dyer (which is equally applicable to Europeans) :

“Many of us in America have lost completely our sense of proportion in regard to the question of activity. We believe that the man who is constantly working is the man who is ‘doing things.’ . . .

“Has the present glory not obscured the deeper and richer conception of life? Have we not forgotten that the enduring things arise from a development of the inner life? Many of us are using the husks and throwing away the corn. As the individuals are, so will the nation be.”²

¹ Orison Swett Marden, assisted by Margaret Connolly, *Do it to a Finish*, Rider, London, 1819, pp. 45-46.

² Trine, *The Winning of the Best*, p. 39.

PART TWO

PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC METHODS

CHAPTER ONE

THE CONSCIOUS AND THE SUBCONSCIOUS

FOR the sake of readers unfamiliar with psychological terminology, it is desirable at this stage to explain the distinction between two ideas to which frequent reference will be made in the sequel.

We give the name *phenomenon of consciousness*, or *conscious phenomenon*, to what goes on in the mind when it is something of which we are directly aware. Our sentiments, our thoughts, our wishes, and our fears; the sensations, received by way of the sense organs, which inform us regarding the outer world; memories that arise within us; our decisions and our voluntary actions—all of these are conscious phenomena. Their totality comprises *consciousness*, or the *conscious*, this term being practically equivalent to what is currently spoken of as the mind. But the affair is not quite so simple as it might seem at first sight, and we shall learn that there are objections to regarding the terms “the mind” and “the conscious” as synonymous. One example will be enough to prove this. Everyone knows that

habitual actions can, after a time, be performed unconsciously. We walk, we turn down a familiar street, mount the stairs, open the door, without thinking about these matters, or while giving very little thought to them. Nevertheless, such unconscious actions preserve all the characteristics of intelligent action, except only that we are not fully conscious of them, are not directly aware of them at the moment when they are performed. But a modicum of investigation will disclose far more remarkable phenomena belonging to the same category.

We have, in fact, what is sometimes called an "unconscious mind," but which the authors of the present work prefer to speak of as the *sub-conscious*. In some of the earlier religions we find an intimation of this idea, for it was supposed that every individual was accompanied throughout life by a "familiar spirit" or a "double." During the last hundred years, and especially during the last fifty years, philosophical study and scientific investigation have furnished important contributions to an accurate knowledge of this subject.

Coleridge in his *Biographia Literaria* (quoted by W. B. Carpenter in *Mental Physiology*) relates the famous instance of the unlettered woman who, in the delirium of fever, began to recite Greek, Latin, and Rabbinical Hebrew texts. When enquiries were made into the antecedents of this patient, it was found that in childhood she had lived for several years in the house of a clergyman whose habit it was to read various books, and among them the Greek and Latin Fathers and various Rabbinical writings, aloud to himself,

while pacing up and down a passage opening into the kitchen where the girl was at work. Though the words were unmeaning to her they had been automatically engraved upon her unconscious memory.

By hypnotism it is possible to arouse in the hypnotised subject a sort of secondary personality. The subject will then recall numerous memories which never become active in the normal state ; and sometimes he exhibits a character entirely different from that of his waking life. And yet these forgotten memories, this unsuspected character, must have been present in the subject before he was hypnotised, must have been present in a latent condition. The hypnotic personality can act upon the normal personality. Thus, when the subject is hypnotised, we may tell him that after he has awakened, he is to perform some preposterous action ; and the action will be duly performed, but the subject will have no memory of the command, and will believe his action to be spontaneous. This is known as posthypnotic suggestion.

Quite apart from hypnotism, dissociation of consciousness may occur in the waking state. Two distinct personalities seem to be functioning simultaneously within the same body. Pierre Janet, among others, has drawn the attention of psychologists to this kind of dissociation in his book *L'automatisme psychologique*. He describes a patient suffering from delirium tremens in whom dissociation could readily be induced. Janet, standing behind the patient, would tell him to raise his arm, to walk, to kneel down, to lie prone. The patient would execute all these orders un-

wittingly ; and when asked at any moment what position he was in, he would reply that he was standing motionless close to the bed. Another of Janet's patients, Lucie, did not recognise a letter she had just written.

Still more remarkable are the cases of *double personality*. A classical instance is that of Azam's patient Férida. Hysterical symptoms made their appearance in this girl when she was thirteen. On first waking she would feel herself to be in a state of mind differing from the normal ; this would last for an hour or two, then she would fall asleep for a time and reawaken in the normal state. During subsequent years the trouble was aggravated. Férida, while at work, would fall into a stupor for a few moments, and would awaken from this stupor "in her second state." She would continue her ordinary activities while in the second state, but would exhibit a very different character. She would be cheerful instead of melancholy, lively instead of apathetic. She did not complain of any physical suffering. In the second state, she remembered all that happened in the normal state, but the normal personality knew nothing of the second personality. The periods during which Férida was in the second state gradually encroached upon the time left for the normal state.

In some cases of dissociation, we may find three and even four distinct personalities. Miss Beauchamp, Morton Prince's patient, would pass through four phases in a single day, having a different character and a different outlook in the respective states. Three of her personalities were

self-contained and knew nothing of the others; but in one of her metamorphoses, the most sprightly and fantastic of them all, Miss Beauchamp was aware of the existence of the other three personalities and made fun of them.

The phenomena we have just been studying are examples of subconscious activity. There are various definitions of the subconscious, and authors differ in some respects in their opinions as to its nature. For our present purposes, suffice it to say that a phenomenon is subconscious when it exhibits all the characteristics of a conscious phenomenon with one exception, namely that of being directly known by the subject. Only by subsequent reflection and induction, or by information derived from another person, does the subject become aware of a subconscious phenomenon. We act subconsciously, for example, when what we do has the characteristics of intelligent action, of action suitably directed towards an end, and yet we are unaware of what we are doing. Another form of subconscious activity is that previously described as the outcome of posthypnotic suggestion. Here the subject is aware of what he is doing, but does not know the real reason why he is doing it.

Although its existence was first disclosed to us by the study of pathological instances, the subconscious exists in us all and at all times. Abramowski has written a book on "the normal subconscious."¹

¹ *Le subconscient normal*, by Eduard Abramowski, head of the laboratory in the Warsaw Psychological Institute, Alcan, Paris, 1914.

Experiments with Chevreul's pendulum, employed to-day as exercises in autosuggestion, give a simple demonstration of subconscious activity. Holding a small plumb-line, the subject thinks of the lead as swinging to and from (either from side to side or backwards and forwards) or as swinging in a circle. The lead swings in accordance with the thoughts of the subject, who nevertheless remains entirely unaware of communicating these movements to it.¹

As we shall learn in Chapter Four, psychoanalytical study has led to the conclusion that the subconscious is continually modifying our actions. The subconscious is responsible for our little slips and blunders. When our tongue trips, and we say one word when we meant to say another, it can often be shown that the mistake was the expression of a hidden wish. One who has just got up after a bad night, and who would like nothing better than to go to bed again, will find himself greeting his housemates by saying "good-night" to them instead of "good morning." In the chapter on psychoanalysis, additional examples of this kind will be given. We shall learn, too, that subconscious trends affect all our thought and our whole character.

The subconscious likewise asserts its influence in intellectual work, in scientific discovery, and in artistic creation. This accounts for what is usually termed "inspiration," a sudden illumination that is the outcome of subconscious incubation. Henri Poincaré studied in his own thinking

¹ For fuller details, see *Suggestion and Autosuggestion*, pp. 208-214.

the part played by the subconscious in mathematical research, and made some remarkable observations. He found that the solution of a problem would sometimes leap into his mind, "always exhibiting in such cases the same characteristics of conciseness, suddenness, and apodictic certainty." Subsequent and detailed calculation would show the solution to be accurate. It was to be presumed that the necessary calculation had already been made in the subconscious.

Traditional philosophy, when considering the question of the inner discipline, was little concerned with anything but the conscious. The philosophers noted that, among the elements of this conscious, some, such as wishes, tendencies, and habits, were continually inclined to escape from control. They tried, therefore, to discover means for the maintenance of control.

To-day the problem is seen to be at once more extensive and less simple. Now that we know that the subconscious exists, we realise that it will not suffice to establish the mastery of the will and the intelligence over the other parts of the conscious; we must likewise ensure their control over the subconscious.

The aim of the moral methods discussed in Part One was to establish *the control of the will and the reason over the remainder of the conscious*¹; the aim of the psychotherapeutic methods to be

¹ In Christian theory, the will and the reason are incompetent to achieve this end unaided, though this is the end to be achieved. However, among the moral methods, that of Christianity involves a fuller recognition than that of any of the others that the problem cannot be restricted to the domain of the conscious.

discussed in Part Two is to establish *the control of the conscious over the subconscious*.


The aim thus defined has not been a primary and direct aim of the psychotherapeutic methods, which have been mainly concerned with the treatment of nervous disorders. But the two things are closely connected. A study of the morbid conditions of the nervous system was the first thing to throw light on the subconscious, and the advances made in the respective fields of knowledge have been interconnected.

Janet was led to formulate the idea of the subconscious by a study of nervous disorders—by the examination of hysterical patients. Since then, the depths of the subconscious have been explored, above all, by the new science known as psychoanalysis. From the psychoanalysts we have learned, among other things, that the subconscious is in large part responsible for our nervous troubles, and this discovery has linked the two orders of phenomena yet more closely for investigatory purposes.

It would seem that there is a serious obstacle to self-mastery. Our subconscious would fain play the master in our household, like Tartufe in the household of Orgon; it is continually interfering with our actions. In cases of nervous disorder, the subconscious has become supreme. Undoubtedly, all illness impairs our kingship within our own realm. Nevertheless, maladies that are purely physical can be in large measure overpowered by one of strong character who refuses to submit to their dominance. "My body suffers; let the body look to its own concerns." Such was the Stoic attitude.

But when we have to deal with the neuroses, at any rate when they become severe, the position is very different. All our organs appear to be sound, there is no danger to life, and yet the very source of our moral energy seems to be affected ; the mind is, as it were, in chains, and we have lost the power to will. First of all, the power has been lost because moral energy is so closely related to the substance of nerve and brain. Secondly, and perhaps mainly, it has been lost because a neurosis is the expression of the reign of the subconscious ; and, when this dominion is established, in very truth we are no longer masters in our own household. However, in this case as in so many others, to discover the cause is to discover the cure. A better knowledge of the subconscious has taught us how to control its workings. We have learned that it may function as our good genius no less than as our evil genius—that its powers may be turned to our advantage. Hypnotism and psychoanalysis, which were primarily methods of exploring the subconscious, have given rise to new methods for the treatment of nervous disorders. In this respect, psychoanalysis has been compared to the X-rays. These latter can be used to disclose certain factors of disorder deeply hidden in the tissues, and they can also be used as a means of treatment. In like manner, psychoanalysis, throwing light on the secret activities of the subconscious, enables us to overcome the injurious consequences induced in the nervous system by these activities.

The earliest scientific methods of psychotherapeutics, *hypnotism* and *suggestion*, made a



persistent and perhaps unduly strenuous appeal to the subconscious.

The exaggeration provoked a reaction. The advocates of *rational persuasion* declare that hypnotism and suggestion tend to make the subject the slave of his subconscious rather than the master. Rational persuasion is a method working—so it is claimed—through an appeal to conscious forces alone. The reaction is itself exaggerated. Thanks to the development of *psychoanalysis* and *autosuggestion*, the appeal to the subconscious as a method of treatment has now been restored, and more than restored, to honour; but the constant aim in both cases is release—the liberation of the subject.

We have, then, to consider seriatim all the methods here touched upon: hypnotism and suggestion, rational persuasion, psychoanalysis, and autosuggestion. We shall find that their beneficial effects are by no means confined to the domain of the nervous system. We can derive from them a complete moral discipline, a system of tactics for the guidance of the subconscious and for holding it in leash. Inasmuch as nervous disorders are conditions in which the working of the subconscious is most vigorously manifested, and inasmuch as the foregoing methods enable us to control these manifestations, all the more should they enable us to dominate the subconscious in its normal activities. The methods are educative as well as curative. They furnish us with some of the most potent means for acting upon ourselves.

CHAPTER TWO

HYPNOTISM AND SUGGESTION

MUCH ink has flowed concerning these words in the past, and much will continue to flow in the future—until a clear understanding has been attained as to the nature of the phenomena they denote.

As we have already learned, animal magnetism led the way to the discovery of hypnotic manifestations. Mesmer's experiments gave rise to the dispute between the champions of the magnetic "fluid" and the champions of the "soul." The fluidists declared that the manifestations witnessed in the vicinity of the celebrated "baquet" were the outcome of the physical action exercised by the fluid that emanated from the magnetiser. The animists ridiculed the explanation, and insisted that the magnetiser's powers were exclusively moral. He influenced the subject's thoughts, and this determined all else that happened.

From these discussions there originated the theories of hypnotism and suggestion, which were the expression of an attempt to break away from the miraculous and the occult, and to explain the phenomena in terms of simple psychological or physiological laws.

The theories of hypnotism properly so called give the preference to physiological explanations, such as the effect of the visual fixation of a luminous point; the theories of suggestion lay especial stress on psychological factors, on the subject's imagination.

In 1823, probably as a pioneer, Bertrand taught that artificial somnambulism was psychologically determined, being dependent on the working of the subject's imagination. Induced sleep was due to the anticipation of sleep; waking from such sleep was due to the imaginative expectation of waking.

Abbé Faria and General Noizet voiced similar views in their respective writings. We now come to 1843, when James Braid published his book *Neurypnology: or the Rationale of Nervous Sleep considered in relation with Animal Magnetism*. Here the word "hypnotism" was used for the first time, and the book marks the beginning of the scientific study of hypnotism. In Braid's view, hypnotism and suggestion were closely connected, and hypnosis was in part due to suggestion. But Braid likewise attached considerable importance to physical methods for the production of hypnoses. In especial, he induced the hypnotic sleep by making the subject fix his gaze on a luminous point situated ten or twelve inches in front of the eyes and rather above the plane of normal vision. This caused, said Braid, a double internal and superior strabismus, which preceded the hypnosis.

At this period, the concept of suggestion was a vague one, but it was generally understood that

suggestion was the action by means of which an idea was introduced into the subject's mind and accepted by the subject. As we shall see, this definition approximated closely to the one subsequently formulated by Bernheim. Hypnosis was defined as sleep induced by artificial means. It will be shown presently that these definitions are incomplete and vague. But this much is certain, that directly the concepts had been formulated, a desire was felt to use hypnotic and suggestive procedures for the treatment of all illnesses. Since an idea could cause disease, an idea should also be able to cure it.

Despine, d'Aix, Teste, Charpignon, and others, whose names are less familiar, developed hypnotic theory and practice, and reported manifold and interesting successes. In all countries, the unofficial healers were afraid of being left in the background, and made promiscuous onslaughts on every kind of disease, including migraine, organic nervous troubles, tuberculosis, malaria, toothache, etc. The result was that towards 1865, overwhelmed by the failure of preposterous claims, suggestion and hypnotism fell into utter disrepute, and were forgotten like their precursor animal magnetism. For nearly twenty years, hardly a word was said about hypnotism; or, at best, hypnotism was regarded as a method good enough for charlatans and cranks, seeing that its use was falsified by humbug.

Towards 1880, however, Richet took up the study of hypnotism, and showed how absurd it

was to attribute all instances of hypnotic sleep to exaggeration and pretence. He considered that the phenomena of hypnotism were genuinely psychological—that when an idea was isolated in the mind it became transformed into a suggestion. Shortly afterwards, Charcot turned his attention to the matter. His work at the Salpêtrière hospital had given him an international reputation as a specialist in diseases of the nervous system, and he approached the study of these phenomena with extreme caution. He maintained that the mistakes of the magnetisers were due to their faulty method, to their failure to analyse the subtle phenomena. At the outset, he said, it was necessary to ascertain the simplest manifestations of the abnormal states under discussion, the ones which could not be simulated. He himself went on to analyse and explain the various pathological types among his own subjects. He came to regard hypnosis as an abnormal condition of the nerve centres, and as directly affiliated to hysteria. The hysterical neuroses and the phases of hypnotism were all systematised by this investigator.

Charcot described the three successive phases of hypnotism as follows :

1. Lethargy, characterised by : muscular relaxation ; diminished sensitiveness of the skin and the mucous membranes ; increased neuromuscular irritability ; and exaggeration of the reflexes.

2. Catalepsy, characterised by : a fixed stare ; immobility of the limbs, which were retained in any position impressed on them from without ;

the partial persistence of sensorial activity ; and the possibility of inducing automatic activity and also hallucinations by external stimuli.

3. Somnambulism, characterised by : the ease with which numerous contractures could be induced by slight stimulation of the skin ; impaired cutaneous sensibility ; and exaggerated suggestibility. (It is in the state of somnambulism that the subject will automatically obey the most preposterous commands).

These states could be induced by making the subject fix the eyes on something ; lethargy would pass into catalepsy when the eyes were forcibly opened ; and when the eyes were sharply reclosed, catalepsy gave place once more to lethargy. These two states could both be transformed into somnambulism by gentle friction of the nape of the neck ; and the change back from somnambulism to lethargy could be induced by gentle pressure on the eyeballs. In their totality, these three states comprised "major hypnotism." This was quite distinct from "minor hypnotism," the latter being characterised by psychological phenomena only, and its difficult study being reserved for a later date.

In 1882, Charcot expounded his theories to the Academy of the Sciences, which had on several previous occasions expressed its unqualified disapproval of animal magnetism. The Academy accepted Charcot's views, this bringing to an official close the quarrel that had so long raged round the subject of animal magnetism. The results of the official imprimatur were tremendous.

Numerous books on the subject were published. Eminent neurologists in all countries turned to the study of these new and pressing problems.

✓ In 1884, however, it became necessary to sing another tune, for the Nancy School came into existence. Bernheim was its leading figure. He had studied hypnotism under Liébeault, who treated a very large number of patients by hypnotic methods. The Nancy School refused to admit the kinship of hypnotism and hysteria, declaring that the major hypnotism described by the Salpêtrière School was not a spontaneous manifestation at all. It was an artifact, the outcome of unconscious imitation and of the contagion of example. The three phases described by Charcot had been created out of whole cloth by suggestion, the subjects being only too eager to play the parts expected of them by the stage manager. Bernheim defined hypnosis as a peculiar psychical state, capable of being artificially induced, and a manifestation of varying degrees of suggestibility—which latter was the habit of being influenced by an idea accepted by the brain and of realising that idea in action. Braid's hypnosis had been an artificial sleep with loss of memory on waking. Bernheim denied that this loss of memory was a constant character, saying that some of his subjects could recall more or less perfectly all that had taken place during the induced sleep. Moreover, he maintained that the phenomena observed during hypnosis could be produced without artificial sleep, by simple suggestion.

At first Bernheim stated his views in moderate terms. Charcot's pupils, however, criticised his experiments as superficial and unscientific, and this made Bernheim aggressive. For many years there was an acrimonious dispute between the Salpêtrière School and the Nancy School. ✓

It would be superfluous to give a detailed account of this Homeric struggle. As time passed, Bernheim's views found increasing acceptance. Other observers declared that their subjects did not present any signs of Charcot's classical three stages, and insisted that the stages must have been artificially induced. Charcot's pupils, after putting up a good fight for their master's views, came at length to recognise the error of their ways. At any rate, they no longer answered the attacks of the Nancy champions ; and major hypnotism, the outcome of drill and suggestion, vanished from the scene.

According to Bernheim and his successors, the physical methods of inducing hypnotism, such as passes, visual fixation, and pressure on the eye-balls, are secondary matters. ✓ The indispensable thing is suggestion. There are various ways of inducing hypnosis. Some methods depend wholly on suggestion. Others look to concentration, to the fixing of attention on some definite point. It is always a good thing to isolate the subject during such experiments. ✓

Faria's method was to tell the patient to sleep, saying in a commanding tone, " Sleep ! Sleep ! " Or some other imperative formula might be employed.

Braid's method of visual fixation was widely used for the induction of hypnosis. Sometimes the hypnotist exerted digital pressure on the subject's eyeballs. Sometimes he would tell the subject to fix his gaze upon a luminous point, such as a small, rotating mirror; sometimes the attention was to be fixed upon an auditory sensation, some monotonous noise, or the strains of a special piece of music. To awaken the hypnotised subject, some would pat the subject's hands, some would blow upon his eyes, and some would utter a stock phrase. There is general agreement that the hypnotist need not be endowed with any special faculty; but obviously individuals with an imposing personality are more likely to succeed in hypnotising others.

There is one common element in all the foregoing methods, namely the fixation of attention. In the physical procedures, it is the sensorial attention that is fixed; when the procedure is purely suggestive, the attention is held captive by an idea. It would seem, then, that a special modification of attention is a persistent psychological characteristic of hypnosis.

Are all persons hypnotisable? When hypnotism was fashionable, Bernheim and others gave figures which it is not altogether easy to accept. Liébeault declared that among a thousand persons, only twenty-four were refractory. There can be no doubt that some can be hypnotised more easily than others. It is easy to induce the hypnotic state in tractable and docile persons, whose habit it is to obey orders. On the other hand, people

inclined to think for themselves, intellectuals, and persons accustomed to command, can readily resist being hypnotised. No one can be hypnotised against his will.

According to modern theory, the indications for the therapeutic use of hypnotism can be compressed within a few lines. Hypnotism can not be fruitfully employed for the relief of hysterical attacks, or mania.

Grasset considered that hypnotism could be used to influence the functions of circulation and nutrition in many neuropaths. The morbid idea could be replaced by leading the mind of the subject to become fixed upon another idea, that is to say, by modifying the nature of the imagination. In other words, the modern theory is that hypnotism does not act *per se* for the relief of the symptoms of organic disease or of the lesions upon which these depend. It can act on the mind and on certain cases of neurasthenia, but no one now advises that it should be used in the education of children.

It has been asked whether a person normally free from criminal tendencies could be led, by hypnotism, to commit a crime. Most observers deny this possibility, and quote Bernheim in support of their scepticism: "Suggestion does not realise what it wishes; it realises what the mind on which it works is capable of realising."

How little do we hear of hypnotism to-day in comparison with the vogue of hypnotic phenomena from 1885 to 1896. At that time, books, pamphlets, and articles in the scientific press,

devoted to the fashionable subject, were continually appearing. Spontaneous somnambulism, mania, and paralyses of all kinds, were treated by hypnotism.

Voisin reported successes obtained by hypnotic suggestion in mental disorder, but no one else has been able to secure similar results. We are also told of the cure of hemiplegia consequent upon cerebral hemorrhage, and of the cure of locomotor ataxia.

✓ Delbœuf regarded hypnotism as valuable in moral education. Bérillon, developing this idea, applied the method to relieve children of faulty habits, such as nail-biting, etc.

✓ Forel published an interesting treatise on hypnotism. This helped to spread Bernheim's ideas in Switzerland, Germany, and elsewhere. Forel treated dipsomania by hypnotic suggestion. ✓ Moll in Germany, van Renterghem in Holland, ✓ Bechtereff in Russia, and Bramwell in England, penned treatises on the value and the effects of hypnotic suggestion. We have mentioned only the most familiar names, but hundreds of other writers have discussed the subject—many of them, most uncritically, recording fantastic cures of every possible kind.

✓ After Charcot's death in 1892, it might have been supposed that Bernheim's methods would make all the more progress. Nothing of the sort happened. Hypnotism had been discredited by the exaggerations of its advocates, and its decline was so rapid that the very hypnotists who had claimed that hypnotic treatment was simple and universally

acceptable were saying that the method was certainly valuable in a few cases of neurosis, but that, on the whole, hypnotism was dangerous.

Dubois of Berne and Dejerine of Paris and their pupils, introducing a new method of treatment based on moral influence, helped to give the death-blow to hypnotism. How are we to explain this extraordinarily rapid decline ?

It was due to the fact that a number of specialists and general practitioners, believing that hypnotic manifestations were simply physiological, fancied that hypnotism could be used for the relief of every kind of disorder. They did not understand that they were concerned with psychological problems. Pierre Janet has put the matter in its true light : " Merely for purposes of study, it was essential to leave the familiar ground of physiology, to learn a new language, to enter the domain of another science—psychology. But at the School of Medicine, psychology had no place of honour ; it was understood to be a mish-mash of literature and moralisings of which people remembered having heard vague talk in their student days. . . . Those empty discussions concerning the origin of ideas and the principles of the understanding, all those theoretical conceptions concerning a purely logical mechanism, had no bearing upon practical and realist views. Doctors could not find in psychology any explanation of the behaviour of their patients. Psychology should be the science of behaviour, and behaviour was precisely what the psychology of that day ignored. Since there was no science of behaviour,

enquirers were repelled from a study for which a knowledge of this science was essential, and there was a revival of the prejudices against induced somnambulism which Charcot had for a time been able to dispel.”¹

Another notable reason for the decline of hypnotism was the declaration of the specialists that it was an easy matter to hypnotise, and that it was quite the exception to find any one refractory to hypnotism. It was precisely because attempts were made to hypnotise every one, that hypnotism ultimately fell into disfavour. Persistent endeavours were made to hypnotise patients in whom it was impossible to induce even the slightest degree of hypnotic sleep. The patients failed to experience what they were told they must be experiencing, so that they grew weary of the treatment, and the hypnotists grew weary of treating them. To quote Pierre Janet once more :

“When patients are dissatisfied with a method of treatment, their doctors are always ready to follow suit, and to condemn the method. In this case, the doctors were not slow to explain their change of front by declaring that hypnotism was immoral. . . . The decline of hypnotism is of no importance, it was determined by accidental causes, by the disillusionment that followed upon an excess of thoughtless enthusiasm. It was no more than a temporary phase in the history of induced somnambulism.”²

We continue to believe that hypnosis, as an

¹ Pierre Janet, *Les médications psychologiques*, Alcan, Paris, 1919, vol. I, p. 188.

² *Ibid.*, p. 190.

aid to suggestion, can be advantageously employed when it is desirable to induce a good impulse, to stimulate (artificially, if need be) the functioning of a tendency which cannot be made to function merely by the subject's own will. Of course, the method is not applicable in all cases of neurosis. Hypnotic suggestion is especially successful when we have to do with a specific form of mental depression accompanied by physical troubles and by disorders of the character—the whole comprising what is termed hysteria, and, as such, familiar to psychologists and to medical practitioners. In quite a number of instances, hypnotic suggestion is an effective remedy, for it arouses and guides the latent energies. Not that it provides any fresh stock of mental or nervous energy ; it simply appeals to the resources already existing in the subject's mind, utilising the subject's automatism.

We recall the case of a female patient who came to a clinic where nervous troubles were treated solely by rational persuasion. She was an emaciated woman with a peculiar temperament ; she complained of slight contractures in the back, and of painful burning sensations in various parts of the body. After she had been kept in bed for a few weeks, with a very liberal diet and moralising treatment, she had put on flesh and looked much better, but there was no relief of the burning sensations which were her main trouble. Since no progress was being made, and the poor woman was in despair, we ventured to tell her privately that she could complete her cure by a few hypnotic

sittings. She took the hint, and shortly afterwards left for home perfectly restored.

A fortnight after the conclusion of this case, a young girl with a contracture of the arm was brought to the same clinic, with the history that in the past this trouble had been kept at bay by hypnotism, used about once a quarter. We ardently urged upon her the method of rational persuasion in vogue at the clinic, but the young woman would hear nothing of it, insisting that she had had ample previous experience of the ill success of moralising sermons. With an uneasy conscience, and with unpractised hands, we essayed a few passes, and hypnotised the patient. To our satisfaction and surprise, we found, when the girl had been awakened, that the contracture had disappeared.

In subsequent years, having seen the failure of rational persuasion in a number of patients suffering from choreic troubles, functional paralysis, and various spasmodic affections, we came to depend more and more in the treatment of such affections (generally due to hysteria) upon hypnotic suggestion. We were able to note that when persuasion had given no relief, a few hypnotic séances, setting the subject's automatism to work, were able to relieve and in some cases to cure.

To sum up, a study of the phases through which hypnotism has passed, and of the means employed to induce the hypnotic state—means ranging from mesmerism to simple authoritative suggestion—shows that all other methods are accessory to suggestion.

The conclusion is that hypnosis is not simply a subconscious state, but an artificial state induced by the hypnotist, and in large measure under the control of the hypnotist.

What are the relationships between hypnosis and suggestion?

Both alike are manifestations in which the specialist is able to turn to account certain subconscious manifestations, some of which are normal and some pathological.

The subject in a depressed, nervous condition is unable to will reflectively, or to guide his conscious life, which lacks harmony and balance. But he remains capable of certain actions, and his actions may even be vigorous when they are the outcome of subconscious workings. Some of the forms of activity may be lively and interesting. Such states, according to certain psychologists, give rise to somnambulism or to impulsive actions. Often, these may be futile or injurious, but by means of hypnotic suggestion we are enabled to turn the somnambulism or the impulsive activity to useful account. By hypnotism we bring about a somnambulist state instead of the waking state; suggestion replaces a reflective voluntary action by impulsive activity.

The time has come for a more precise explanation of what we mean by suggestion. Those who have a special interest in this question may be referred to the work in which one of the present writers has discussed the subject at considerable length.¹

¹ Charles Baudouin, *Suggestion and Autosuggestion*.

It will suffice here to give an outline of the meaning attached to the term by Bernheim and his successors, and of the meaning attached to it by contemporary psychologists. Bernheim defined suggestion as the action by means of which an idea is introduced into the subject's mind and accepted by the subject. The leader of the Nancy School thus extended the notion of suggestion by supposing that every idea, however it may have entered the mind, influences the nerve cells of the brain and operates as a suggestion. This was tantamount to confounding suggestion with all conscious thought, and the critics of Bernheim declared that suggestion as thus conceived could not be a specific psychological phenomenon. Bernheim did not trouble to clear up the matter, or to detach suggestion from the other phenomena of thought. Since no agreement was reached as to the precise meaning of the term suggestion, some writers wished to explain suggestion as the emotion produced by the inadequacy of an action, by a false step of the mind. But this explanation was unacceptable, for it speedily became apparent that suggestion, though it might be accompanied by an emotional state or engendered by such a state, was not itself the emotion.

Then an attempt was made to explain suggestion as a form of error; those who took this view declaring that a suggested idea determined erroneous ideas, whereas rational persuasion gave rise to true and good ideas or actions.

Pierre Janet, replying to this view in one of those concise phrases of which he is a master,

wrote: "To define suggestion as error, and persuasion as truth, is no less unreasonable than it would be to define imagination as sin, and memory as virtue."¹

This author, followed by other contemporary psychologists, assimilates suggestion to impulsive activity, defining suggestion as follows: "It is a specific reaction to certain perceptions. This reaction consists of the more or less adequate activation of the tendency evoked, without the completion of the activation by the collaboration of the rest of the personality."²

This definition is accepted by a number of contemporary psychologists and medical practitioners, who will agree, moreover, thanks to Janet's profound and able researches, that impulse participates in the genesis of suggestion. Impulse is characterised by incapacity for bringing the thought process to a close, incapacity for coming to a decision.

An impulsive person is conversing with you. You will find that he does not listen to your observations, but reiterates the same arguments, he will suddenly leave you, with a final repetition of his own idea, but really unconcerned as to the impression he may have made upon your mind; or, just as suddenly, he will accept your point of view, gulping down whole, as it were, all that you have said. He jumps to an agreement, without carrying his thought process to a conclusion.

This kind of mental operation is likewise classed

¹ Pierre Janet, *Les médications psychologiques*, vol. I, p. 206.

² *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 212.

among automatic actions, for the action, not being perfectly adapted, is unfinished. According to some authors, this is precisely what happens in the case of suggestion. Suggestible persons are perfectly able to subordinate their ideas to their reflections. They can deliberate and reason, but from time to time their deliberations are suddenly cut short. In that case, the idea, left to itself, does not disappear ; the tendency, being endowed with a sufficiency of independent energy, goes on developing by itself. Thus, complete realisation may ensue. But to this realisation, as to impulse, there is lacking the last perfectionment of conscious reflection.

Considering impulse and suggestion from this outlook, we find it easy to explain the difference between persuasion and suggestion. In persuasion the endeavour is to bring about in the subject a personal and rational acceptance ; in suggestion, the endeavour is to liberate an impulse.

As regards the proportion of cases in which suggestion is successful, reports naturally differ. We know that Liébeault and Bernheim declared themselves able to succeed with suggestion in 90% of their subjects. Forel reported an even larger proportion of successes. Coué's results are comparable to those of Bernheim and Forel ; but Coué tells us that the refractory subjects may be classed under two heads : first, persons who are feeble-minded, or so ill-educated that they cannot understand what the suggester is driving at ; and, secondly, persons who, though of considerable

intellectual capacity, are so flutter-brained as to be unable to fix their attention upon one idea for a few consecutive seconds.

Other authorities decline to admit that suggestibility is so widespread a phenomenon, their reserves in this respect being accordant with their general outlook. For them, readiness to accept suggestion is one of the conditions characteristic of psychasthenia, associated with disorders of the will, of belief, and of the sense of reality. They consider, also, that suggestion may take effect in cases where for one reason or another, an idea penetrates the mind so rapidly that the reflective powers (which always get to work slowly) have no time to intervene. Suggestion may likewise be effective when an idea is kept before the mind for so long a time that the reflective powers become wearied before a conclusion has been reached. ✓

Whatever the interpretations of suggestion, either in its wider or in its narrower sense, we have certainly to do with a psychological phenomenon which is nowise abnormal. Indeed, we shall recognise it to be quite an ordinary affair, if we take the trouble to understand that suggestion consists of the artificial activation of a tendency which the subject is not able to activate by the unaided powers of the will.

Substantially, suggestion means the replacement of reflective assent by direct assent. Suggestion merely awakens and guides the latent activities, utilises the pre-existent resources of the mind.

At a later stage we shall speak of the New Nancy School, which has supplemented the theory of suggestion by that of autosuggestion, the aim being to render the subject less dependent on the suggester, and to give him more self-mastery, by teaching him how to make suggestions to himself. It is supposed that thereby are removed the most serious among the drawbacks of hypnotism and heterosuggestion (suggestion conveyed to the subject by another person). It is further supposed that this new method fulfils the requisites for education in self-mastery, for the progress of an inner discipline.

Naturally there was an inclination to criticise hypnotism and heterosuggestion as tending to work in the very opposite direction—as tending to cause dissociation of the subject's mind, to create automatisms or to liberate impulses, and thus to break up what Janet has termed the "psychic synthesis." The accusation is not wholly just, for cases of duplex personality such as were described in the foregoing chapter have been successfully treated by hypnotism; the rebellious ego has been brought to heel, has been forced to obey the ego-in-chief; the tendencies and impulses which had assumed automatic activity have been put in leash once more; in a word, hypnotic suggestion has restored the inner discipline. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the treatment utilises automatism and dissociation to cure automatism and dissociation, much after the manner in which a vaccine acts.

Obviously, therefore, through a blunder, through

an error of dosage, it may happen that hypnotism and heterosuggestion will encourage dissociations instead of bringing them under control. This is no reason for the unqualified condemnation of the methods in question, but it is a reason for recommending caution and skill. It is also a reason for the discovery, if possible, of other methods which involve little or no danger to the subject's autonomy. Such alternative methods will now be considered. They fit better into the framework of our main study of the inner discipline than do hypnotism and heterosuggestion, but it was expedient to discuss the latter first—for the psychotherapeutic methods we are about to describe are the offspring of hypnotism and suggestion, though they manifest an ingratitude sometimes met with in members of the human species, and are inclined to blush when any reference is made to their parentage.

CHAPTER THREE

RATIONAL PERSUASION

THE founder of the method of moral treatment by rational persuasion was Dubois of Berne. When still quite a youthful practitioner, he became interested in the study of nervous diseases. Treatment by the interrupted current was in fashion at that time, and Dubois applied the method, but soon came to realise that the practitioner's benevolent interest, his philosophic advice, and his contagious affirmations, were the effective remedial agents rather than the electricity. Dubois went to Nancy, where he studied hypnotic suggestion under Bernheim, but he formed an unfavourable opinion of the method, considering that it imposed upon the patient's credulity. Thenceforward he treated nervous disorders by moralisation and reasoning; and a few years later he began to publish accounts of his theories and his practice, his most important work, *Les psychonévroses et leur traitement moral*, having appeared in 1904.¹ We remember the keen interest with which we ourselves made acquaintance with Dubois' strikingly original views in 1906,

¹ Masson, Paris.—English translation by Smith Ely Jelliffe and William A. White, *The Psychic Treatment of Nervous Disorders*, Funk and Wagnalls, New York and London, 1908.

when they were being expounded at the University of Geneva by a sometime pupil of his, Zbinden, whose premature death was a grievous loss to medical science.

Dubois treated his patients in a sanatorium, where they could be isolated from their families. For a few days, the patient was put on a milk diet, and was then given ordinary food. Emaciated patients were kept in bed and were given large quantities of food. But these were minor details, the central feature of the treatment being a daily and intimate conversation with the doctor. Truth and reason were the leading elements of these talks. By truth Dubois meant that the patient, who falsely imagined himself to be affected with organic lesions which made a cure impossible, was to be given a precise understanding of the nature of the malady. He must be convinced that his troubles were functional merely, that they were nothing out of the common, and that they were not of a serious character. He must learn that the palpitations of the heart, the distressing sensations in the stomach or bowel, and the various other disturbing symptoms, were induced and maintained by ideas or mental representations underlying which was an exaggerated emotionalism. We incline, said Dubois, to attach too much importance to such sensations, and make a mistake when we fix our attention upon them. This is proved by the fact that the sensations can be annulled by inhibitive autosuggestion, whereas they can be intensified by expectation, and can even be produced anew by mental representation.

The human machine, being extremely complicated, is liable to get out of order from time to time ; but if we have faith in our own health we shall be able " to dismiss all our little ailments with a smile." When such physical disorders are not grave enough to create intractable organic disease of the nervous system, and yet the patient believes himself to be affected with such disease, it is because moral disorders are superadded. In Dubois' opinion, the moral troubles that act in this way are not so much the graver misfortunes of life, as the repeated pinpricks and disagreeables of everyday existence. Good sense and philosophy can reestablish the tottering moral equilibrium. Owing to false interpretations, neurotics have contracted bad mental habits ; they pay undue heed to sensations which healthy persons likewise feel, but ignore. No matter whether it be some trifling pain in the digestive organs, or a heart which beats too vigorously or beats irregularly, or an occasional disturbance of sleep—in nervous patients, thanks to expectant attention, such symptoms are a persistent source of anxiety. Soon this anxiety becomes an obsession ; and the obsession, without the patient being aware of the fact, finds expression in action. When we take into account the superaddition of various emotional states, such as moodiness, ill-temper, and the like, we shall readily understand that complicated and multiform disorders can be born of these false ideas.

Dubois insists that medical practitioners must be sufficiently competent as psychologists to

demolish this edifice, built up out of fears and erroneous theories. He holds, as we have already learned, that the principal lever to be employed in this work of demolition is persuasion by logical and truthful conversation. The doctor must avoid the frequent repetition of physical examination, the administration of drugs, the use of the sound and other instruments, and the analysis of the secretions. In neurotics, all these manœuvres will only confirm the patient's preconception that his disorder is the outcome of some incurable organic lesion. As soon as a thorough physical examination has been made, and as soon as the doctor is satisfied that the disorder is dependent upon functional nervous troubles, it is essential to begin a course of moral treatment, whose chief aim must be to help the patient to keep the idea of health before his mind, and to cherish this idea until it has been realised. During the progress towards cure, the practitioner will stress all the little advances, will magnify them with deliberate optimism in order to encourage the patient, so that by degrees it will be possible to dispel the idea of illness dependent on incurable lesions and to replace it by the notion of health, by that of a complete restitution of health and of normal powers. Thus we shall have attained the essentials of cure, which consist in the replacement of the false mental representations entertained by neurotics, by healthy and philosophical ideas. What is the nature of the latter? According to Dubois, they derive from a precise understanding of biological determinism.

Man never has had and never will have more than one aim, happiness. Most people seek happiness in the gratification of their wishes, in enjoyment; others work in expectation of a future life; others attempt to reconcile the service of God and Mammon. Most human beings are the artificers of their own suffering, but they are also subject to the yoke of heredity; we all have to pay ancestral scores. Mankind, athirst for happiness, has a natural inclination towards moral development; education is essential for the promotion of this development. What is innate in children is the outcome of the influences of intra-uterine life, of heredity, and of atavism. Parents are apt to be annoyed when they see the hereditary defects of their offspring. But, by a wisely planned education, vicious tendencies can be corrected, and the moral sentiments can be awakened. Persuasive influence can create a durable morality.

“As soon as we realise that people are only what they think themselves to be, in virtue of the mentality they owe to their inherited disposition and to their education, we shall excuse them for their blunders and their faults.”¹

We are too ready to explain mental defects by physical causes, by intoxications, by material processes; that is why our remedies are apt to be ineffective. Within a variable time, abnormalities of the mind can be rectified by mental orthopaedics. Nevertheless, far too many educationists and far too many doctors are ignorant of the way

¹ Dubois, *op. cit.*, 3rd edition, 1909, p. 68.

in which the moral nature of children or of patients can be influenced. Their own minds being perverted by absolutist notions of liberty, they exhibit a spurious benevolence which masks disapprobation or contempt. If we would change the state of mind of one who suffers, or who has fallen by the way, "we must love the afflicted person like a brother, must take him under the aegis of an intimate conviction of our common human weakness."¹

Considering the exalted character of these ideas, it is natural that the name of "moralising treatment" should have been given to the psychotherapeutic method of Dubois and of those who practise on kindred lines. (In the United States the method has a great vogue.)

Dubois and his disciples "moralise" neurotics by discussing with them the problems of freedom, responsibility, egoism, altruism, and many other philosophical topics. They declare that if we are guided by well-chosen tendencies, by the sentiments of the True and the Good and the Beautiful, the net upshot of these guiding ideas will be that we shall be enabled to grasp and to develop the moral notions that can conduct us towards a definite goal, namely, the regulation of our behaviour towards ourselves and others. Morality is essential both for the hale and for the sick. The latter must train their reasoning faculties, and must learn not to think so much about themselves. The simplest way of achieving this is to seek happiness in care for others, in love of our neighbour.

¹ Dubois, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

But in Dejerine's view, the foregoing methods do not make sufficient allowance for the affective life. At the outset of his career, Dejerine employed Dubois' plan of treatment, but subsequently he reproached his friend for being unduly rationalist. Here is his own confession of faith :

" I have long been convinced that in ethics and philosophy everything has been said and reiterated for centuries, the foundation being always ratiocination, so that we never get beyond the same point. I believe in the benevolent influence that can be exercised on one person by another, and this is for me the foundation of psychotherapeutics. We cannot cure a neurasthenic, we cannot change a mental state, by syllogisms or by reasoning. You will cure your patient when he has confessed his whole life to you, when he has complete trust in you. Between your reasoning and the acceptance of this reasoning by the patient, there intervenes an element of supreme importance. I refer to sentiment, for it is sentiment which creates the atmosphere of confidence without which (in my opinion) there can be no psychotherapeutics. I mean something which, without being suggestion, is akin to suggestion, and is likewise akin to faith. What we witness is an application of the familiar text, ' Thy faith hath made thee whole.' " ¹

Dejerine's observations are most interesting, but I think his criticism of Dubois unwarranted. The latter, in addition to his excellent work, *Les*

¹ André Thomas Dejerine, *Psychothérapie*, Baillière, Paris, 1912, p. 67.

psychonevroses, has published a little manual entitled *L'éducation de soi-même*.¹ Herein we find an account of something more than the cold intelligence. There are fervent and engrossing passages concerning tolerance, pity, kindness, and altruism. As Pierre Janet insists, this excellent sermon might be even more useful to the hale than to the sick. Dubois is justified in his repeated declarations that his method of treatment is one which "makes the strings of all the moral sentiments vibrate in unison with those of the reason."²

Thanks to the influence of Dubois, during the opening years of the twentieth century, there was a notable output of books expounding, with more or less modification, these ideas of treatment by rational persuasion and moralisation.

In Zurich, Auguste Forel dwelt at considerable length on the importance of arousing in children a detestation of evil and falsehood, so that all persons, whether well or ill, could advance towards a lofty human ideal, instead of devoting their time to profitless brooding upon the nervous and functional disorders which are so multiform and so futile because they are magnified by habit.

In Germany, Strümpell, Oppenheim, and others, have laid much stress on the importance of the influence exercised by psychic manifestations upon the nature of the different nervous disorders.

In France, Dejerine and his pupils, Camus and Pagniez, discussed at great length the same

¹ English translation by Edward G. Richards, *The Education of Self*, Funk and Wagnalls Co., New York and London, 1911.

² Dubois, *Les psychonévroses*, etc., p. 264.

theories of treatment, and a careful study of their writings discloses little difference between their views and those of Dubois. Bernheim during the later years of his life, and Paul Emile Lévy, influenced by Dubois' accusation that they practised "thaumaturgy," made use of the latter's methods.

In the United States, before the days of Dubois (and as a counterblast to the theory and practice of Mrs. Eddy) Warren Felt Evans, Dresser, and Henry Wood showed that a person with a powerful mentality could help one with a feebler mentality to overcome undesirable modes of thought. These were the real progenitors of the New Thought movement. In October 1906, the need to provide an ecclesiastical and medical counterpart to Christian Science, led two rectors of the Emmanuel Episcopal Church of Boston in collaboration with certain regular medical practitioners to found the "Emmanuel Church Health Class." This blossomed into the "Emmanuel Movement," run by an association of clergymen and doctors. The latter examined the patients and then shepherded them to the churches of those pastors who had specialised in the treatment of moral ailments. The movement spread to churches in Detroit, Buffalo, Chicago, and other towns in the States. Morton Prince, Cabot, and Putnam, accepting the truth of these theories of moral treatment, fought against the exaggerations of Christian Science, insisted on the need for paying due respect to the demands of scientific medicine, and gave a valuable impetus to the study of the social causes of idleness, alcoholism, and crime. Other psycho-

therapeutic manuals, too numerous to mention, have appeared in the United States and in Britain. In so far as they differ (and there is, in fact, a good deal of divergence among them), it is because they pay much attention to religious exercises side by side with medical treatment in the strict sense of the term. This amalgam of rational persuasion and religion gives a peculiar stamp to American psychotherapeutics.

Such moralising methods naturally encountered scepticism and criticism. Their exponents were accused of ignoring scientific medicine, of paying too little heed to the classification of the neuroses and to the essentials of diagnosis; their errors in this respect were said to be due to their ignorance when faced with the complexity and the diversity of the psychoneuroses.

With the panacea of moralisation, disease was attacked indiscriminately; and if a neuropath was not cured he was labelled insane. The moralisers declared that patients suffering from "inorganic" nervous disorders had no lesions at all in their organs, the absence of tissue abnormalities being the distinctive characteristic of such affections. But, said the critics, the assertion was a rash one, for we have no evidence that what are termed "functional" nervous troubles may not be the outcome of transient lesions of a kind which we are not yet able to detect by microscopical examination. Besides, there are diseases which, on cogent grounds, are supposed to be microorganismal, although no microorganisms

have yet been discovered in them. As far as real mental disorder was concerned, Dubois and his pupils declared it to be refractory to any form of psychotherapeutics, and they were equally hopeless as regards the treatment of epilepsy.

Nevertheless, said the critics, mental disorder and epilepsy needed psychological treatment even more urgently than did the simple neuroses. The persuasionists, finding their method ineffective in these cases, had been content to exclude them from treatment. Dubois was fond of talking of the mistakes that had been made by the sufferer from nervous disorders, and this recalled the hoary notion that illness was a punishment for sin. It was antipathetic to the spirit of modern civilisation to look upon illness in such a light. Even if, as the moralisers declared, neurotics were apt to interpret their troubles falsely, this did not prove the moraliser's own theory correct.

Granted that the affirmations of medical science were hypothetical, those of philosophy (such as rational determinism with its conceptions of the Good, the True, and the Beautiful) were also open to dispute and were in many cases the outcome of a passing fashion. Besides, Dubois' persistent animus against suggestion, his obdurate mistrust of the suggestive method, was really amazing (the present writers consider this criticism well-grounded). Dubois is never weary of explaining that suggestion appeals only to the automatic tendencies, and not to the will, to logic, to the sublimest faculties of our personality. If the patient is cured by suggestion, little is gained ;

actions that are the outcome of suggestion are unstable; and they are of little worth, for conscious will has done nothing towards augmenting the patient's moral energy. Notwithstanding Dubois' disapproval of suggestion, he had recourse to it in exceptional cases. As a matter of fact, whether he liked it or not, his advice was addressed to the subconscious, although he could never make up his mind to use the term. But Dubois' pupil, Zbinden, wrote:

"The patient suffering from sleeplessness must not try to coerce sleep by saying to himself: 'I will to go to sleep!' This exertion of the will causes cerebral excitement, which prevents sleep, and leads to a condition of exhaustion and depression. Realising the futility of effort, the patient must practise autosuggestion so as to achieve an attitude of impassivity."¹

We seem to be listening to Coué speaking of his experience of the use of autosuggestion in his practise at Nancy. But it is not merely Zbinden, the pupil, who has recourse to autosuggestion as a curative measure. Dubois himself, addressing tubercular patients who do not take their food properly, does so in the following terms:

"To the consumptive who declares himself unable to eat because he has no appetite, I do not give medicine. I tell him again and again that he must fix his mind on the idea that it is essential for him to eat; that he can only escape the grip of the malady by strengthening himself. I

¹ H. Zbinden, *Conseils aux nerveux*, Kundig, Geneva, 1912 p. 41.

hammer the following notions into his head : ' A consumptive who is losing weight, is on the downward path ; but it is a happy augury when such a patient puts on flesh.' I add, ' Now, you can't put on weight unless you take your food properly. I can't eat it for you. That would not pad your bones any better.' The patient answers, ' I'll try to eat, Doctor.'—' Try ! ' I say, ' What's the use of that ? The word " try " conveys a doubt of the result, and the doubt will not fail to reduce your impetus. What you must say to yourself is, ' I am going to eat ! ' ' ' ¹

But this is precisely what we do in our auto-suggestive sittings. Knowing that the will of these patients is affected by the enfeeblement to which all their faculties are a prey, we address ourselves directly to the subconscious.

Consider, again, Dubois' advice to the sufferer from aphonia :

" You will have your aphonia whenever you suggest to yourself that you will have it ; and you will keep it just as long as you like. But if you cultivate the opposite idea, if you repel the notion of a relapse, you will be cured. It is for you to choose ! "—Dubois tells us that the patient to whom he spoke in these terms was cured. She had no relapse, although the weather was bitterly cold.²

In our autosuggestive sittings, we use similar phraseology, without employing the word " choose." Dubois, realising that this particular

¹ Dubois, *Les psychonévroses*, etc., p. 303.

² *Ibid.*, p. 374.

exposition of his method, which is said to be one of "rational persuasion," may have aroused a doubt in the reader's mind, goes on to say :

"I have shown that there is a suggestive element in the influence thus exercised on the patient suffering from various functional disorders of the alimentary system, the heart, or the respiratory apparatus. The primary indication is to arouse in the patient's mind the conviction of a cure. I cannot, in every case, prevent the patient from reaching this conviction by way of blind faith ; but the fault, if fault there be, is not mine. For my part, I see to it that my assertions have a rational basis, and I say nothing to the patient which is not the expression of my own conviction, founded upon my psychological and physiological knowledge. I try to make the patient follow the same course of reasoning ; to enlighten him ; to make him understand the influence of mental representations upon the organic functions."

But in a subsequent passage (p. 479), Dubois speaks more sympathetically of autosuggestion. He writes :

"Anyone who wishes to grasp the importance of psychotherapeutics, must follow up his cases, and must listen to his patients' conversations. He will then learn how much the doctor can effect by a word or a smile. He will realise the extreme malleability of the mind, which is a misfortune when it leads to morbid autosuggestions, but a splendid thing when it leads to health."

The concession or avowal thus made by the chief exponent of moralisation or rational

persuasion is of especial interest to the writers of the present work. We regard it as an extremely valuable indication of the importance of the conjoined use of methods appealing to the conscious and to the subconscious. One who wishes to employ either method exclusively is a bad observer and a poor psychologist, and invites failure.

All reserves notwithstanding, there can be no doubt that Dubois' writings and the success of his methods drew the attention of medical practitioners to the importance of psychological treatment. He was the founder of psychotherapeutics by moralisation, and he and his disciples have to their credit numerous and striking successes in the cure of psychoneuroses. He was a conscientious practitioner, one who always examined his patients with extreme care; and his recommendations issue from a salutary philosophy and indicate a genuine loftiness of mind. During fifteen years, we have frequently had recourse to Dubois' methods and are convinced that it has been of great value in the relief of nervous troubles.

Among our case-notes we find the history of a sufferer from intractable dyspepsia. A man of five foot seven, his weight was only eight stone, and he was so much emaciated that he looked like one in the last stage of consumption. He was suffering from aphonia, general asthenia, and hypochondria. He was treated by psychical re-education, in conjunction with rest in bed for part of the day, and with hyperalimentation.

In three months he had gained forty pounds, and the man who had hardly been able to walk when the treatment began was now able to climb mountains. His digestive troubles had disappeared. The melancholy had been replaced by a feeling of energy and a sentiment of tranquillity.

Another notable case was one of œsophageal spasm which had long resisted treatment. This patient came to attend the clinic of the late Dr. Jentzer. The lady arrived at the beginning of the Great War, just before Jentzer's departure for the front. Her height was five feet three and her weight only five stone. Her weakness was extreme, and her emaciation positively alarming. The case was, indeed, most unpromising, for experience had shown that œsophageal spasm was apt to prove refractory to moral treatment. Even Jentzer was by no means hopeful. The first sittings were not followed by any improvement, and it seemed as if the end must be at hand. One morning, however, when we had spent two hours at the bedside, doing our utmost to convince the patient that she was able to swallow, we were rewarded by seeing her swallow and retain a cup of milk. Improvement continued, and within a few weeks she had gained nearly a stone. Some time later, at a chance meeting with the patient, who had now fully recovered, we found it difficult to recognise her, for she had been little more than a skeleton on first arrival.

At about the same period we were consulted by the uncle of an officer on active service who was

extremely uneasy because of the nephew's loss of weight. The patient, a man of thirty-five, was as lean as a fakir, but the fakirs remain motionless, whereas this officer was perpetually on the go. His trouble was of a very different kind from that of the last patient. It had originated from his reading a work written by a monk who said that the secret of good health was to eat very little. The young man applied the precept literally, and no one had been able to get the idea out of his head. We tried to convince him of the danger he was in, but in vain. A few months later, we learned from the uncle that the patient had succumbed.

An analogous case came under our notice a few years later. It was that of an elderly Hungarian spinster, whose reluctance to take food we were unable to overcome, and who died not long afterwards.

We have seen two other cases of anorexia nervosa, which showed the extreme danger of such maladies, though they were due to purely ideational causes.

To set off against these failures, there have been gratifying successes in analogous cases treated by rational persuasion or by autosuggestion.

One such instance was that of a young woman in whom a difficult labour had been followed by the onset of a dread of going out alone, of other phobias, and of various painful symptoms. Hitherto the case had been refractory to treatment, but rational persuasion effected a cure in four months.

Many other examples of obsession, anxiety, etc., relieved by the same method, might be quoted, but to recount all these details would take us beyond the scope of this book.

Zbinden describes multiform cases of functional disorder of digestion. All practitioners who understand the influence of the mind upon the digestive system will have noted many interesting cases of the relief of such disorders.

The method of rational persuasion has been frequently employed to develop the moral and intellectual powers of children and young persons suffering from hereditary nervous troubles. Success has been obtained even in serious cases.

Our colleague Dr. Castanié of Vevey, has been able to effect numerous cures thanks to the exercise of a calmative and tonic influence upon the nervous system. He recorded one of these cases in a paper published in 1908.¹ It was that of a young man of twenty, a degenerate, with vicious tendencies and delusions unfitting him for social intercourse ; but after a few months' treatment he was able to return to family life.

To sum up, the method has been found effective in every kind of mental or bodily disorder belonging to the group of neuroses ; with patience and skill, such cases can be relieved and often permanently cured. Of course, a few will prove intractable, for rational persuasion is not a panacea. Dubois and the other practitioners of moralising treatment are inclined to tell us only of their successes.

¹ Castanié, *L'influence de la rééducation dans un cas grave de psychasthénie*, "Archives de Psychologie," Kundig, Geneva, Vol. VIII.

Their theory is that the cures are due solely to the ratiocination, but there can be no doubt that, in some instances at least, a different factor is at work. Sometimes the most potent influence has been travel and change of scene ; sometimes it has been rest in bed ; sometimes tedium ; sometimes the personal influence of the specialist. One or more of these factors indubitably contribute to the cure in many instances ; and the lack of any one of them may account for a failure.

There can be no doubt, too, that the body-weight plays an important part. In many cases, if, in an emaciated neurotic, we can bring about a gain in weight, we shall put the patient on the high road towards cure, or consolidate a cure that has been effected by other means. In the case of patients affected with enfeeblement of the power of attention and of the capacity for a synthesis of the intelligence, with a consequent inclination towards dissociation of consciousness—the great group of hysterical patients—our personal success with the method of rational persuasion has been small. We have the melancholy satisfaction of knowing that Zbinden and Jentzer fared little better with patients belonging to this category, so long as they were content with the exclusive use of moralising treatment ! We are firmly convinced that where the treatment of hysteria is concerned, the practitioner who cannot boast of the authority of a Dubois or a Dejerine will be wise to make a deliberate appeal to the patient's subconscious. That method is more effective in such cases precisely because, by

regulating the psychological automatism, it goes directly to the root of the mischief in hysteria.

It is nevertheless true that Dubois, thanks to his personal qualities of mind and heart, was able to achieve remarkable cures ; and he was able to stimulate other notable practitioners, such as Dejerine and his pupils, and a number of psychologists and therapists in various lands, to adopt the same methods.

A distinguished exponent of clinical medicine, he was bold enough to insist that the psychotherapeutic method is the correct method to employ in all functional disorders, even in those of a grave character. In this respect he was a pioneer.

Finally, it must be remembered that the scope of his teaching greatly transcends that of therapeutics in the strict sense of the term. We have said enough to show that the essence of his originality lay in the manner in which he reduced one kind of therapeutics to a sort of education in practical philosophy. But it is obvious that this same education in practical philosophy can find an application in other fields than therapeutics—in everyday life, in fact. The reader will have noted that Dubois touches upon the subject of the education of youth. Much of his advice is manifestly applicable to the education or reeducation of the self, to the conduct of life. Every one, ill or well, can find aid in Dubois' writings, should he wish to overcome some weakness in himself, or perhaps to radiate a beneficent influence on others.

F. W. Foerster refers to this matter as follows:
"One of the best-known works on the education of the self was written by a neurological specialist, Dubois of Berne. Nor is this a chance connexion. In his medical practice that author was able to note the intimate association between the nervous degeneration characteristic of our epoch, and the loss of a moral ideal. A lofty conception of life will suffice, in many persons of neuropathic temperament, to keep the nervous disorder latent, for it saves them from the unwholesome effects of numerous caprices."¹

¹ Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster, *L'école et le caractère*, Délachaux and Niestlé, Neuchâtel, 4th edition, 1914, p. 21. (This is the French translation by Pierre Bovet, of *Schule und Charakter*, 11th edition, Zurich, 1912.)

CHAPTER FOUR

PSYCHOANALYSIS

BREUER AND FREUD'S Studies of Hysteria (the German original, *Studien über Hysterie*, was published at Vienna in 1895) was the pioneer work on psychoanalysis. This psychological method was directly derived from the studies of hypnotism and suggestion that were then in progress. Freud, who was to be the leader of the new school, had worked at the Salpêtrière under Charcot; he had witnessed some of Bernheim's experiments at Nancy; and he had been interested in Pierre Janet's early investigations into psychological automatism and the nature of the subconscious. But some of Breuer's researches were to direct Freud into an original path.

Breuer's patient, the first subject to be psychoanalysed (before the term "psychoanalysis" had been invented) was a young woman of twenty-one suffering from hysteria. During the two years she was kept under observation she exhibited multiform hysterical symptoms: contracture and anaesthesia of the right arm and leg, or sometimes of the left arm and leg; disturbances of the ocular movements and of the visual capacity; difficulty in holding up her head; nervous cough.

Especially conspicuous was an intense dislike for food; and for several weeks in succession she found it impossible to take any fluid, though tortured with thirst. She was also liable to fits of abstraction during which she would murmur phrases that seemed to bear upon intimate personal matters. Breuer noted down some of these mutterings, and repeated the words to the patient when she had been hypnotised. As he had hoped, she automatically supplemented these words, disclosing the existence of fantasies or day-dreams built up upon scenes of her actual experience. When she had thus externalised what had been weighing upon her mind, she was to some extent relieved. Certain symptoms disappeared after, in the course of the hypnotic sittings, she had recounted the events which had given rise to the symptoms in question. Thus, under hypnosis, she spoke of her English governess, whom she had disliked. One day, in the governess's room, she had seen a horrid little dog drinking out of a glass. Since that day she had been unable to drink. Understanding, now, that this had been the cause, she asked for and drank plenty of water, awaking from the hypnotic trance while she was drinking. This difficulty no longer troubled her henceforward.

In like manner, Breuer studied some of the other symptoms from which the patient was suffering, to find that they could be explained in the same way, as the outcome of emotions which had been partly or completely forgotten but could be recalled in the hypnotic state. All her troubles

dated from a period when she was nursing her sick father. Her eyes had been filled with tears at the moment when her father had asked her the time; her tears made it impossible for her to see the hands of the clock, and the clock-face appeared to her to be magnified; this incident was the starting-point of all the disturbances of vision. On another occasion she was sitting beside her father's bed, resting her right arm on the back of the chair. Falling into a doze while in this attitude, she had a dream or hallucination of a snake which she wished to drive away, but she was unable to do so because her right arm seemed to her to be dead. This was the origin of the contractures and the anaesthesia.

Breuer and Freud were thus given a clue to follow up in their researches concerning hysterical symptoms. Hitherto these symptoms had been generally regarded as the capricious, the irrational, consequences of a morbid state of the nervous system. Breuer and Freud's discovery showed that they had a meaning, a psychological origin. But the patient is unaware of that origin. In a word, the symptoms are dependent on sub-conscious mentation. Breuer compared them to posthypnotic suggestions. When the subconscious cause was brought into the field of consciousness, the symptom disappeared and the patient was relieved. In a popular lecture, Freud uses a fine image when he says that "hysterical patients suffer from reminiscences." He continues:

"Their symptoms are the residues and symbols of certain happenings which have produced

traumata. In fact, they are commemorative symbols. A comparison will help you to understand what I mean. The monuments with which we adorn our cities are commemorative symbols of the same kind.

“ Thus, in London, in front of one of the great railway termini, Charing Cross, the traveller will see an elaborately carved Gothic column, the cross which gives its name to the station. In the thirteenth century, Edward I, bringing back to Westminster the body of his wife Eleanor, had one of these crosses erected to mark the site of each place where the body had rested at the end of a day's march. Charing Cross was the last of such commemorations of the funeral march. In the same city, at the north end of London Bridge, is a tall pillar of comparatively modern date, known as The Monument. This was built in memory of the great fire of London, which destroyed a large part of the British capital in the year 1666. These and similar monuments are commemorative symbols, like the symptoms of hysterical patients. The comparison is valid up to a certain point. But what would you think of a contemporary Londoner who should pause to mourn in front of the monument recording a stage in Queen Eleanor's funeral procession, instead of busying himself about his own affairs with the zeal demanded by the conditions of modern life, or instead of delighting in the company of some young and charming queen who had taken his own heart captive? What would you think of a twentieth century Londoner who should shed

tears before The Monument recording the destruction of the city of his ancestors, ignoring the fact that a new and greater and far more splendid town had long since risen upon the ashes of the old ?

“ Hysterical patients and other neurotics behave like the two Londoners of my hypothetical instance. Not only do they harbour remembrances of painful incidents of a time long past, but they are tied to the past by affective bonds. They cannot free themselves from the past, and in its favour they neglect reality and the present.”¹

But Freud is not satisfied with the disclosure of the part played by subconscious elements in the causation of neurosis. He asks why it is that these elements, linked as they are to emotions of great importance to the subject, do not form part of the subject's conscious life. The answer is to be found in the Freudian theory of *repression*, according to which we automatically thrust down into the subconscious, matters which it distresses us to think of, and especially matters we are ashamed of, such as some of our sexual emotions.

These discoveries were to lead to a theory of wider scope, to a theory of the evolution of instinct.

For some time ere this, biologists had been inclined to repudiate the dogma that instinct is immutable, or at any rate to repudiate it as far

¹ Sigmund Freud, *Ueber Psychoanalyse*, Deuticke, Leipzig and Vienna, 1909, 5th edition, 1920 ; French translation by Le Lay, *La psychanalyse*, Sonor, Geneva, 1921. (The German version was a translation of five lectures delivered in 1909 at Clarke's College, U.S.A., and published in the American “ Journal of Psychology ”.)

as the lower animals were concerned. Spalding's experiments on newly hatched chickens (1873) and Forel's observations on ants (1874) had shown that instinct may be suppressed or transformed. William James introduced similar conceptions into the psychological study of man, and showed that they could be turned to useful account in education. Freud's contribution to the topic was his demonstration of the link between these two notions of *suppression* and *transformation*. The suppression of an instinct is apparent merely. In reality it is "repressed," and finds vent in other forms. If we contemplate the sequence from the other end, we see that an instinct which undergoes transformation is, generally speaking, an instinct which has been thwarted. Thus we grasp the course of the evolutionary process.

The attention of the Freudian psychologists has been concentrated on the sexual instinct. Freud regards this instinct as a sheaf of secondary tendencies (autoerotism, homosexuality, algolagnia or sado-masochism, inspectionism and exhibitionism, etc.), which exist to some extent even in normal individuals, but in them are grouped around the primary tendency—sexuality properly so called. The psychological history of this complex instinct is outlined by Freud in his book *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie*.¹ When the main current of sexuality is repressed, a derivation of the instinct towards one or more of the secondary components ensues, and thus a

¹ Deuticke, Leipzig and Vienna, 1905; English translation by A. A. Brill; *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex*, 3rd revised edition, New York, 1918.

perversion arises. We are far too apt to regard perversions as physiological and inborn. Methodical analysis of the subconscious shows that in most cases they are psychological and acquired, and are curable by the analysis. Thus, for various more or less obscure reasons—sentiments of shame, respect, etc.—the sexual impulse may be forcibly repressed in a man who from childhood onwards has been intensely attached to his mother; the repression may give rise to a homosexual perversion, which may, however, disappear if the primary cause is brought into the patient's consciousness. The counterpart of this phenomenon may be witnessed in a woman who is intensely attached to her father.

In many cases, however, the perverse tendency is in its turn repressed. It may become completely unconscious, so that it is manifested only in dreams, and even then appears under a mask. When this happens, the instinct seeks for new modes of expression, and one of these is *neurosis*. According to Freud, every neurosis is the outcome of a perversion that has been repressed, and has manifested itself in a derivative form; that is why he tells us that "a neurosis is the negative of a perversion." But derivation may take place along happier lines; it may assume a moral, artistic, intellectual, or religious form. In that case Freud speaks of it as a *sublimation*, which is a successful derivation, whereas a neurosis is an unsuccessful derivation. Freud means just the same thing by the formula which has made a good deal of noise in the psychoanalytical world: "A

neurosis is an unsuccessful work of art ; a work of art is a successful neurosis." This does not imply that the work of art is pathological, for perhaps success is the criterion which best distinguishes the normal from the pathological. The normal is a happy evolution, a successful adaptation.

Energy that is primarily sexual thus resembles a stream which has broken up into several channels. These channels may tend to coalesce, or to diverge yet more widely. If a dam obstructs one of the channels, the waters that were passing through it are diverted into the collateral channels, and a new derivation may even become necessary.

Whereas Freud studied the possible transformations of the sexual instinct, the attention of one of his disciples, Adler, was mainly concentrated upon another instinct, the desire for the expansion of the personality, the *will-to-power*. In Adler's view, neurosis must mainly be regarded as a means by which the neurotic dominates his or her associates—the toilsome and awkwardly conceived means.¹ A boy who is being coddled for a sore throat may develop symptoms of asthma, his subconscious aim being to keep every one at his beck and call. We may note in passing that it is dangerous to pamper the sick unduly, and especially dangerous to provide a superabundance of pleasant remedies when we have to deal with

¹ Alfred Adler, *Ueber den nervösen Charakter*, Bergmann, Wiesbaden, 2nd edition, 1919 ; English translation by B. Glück and J. E. Lind, *The neurotic Constitution*, Kegan Paul, London, 1921.

sick children. If we do this, the patient, innocently and unwittingly, will be prone to make a cult of the illness which is the source of so many pleasures.

Adler does not forget that a mother may pamper her children in the unconscious determination to tyrannise over them. People complain of their troubles, and neuropaths in especial complain of their troubles, in order to weaken others by arousing in them the emotion of sympathy. On the other hand, solicitude for others is often the mask for a wish to exert authority.

In many cases, a phenomenon which Freud explains as a function of the sexual instinct, is explained by Adler as a function of the will-to-power. But this divergence of outlook need not make us sceptical as to the value of psychoanalysis. The study of the subconscious discloses positive relationships between certain phenomena but at their margins these relationships are open to conflicting interpretations. As concerns the neuropath's dreams and day-dreams, Adler detects the same relationships as Freud; but for Adler sexual allusions are here nothing more than a symbol of the subject's will-to-power. Let us suppose that one of our subjects is a woman who refuses to play the woman's part in life, and repudiates maternity. Freud would incline to consider this refusal a manifestation of homosexuality; Adler would regard it as a "masculine protest," and would say that the woman's desire to play a man's part in life was no more than an expression of the will-to-power.

It is important to note that these masquerades of the will-to-power are preeminently signs of the lack of power. This consideration brings us to another noteworthy idea of Adler's, that of *compensation*. The imaginative creations, the "guiding fictions," which influence us all, are, in essence, mental compensations for some form of bodily inferiority. In especial this is true of the morbid ideals of neuropaths. Our will-to-power seeks compensation precisely where we feel the weak spot in our armour. What Freud says of the sexual instinct, Adler says of the will-to-power—where it is thwarted, is where it seeks and finds a derivation. We have a notable illustration in the case of the stammerer who fancies himself an orator, and who, if he be a Demosthenes, may actually develop into an orator.

Defects of vision may lead people to become "mental visualisers." In actual fact, at schools of pictorial art, the percentage of pupils with visual anomalies is amazingly high. Among the students of human nature, Adler is akin to La Rochefoucauld and Nietzsche; he is one of those bitter and cynical observers who are fond of detecting the selfishness or the will-to-power that lurks behind all human sentiments. And yet Adler's view does not lead to pessimism any more than does that of Freud. We learn from Freud that the sexual instinct can undergo sublimation; but the same is true of the will-to-power. The differences between these two authors must not make us overlook the parallelism of their outlooks. Both tell us that the neuropath is out

of touch with the real world and social life, is maladapted because he is guided by an egoistic principle. Freud calls it the "pleasure principle"; Adler speaks of it as the "power principle." In both cases alike, the task of psychoanalysis is to restore adaptation, and in doing so it promotes altruism. Adler tells us that psychoanalysis is "education in confraternity" (*Erziehung zur Gemeinschaft*). We can understand, therefore why it is that in Jung's synthesis,¹ which stresses the common elements in the respective doctrines of Freud and Adler, especial emphasis has been laid on the idealist aspect of psychoanalysis, upon its work as artificer of altruism. Such, too, is the position of Maeder.² Above all it is the attitude of the Swiss pastors who have adopted the practice of psychoanalysis. In especial I may refer here to Pfister, who insists upon the educative aspects of psychoanalysis,³ and has devoted a special study to the topic, under the significant title, "A new Road to the old Gospel."⁴

¹ Carl Gustav Jung, *Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido*, Deuticke, Leipzig and Vienna, 1912; English translation by Beatrice M. Hinkle, *The Psychology of the Unconscious*, Moffatt, Yard, & Co., New York, 1916, Kegan Paul, London, 1921.

² A. Maeder, *Guérison et évolution dans la vie de l'âme*, Rascher, Zurich, 1918.

³ Oskar Pfister, *Was bietet die Psychanalyse dem Erzieher?* Klinkhardt, Leipzig and Berlin, 1917; English translation by Charles Rockwell Payne and F. Gschwind, revised by Barbara Low, *Psychoanalysis in the Service of Education, being an Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, Kimpton, London, 1922; see also *La psychanalyse au service des éducateurs*, French translation by Pierre Bovet, Bircher, Berne and Leipzig, 1921.

⁴ Oskar Pfister, *Ein neuer Zugang zur alten Evangelium*, Bertelsmann, Gütersloh, 1918; French translation by H. Malan, *Au vieil Evangile par un chemin nouveau*, Bircher, Berne and Leipzig, 1920.

Thanks to the twofold impetus given by Freud and Adler, psychoanalysis has been widely diffused of late years. First of all, as we have already learned, Jung attempted a synthesis of Freud and Adler. According to Jung, in each one of us psychic energy is expended in two directions, centripetal and centrifugal, towards the ego and towards the outer world. These two flows of energy are complementary, but in many instances one is over-developed at the cost of the other. Thus there arise two contrasted types of being, both incomplete: the *introverts*, in whom the flow towards the self and the inner life is excessive; and the *extroverts*, in whom the outward current of energy is excessive. In Jung's view, Adler's theory is especially applicable to introverts; Freud's theory, to extroverts.

It seems clear, however, that this conception of the two types is one of those simplifications which are unduly abstract. When we look into details, we see that our psychic energy is not expended in two directions only, but flows along a great number of channels. We have a multiplicity of different instincts, and much ingenuity is now being devoted to the attempt to elucidate the possible transformations of every one of these—just as Freud and Adler have respectively studied the transformations of the sexual instinct and the instinct for power.

In such a spirit, British psychoanalysts have studied war neuroses.¹ They hold that in this

¹ William Halse Rivers, *The Repression of War Experiences*, "Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine, Section of

type of neuroses the instinct of self-preservation takes the place given by Freud to the sexual instinct in ordinary neuroses. In war, it is the instinct of self-preservation which is repressed by the "censorship," here taking the form of the conventions of military life; just as in civil life the sexual instinct is repressed by the conventions of morality. But whatever the instinct concerned, analogous mechanisms are at work. In the frequent instances of loss of memory following upon a shock (explosion, bombardment), the part played by the repression of an extremely painful experience is obvious. The hysterical symptoms that arise in soldiers during war time have as their common characteristic that they simulate the infirmities (blindness, deafness, paralysis) which make it necessary to send a man away from the front. Anxiety states, on the other hand, are the expression of a conflict between instinct and the conscious. Thus, according to MacCurdy, these states are commoner in officers; whereas hysterical symptoms tend to occur with especial frequency in the rank and file. However this may be, we are indebted to these British psychologists for their pioneer studies of the metamorphoses of the instinct of self-preservation.

On the other hand, Pierre Bovet, in his book, *The Fighting Instinct*,¹ inclines rather to adopt the

Psychiatry," London, 1918; John T. MacCurdy, *War Neuroses*, Cambridge University Press, 1918; Millais Culpin, *Psychoneuroses of War and Peace*, Cambridge University Press, 1920.

¹ Pierre Bovet, *L'instinct combatif*, Delachaux and Niestlé, Neuchâtel and Paris, 1917; English translation by J. Y. T. Greig, *The Fighting Instinct*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1923.

evolutionary standpoint. His results are remarkable. He considers it possible to verify concerning the fighting instinct what Freud affirms concerning the sexual instinct. The fighting instinct may disappear when it has not been exercised (in the games that assume a combative form, for instance) at the time of its normal appearance, during childhood that is to say; and after it has developed it may be thwarted in one way or another. But this instinct, though apparently suppressed, has really been transformed. It undergoes derivation into the more active sports; is intellectualised in such tranquil games as chess and also in the study of history; is idealised in the writing and reading of epics, and in moral struggles. In all these cases, following Freud's terminology, we can speak of sublimations. The derivative or sublimated instinct betrays its origin by the use of the metaphors of war. Just as St. Theresa transfers the imagery of love into the world of mystical thought, so does Loyola, the old campaigner, retain the language of a man-at-arms when he becomes a soldier of God, and he founds his "Company of Jesus" upon the model of an army. The Salvation Army is a still more typical instance.

Additional monographs, on the lines of Bovet's *The Fighting Instinct*, but devoted to the study of other instincts, are a desideratum.

We see then that psychoanalysis contributes :

- (1) a theory of the subconscious ;
- (2) a theory of the evolution of the instincts.

Upon this twofold theory, has been founded a twofold practice. Psychoanalysis has become :

- (1) a method of *treatment* ;
- (2) a method of *education*.

The essential purpose of psychoanalytical treatment is to bring repressions into the light of consciousness. How is this to be done? How can we bring into consciousness what is hidden in the subconscious?

At the outset, the psychoanalysts had recourse to hypnotism, for they knew that, in the hypnotic state, forgotten things could be remembered, repressed things could be restored to consciousness. But Freud soon realised that normal sleep could do the same service as hypnotic sleep. He learned that the *dream* is the mouthpiece of the subconscious, of the repressed. In the dream, that which has been repressed still wears a disguise, but we can penetrate the disguise. Nowadays, most psychoanalysts (displaying, in our opinion, exaggeration and ingratitude) are opposed both to hypnosis and to suggestion, on the ground that the suggester's orders give rise to further repressions. The aim of the psychoanalyst is to interfere as little as possible, to avoid thwarting the subject's spontaneous reactions.

Psychoanalysts look upon dreaming as symbolic language. The dream does not, as used to be supposed, foretell the future; but it gives us valuable information concerning the subject's past and concerning his hidden sentiments. All

that is necessary is to decipher the symbols, and this can be done, for there is no mystery about the way in which they are manufactured by the sleeper's imagination. The construction of the symbols takes place in accordance with the laws of the association of ideas.¹

We all remember what happens when we let our thoughts wander at random. One idea calls up another without obvious logical connexion, so that we leap in a moment from Pekin to Timbaktu. Psychologists know, however, that there is an underlying determinism. One image calls up another because the second resembles the first, or because both are parts of the same reminiscence, or (add the psychoanalysts) because both are linked to the same emotion, to the same sentiment. Now, in our dreams, the images follow one another in accordance with the same laws, and are interconnected in like manner, the only difference being that they are richer and more complicated. But if one of the images that thus crops up is distasteful to the sleeper's consciousness, so that it is repressed as such, he will retain in consciousness an associated image, and will assign to the latter the sentiment which really belongs to the former. This process is what gives the dream its incoherent aspect. A sleeper is really thinking of some imminent test the thought of which causes anxiety lest incompetence should be displayed ; the dream will not relate overtly to this matter, but to

¹ Sigmund Freud, *Die Traumdeutung*, 4th edition, Deuticke, Leipzig and Vienna, 1913 ; English translation by A. A. Brill from 3rd German edition, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1913.

an examination of long-past date ; and the fear of failing in the examination is so intense that the dream becomes a nightmare. Or, again, a woman is pregnant. She lives far from any town. One evening, before going to sleep, she has been worried by the thought that her confinement will take place on a Sunday, and that she will not be able to get a doctor. That night she dreams that it is Sunday, that the stove-pipe is blocked, and that she cannot get a sweep. Poets, who are perpetually communing with the subconscious, grasped this mechanism of the dream before scientists had become aware of it. In proof I may refer to a chapter in Victor Hugo's *Les misérables*, the chapter entitled "Forms assumed by Suffering during Sleep."¹

In the "analysis" of a dream, we have to retrace the associations that occurred in the sleeper's antecedent experience. We ask the subject to relax attention, to let the thoughts run freely, and to tell us whatever comes into his mind. He must not conceal from the analyst thoughts that appear to him absurd, coarse, or futile, but must faithfully recount everything that surges up. Thus he will reproduce, more or less effectively, the associations which account for the change of the "latent content" of the dream into its "manifest content." That is the "method of association." The associations secured in connexion with a given dream are not wholly coincident with those which occurred during the dream-work, and they do not always suffice to

¹ *Fantine*, Book VII, Chapter IV.

elucidate the dream. But when, in any one dreamer, we find that the associations obtained in connexion with different dreams persistently relate to certain groups of ideas, we may infer that these ideas are extremely important to the subject, and that they have been masked in various ways in the different dreams.

We give an elementary instance of dream analysis, drawn from the personal experience of the authors.

Raoul is a lad of sixteen, a normal young fellow, well-balanced and able, being usually at the head of his class. Here is the dream :

He is in a first-class compartment with his school-fellow Louis. Then he finds himself on the railway track, running after the train, accompanied by Louis and others. Louis says to him : " What a lark, the suction of the train will help us to catch it." At first Raoul thinks that he will be able to catch up with the train, but soon he is outdistanced. The country is well wooded ; there is a house which appears to be an inn ; here the train is waiting for them, but it has now become a post-chaise. He gets in, and is disappointed to find how close the quarters seem after the comfortable first-class compartment. The driver of the post-chaise is Monsieur Weiss (the headmaster of Raoul's boarding-school). Including Raoul, there are four schoolboys in the post-chaise. Monsieur Weiss says to them : " Look at these four rolls." The rolls are wall-maps. They are very much in the way. The inside of the post-chaise is like that of a motor car in which Raoul usually drives

when the family goes away for a holiday ; in this motor car they are always crowded up with luggage.

The associations are obvious. Louis is a bit of a dandy, and is fond of showing off. Raoul cannot catch up with the train. In real life he is apt to be outclassed at certain physical exercises, especially running, by schoolfellows who, intellectually speaking, are his inferiors. Always at the head of the class, he finds it rather trying to be aware that his schoolmates excel him as gallants and sportsmen. The train after which he has to run represents the manliness in which he feels himself somewhat deficient. (It should be noted that physically he is not very strong.)

The headmaster's words remind him that he has really heard Monsieur Weiss say something of the sort to some of the younger pupils who were "packed" into the school omnibus. It annoys him to be "packed" into the post-chaise, and to be still treated as if he were one of the juniors. He adds that Monsieur Weiss always insists that they should be very careful of their things. The post-chaise, then, is the school, with the constraints it imposes. But it is also the family environment, as we learn from the condensation of the post-chaise with the motor car. This is likewise shown by another associated memory, that of a donkey-cart in which the family had gone for a drive through a countryside resembling the one seen in the dream. During this drive they had had to get out in one place and to run after the cart. We see that the headmaster is condensed with the father. He represents authority, an

authority against which Raoul is feeling an inclination to rebel.

But the really troublesome things are these rolls, which they have to carry about, all four of them; each schoolfellow has a roll. The boy is growing up, and he feels ill at ease on account of some of the things that are happening to him. What are these rolls? First of all they are maps of the world. Next, they recall four rolled numbers of the review "*L'Illustration*" which, the night before, Raoul had wanted to put away in his locker, and which had taken so much room that he could not get his slippers in. Now "*L'Illustration*," like the maps, is an epitome of this great world, whose novelty makes its appeal to the adolescent, so that his interest in the new world tends to replace interest in the ordinary routine of the innocent life of boyhood. The same call of the world was symbolised by the train, which contained a reminiscence of an occasion when Raoul had left his native city. Thus the rolls were symbolic of extroversion, of the life of the adult contrasted with the life of the boy.

Dreams are not the only revealers of the repressed. In like manner we may analyse the day-dreams of imaginative persons. Or, again, if we have to do with a poet or an artist, we may analyse their works, and this is a form of literary and artistic criticism which furnishes us with a remarkably penetrating insight.¹

Extremely revealing, and most useful therefore

¹ Cf. Charles Baudouin, *Psychoanalysis and Aesthetics*, as exemplified by a Study of the poetic Symbolism in the Works of Emile Verhaeren, Allen & Unwin, London, 1924.

to the competent psychoanalyst, are petty slips and blunders (*Fehlhandlungen*)—*lapsus linguae*—and the like, the outcome of absence of mind. Freud recalls the instance of a doctor on whom it became incumbent to make a public announcement of the nomination of two of his colleagues to a post he himself coveted. Instead of saying that they had been nominated “*ex aequo*” (with equal title) he said “*ex loco*” (out of place), thus involuntarily betraying his hidden wish. In like manner we may “carelessly” destroy something we want to get rid of; or we may “lose” a gift which had been made to us by somebody with whom we have subsequently quarrelled. A woman who is unconsciously eager for a divorce from her husband may mechanically play with her wedding ring, and continually be drawing it off. We misdate a letter, the false date being that of some important and regretted happening; and yet we could not consciously have recalled the date of that event without searching through old memoranda.

The subconscious, thus disinterred by the analysis of dreams or in some other way, is found to be especially well equipped in the matter of sentiments, emotions, and ungratified or repressed wishes. Neurotics, therefore, are persons suffering from emotions which have found no outward vent, and have turned inward. Merely to restore these emotions to the field of consciousness, merely to provide scope for their free expressions, brings relief to the patient. Thus the essential of

Breuer's *cathartic method* ["cathartic" is a synonym of "purgative"], used subsequently by Frank, Forel, and others, was to allow the patient, hypnotised for the purpose, to give free expression—violent expression, if needs must, as by a crying fit—to emotions of old date which had never been sufficiently "abreacted," had never found adequate vent. The violent reaction is no more indispensable to a cure than hypnosis is indispensable. What is indispensable is to restore to the field of consciousness that which has passed out of consciousness. In many instances, a nervous trouble will disappear as soon as the analysis makes the subject aware of its sub-conscious cause.

A young woman named Bertha¹ had suffered from various troubles, some of them (delusions of persecution) being indications of mental disorder. The analysis had explained and relieved many of her symptoms. However, she was still subject to daily attacks of severe neuralgia, usually in the left arm, but occasionally transferred to the right. After a fruitless attempt to follow up various clues, it occurred to us to ask Bertha if she had ever known any one who suffered from a grave affection of the arm. In answer, came the following reminiscence.

When she was nine years old, her most intimate friend had been a schoolfellow who had a paralysed left arm. She was Bertha's namesake, and the two Berthas were inseparable. One day her

¹ For a fuller account of this case, see Charles Baudouin, *Studies in Psychoanalysis*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1922, pp. 255-261.

friend had a fall, and injured the paralysed arm. She was laid up for a long time. During this illness, the mistress of their class used to visit the invalid and bring her books. The sick Bertha had taken advantage of the period of enforced leisure to read, and acquire knowledge. During this period, the invalid's sister had done all the housework, working double tides, for the family was not well off.

The accident to the arm in this schoolfellow had secured for her leisure, and opportunities for culture, and we knew that these were our own patient's chief desires—we knew, indeed, the unfulfilled desires had counted for much in the genesis of the latter's other troubles. Furthermore, the close association between the two girls, the facts that they were of the same age and bore the same name, had favoured perpetual comparisons, and had led to a sort of imaginative identification between the two companions. What was true of one was true of the other. Everything happened as if our patient Bertha's subconscious had reasoned as follows: "Through an affection of the left arm, my double has secured leisure and culture. A similar affection of my own arm will bring me the same good fortune. (We may add that our Bertha, like her friend, had a sister, and that the latter, in fits of temper, had frequently grumbled at Bertha for not doing her fair share of the housework.)

We asked Bertha, who was now twenty-seven, whether she had never suffered from any ailment of the arm between the age of nine and the recent

onset of the neuralgia. Oh, yes, since she was nine she had always had a pain in her arm when she was carrying a muff. We begged her to show us the position in which her friend had held the paralysed arm, and then to show us the position of her own arm in the muff. The positions were identical, with the same drop at the wrist.

We promptly explained to Bertha the origin of her neuralgia. The trouble vanished that very day.

Psychoanalysis can do something even more remarkable than dispel hysterical symptoms. By disclosing the subconscious and infantile cause of certain character traits, it can modify the whole bent of the subject's mind.

Marcel,¹ a man of thirty-five, a clerk, is timid and scrupulous in disposition. He is continually wondering whether he has done his work right; he checks an account twenty times over; he cannot add up figures under the eye of the head clerk without feeling paralysed with alarm. Our analysis showed that this dread of his chief was merely the vestige of a childhood's dread of his father; his timidity and over-scrupulousness were derived from the same source. The analysis was speedily successful in enabling him to remodel his character.

But this exploration of the subconscious, this release of repressions, this negative work, is not always sufficient to secure the ends of which we are in search. Psychoanalysis has another weapon

¹ Studies in Psychoanalysis, pp. 176-183.

in its armoury. A study of the evolution of the instincts gives us additional lights. When the forces that were prisoned in the subconscious have been released, they may be usefully directed, as far as their evolutionary possibilities permit, towards new objects. Some of the instinctive energies had found their way into a blind alley. This unfortunate derivation has been remedied, and it now remains to open a better channel, to effect a sublimation. This is the strictly educative task of psychoanalysis.

“Our instincts,” writes Pierre Bovet, “even the most animal among them, can be educated; to use the psychoanalysts’ term, they can be sublimated. This means that in one way or another they can be so modified as to become, not merely harmless, but socially useful. The most outstanding social values, those of science, art, and religion, had a humble origin. Patriotism, and the general love of humanity, that is wider in its scope than patriotism, are alike the outcome of the filial instinct. The same is doubtless true of the religious sentiment. The fighting instinct can be canalised by the laws of chivalry, transmuted into the passion for mountaineering, platonised and internalised into the ascetic heroism of a monk or a saint. As for the sexual instinct, the psychoanalysts are agreed in discovering its avatars almost universally, and especially in the mystical fervour and the passion for self-sacrifice that characterise the quasi-maternal philanthropy of the sister of charity. The psychoanalyst who desires to use his method

for educational purposes must constantly bear in mind the equivalence of certain instincts which can replace one another because they have a common origin. He will find it expedient to suggest derivations; and will be able to turn to useful account those among the affective powers which are apt to run to waste for lack of an adequate object." ¹

It is true that we as yet possess but little knowledge concerning the laws of the transformation and sublimation of the instincts; and we are still worse informed regarding the limits of what is practicable in each particular case. Mathematical formulæ exist whereby it is possible to determine in terms of motor force, the equivalent of a specific number of calories, or of an electric current of given strength; but the calculation of the amount of benevolent or maternal or artistic activity corresponding to a hysterical tantrum exceeds our present powers. The analyst must, therefore, walk warily in this domain. He can, however, be guided on the right path by a study of the subject's spontaneous attempts at sublimation; and his chief role must be to assist such spontaneous efforts. We may suitably record here another instance drawn from our personal experience. This was a case of spontaneous sublimation, in which our part as analysts was merely that of a guide.

Ida ² belongs to a family endowed with artistic sensibilities. Her brother has produced some

¹ Pierre Bovet, *La psychanalyse et l'éducation*, Payot, Lausanne, 1920, p. 22.

² *Studies in Psychoanalysis*, pp. 276-279.

striking specimens of automatic writing and of subconscious painting. She is sixteen years old. Her development was precocious, and she began to menstruate before she was twelve. Not very long after this early puberty she had a nervous shock, owing to a rencounter with an exhibitionist. Her nervous troubles dated from this experience.

Since then, at the menstrual periods, she has been subject to mental and nervous crises. Each crisis lasts for several days, and is often alarming. It manifests itself in either of two forms. Sometimes she is affected with phobias and hallucinations, and with a tendency to delirious outbursts indicating the existence of delusions of persecution. Sometimes she devotes herself to the arrangement of various objects, such as plants, clothing, dolls, etc.—displaying meticulous care, tastefulness, and a certain amount of agitation. The two types of crisis are complementary and mutually exclusive, but they centre round the same disquietude. In her delirious outbursts she believes herself to be under the spell of a magician. When dressing her dolls, she is fond of habiting them as magicians, and decks them out to resemble the magician of her delirious fancies. The two forms of crisis are certainly equivalent derivations, but the crisis of “arranging” is more wholesome and less pathological than the other.

The analysis showed that Ida detested any smartness in her personal apparel, but liked her dolls to be smartly attired. We soon came to realise that the “arranging” crises were a manifestation of suppressed and objectified coquetry,

dolls being substituted for her own person. The repression of the instinct of coquetry had been the outcome of the sexual shock previously mentioned.

The inclination to arrange objects tastefully was developing spontaneously, and was manifesting itself at other times than those of the crises. Ida showed a marked fondness for drawing, and she had a special fancy for drawing decorative designs and pictures of stylate plants. An analysis of these drawings showed that most of them were masked representations of the object with which her subconscious mind was obsessed—the object which had given her the shock. Thus the artistic tendency was a prolongation of the crises, a spontaneous sublimation.

It was enough, therefore, to advise the parents to encourage this tendency. We saw Ida again six months later. She had been resolutely and exclusively influenced in the direction of her art, and had shown that she possessed real talent. Her mental troubles had vanished. Her bodily development, which had been for some time arrested, had now taken such a stride that I hardly recognised her.

Ethically considered, there is nothing subversive or alarming in psychoanalytical teaching. Only ill-informed persons can possibly imagine that those who discover the evil consequences of sexual repression are the advocates of giving free rein to instinct. Psychoanalysis aims at teaching us how to sublimate instinct.

Pfister has laid especial stress upon the educative and moral aspects of psychoanalysis, and we have already quoted his phrase "a new road to the old Gospel." We know that psychoanalysis reveals the egoism underlying neurosis, and it teaches that a certain measure of education towards altruism is essential to a cure. In this respect, psychoanalysis confirms Dubois' conclusions, but it offers new means for effecting such a desirable form of education. The psychoanalysts recognise that the egoism of neurotic patients—and of many persons who are not invalids—is mainly a product of repression. For instance, when a child's affectionate advances are repelled, its spontaneous lovingness is chilled, and the adult that develops out of this chill may be cold and "reserved" throughout life. By overcoming such repressions, psychoanalysis favours the blossoming of love.

"Misanthropy," writes Pfister, "incapacity to love one's neighbour, whether endured with indifference or attended by a dull sense of bitterness, often shows itself as one of the dangerous consequences of repression, as one of the ways in which repression influences the affective life. . . . I have already referred to the type of persons who are incapable of any strong feeling, whether for their fellow human beings, for animals, for nature, or for practical or scientific activity. Such people are obviously in the borderland of melancholia; and if they do not find effective outlets for their vital impetus, they are likely to succumb to nervous or mental disorder. . . . Psychoanalysis

may save them. In these cases of stagnation of feeling its results are often amazingly good." ¹

When the case is one of neurosis or one of some grave malady of the character, the aid of a psycho-analytical expert is indispensable. But the non-specialist can derive profit from a study of the conquests of psychoanalysis. Every intelligent person will be enabled by self-study, to detect repressions, to release chained forces, to reach out towards sublimation.

¹ Oskar Pfister, *La psychanalyse au service des éducateurs*, p. 111.

CHAPTER FIVE

AUTOSUGGESTION¹

THE exponents of the two psychotherapeutic methods we have just been discussing, rational persuasion and psychoanalysis, agree in their disapproval of the use of hypnosis and of suggestion. Both methods originated as affiliations of hypnotic treatment, but their respective advocates consider them to mark a definitive advance upon hypnosis and suggestion. It is interesting to note, however, that in one respect their criticisms counterbalance one another. The moralisers of Dubois' school tell us that the fault of the suggestive method is that it makes its appeal to the subconscious; in their opinion, all our results ought to be secured through the instrumentality of reason and the conscious will. The psychoanalysts, on the other hand, opine that the study of the subconscious is the only effective method, and their complaint against suggestion is that it does not concern itself sufficiently with the subconscious. Manifestly, these two criticisms tend to rule one another out. The suggesters, though

¹ Those desiring to undertake a detailed study of this question should consult Charles Baudouin, *Suggestion and Autosuggestion*, second edition, ninth impression, Allen & Unwin, 1924.

flustered at first by being caught between two fires, were not slow to realise, like the miller in La Fontaine's fable, that it is no use trying to satisfy "everyman and his father!"

Nevertheless, some of those who practise suggestion realise that they must take both criticisms into account. They must be equally careful to avoid an excessive cultivation of the automatism denounced by Dubois, and to avoid generating the repressions denounced by Freud.

Furthermore, there is one point in which the objections of the moralisers and those of the psychoanalysts coincide. They all agree in advising us to leave the maximum of autonomy to the subject, to be his guide rather than his master. This recommendation harmonises with the whole trend of modern educational philosophy, and it was inevitable that the practitioners of suggestion should pay heed to it at long last. Thus the suggestive method, while holding its ground, has evolved. The evolution has been one which leaves increasing scope for the subject's automatism. The essential idea of the New Nancy School is that we must teach the subject how to make his own suggestions, must teach him the art of *autosuggestion*.

The contemporary theory and practice of auto-suggestion are the outcome of a natural evolution of the ideas of Liébeault and Bernheim. That evolution has been determined, partly by the influence of other methods of scientific psychotherapeutics; and partly by that of the American movements known as Christian Science and New

Thought, whose exponents invite us all to recognise the potency of the mind or the imagination.

The founder of the New Nancy School was Emile Coué. He was twenty-eight years old when, in 1885, he first came into contact with Liébeault, and this meeting was decisive in its influence upon his life. The two were kindred spirits. Liébeault was a simple country doctor, unambitious and unassuming, but none the less a man of genius. He was the first to grasp the full significance of suggestion, and the first to isolate the notion. By the use of the suggestive method, he worked what looked like miracles. After a time he settled in Nancy, where he was to find in Bernheim the disciple and the theoretician who could make his ideas known to the world. Coué had a similar history. His modesty resembled that of Liébeault. He made no advances in search of patients, but allowed patients to come to him. At first he was consulted by only a few neighbours, but his practice grew. His fame is now world-wide, and every week a number of English enquirers and patients cross the Channel on their way to visit him at Nancy. For his part, with the simplicity of those who are at once straightforward and great, he is astonished at the extraordinary vogue of his ideas.

Coué studied the ramifications which the Nancy principles had undergone in the United States. He was able to extract from these new theories all that was valuable and solidly based, while rejecting those of their elements which were nothing but puffery, and likewise rejecting the mystical postu-

lates that underlay much of the teaching. By the turn of the century, Coué had realised the essentials of his thought. He had discovered that autosuggestion is a powerful agent, and one of universal application; and he had learned that hypnotic suggestion, the only form of suggestion hitherto closely studied by the exponents of scientific medicine, was no more than a particular application of autosuggestion. In his practice, he was continually able to demonstrate that the force of autosuggestion was effective even in cases of organic disease; and to prove that training in autosuggestion was a simple matter, and open to all—differing in these respects from training of the will, with which training in autosuggestion is too often confounded.

Being absolutely disinterested, and having a free clinic, Coué has had an enormous practice. But, for this very reason, his energies have always been concentrated on practical work. He has written very little—a few articles in the “Bulletin” of the Nancy School, one or two papers read to congresses of psychology, and his booklet *Self-Mastery through conscious Autosuggestion*.

These writings, moreover, are directed towards purely practical ends, and are so worded as to be within the grasp of the humblest reader. Coué is not the philosopher of the School which he inspired; but the theoretical exponents of his views can never forget that their inspiration came from him, even when they cannot follow him in all respects, or when they find it necessary to develop the abstract side of his teaching.

The New Nancy School comprises a group of investigators—medical practitioners, psychologists, and university professors—many of whom live and work a long way from Nancy ; and the adherents of the School are anything but dogmatic. We are not one another's "disciples." Nor, indeed, are we Coué's disciples, as that term is ordinarily understood. We look upon Coué as the unassuming but talented originator of a movement which has already become much bigger than its founder, and will soon bulk far more largely than all those who are at present working in it. Coué is for us what Pestalozzi is for the advocates of the new methods of education. His role has been to give the practical demonstration which was to launch new and inchoate ideas—ideas which, for a long time to come, will be subject to revision and to further revision.

When our attention is concentrated upon the idea of a physical or a moral modification of our being, this modification tends to undergo spontaneous realisation, within the limits of the possible. Such is the essential nature of every suggestion. It is not necessary that the idea should have been introduced into the subject's mind by another person, a hypnotist or a suggester ; and when it is so introduced, the operator is merely setting in action a law which can act without his intervention. We are therefore entitled to say, in a sense, that there is no suggestion, but only autosuggestion.

Suggestion, or autosuggestion, occurs spontaneously in us all. If we fail to detect the fact,

this is because the process whereby the thought undergoes realisation occurs subconsciously, and is not always open to direct perception. That is where suggestion differs from the will. In a voluntary action, likewise, an idea is transformed into action, but the process is a conscious one and is directly perceptible. For instance, I will to move my arm, and I move it, being fully aware what I am doing. In suggestion, the course of affairs is very different; the phenomenon is far from being plainly perceptible; and that is why, though it is constantly occurring in every one, it escaped observation for so long. Let us consider some examples.

There is an element of suggestion in neurasthenia, a malady in which the patient suffers more keenly in proportion to his belief that he is suffering; and there is an element of suggestion in giddiness, in which the dread of falling hastens the fall. In like manner, the fear of being nervous induces or accentuates nervousness. But obviously such phenomena are much less conspicuous than the course of a voluntary act. It is perfectly plain to us that the will to move the arm is the cause of the movement that ensues, but it is by no means so plain that the fear of nervousness is really the cause of nervousness. When, however, through the methodical use of suggestion, the idea that we shall not be nervous is substituted for the converse idea, and when, as a result of this substitution, confidence replaces nervousness, we have a practical demonstration that the fear of nervousness was its cause.

For one reason or another, some familiar fact eludes us just when we want to use it. In our surprise, we say to ourselves "I have forgotten," and the forgetfulness is sustained by the suggestion. But suggestion may act on memory as a whole, as well as on an isolated reminiscence. Suggestion plays a great part in maintaining a loss of memory, in keeping up what is technically known as amnesia ; this is proved by the rapidity with which, in many cases, amnesia can be relieved by curative suggestion.

Suggestion can create purely artificial sensations, can engender hallucinations. On the other hand, an idea can annul a sensation, just as well as it can create one. A person suffering from a cold in the head, whose sense of smell is so far impaired that he is unable to perceive faint odours, will imagine himself to have completely lost the sense of smell, and will then be unable to smell anything.

As far as visceral sensations are concerned, an incident recorded by Herbert Parkyn is worth quoting. "A New York visitor in Chicago looks at his watch, which is set an hour ahead of Chicago time, and tells his Chicago friend that it is twelve o'clock. The Chicago friend, not considering the difference in time between Chicago and New York, tells the New Yorker that he is hungry and that he must go to lunch. Twelve o'clock is the Chicago man's regular lunch hour, and the mere mention of twelve o'clock is sufficient to arouse his appetite."¹

¹ Herbert Parkyn, *Autosuggestion*, Fowler, London, 1916, pp. 11 and 12.

In like manner, the sensation of cold may be, to a considerable extent, either inspired or neutralised by suggestion. Here is an incident, by no means exceptional, recorded in the words of the person who had the experience: "When I got out of bed one morning, the window was wide open and the sun was shining brightly. The mere sight of the sunshine made me feel cheerful and warm. I put on very light clothing and went about my business with bare arms, and nevertheless felt a great deal warmer than I had felt during the last few days. Then I went to the window and saw that it had been snowing. A glance at the thermometer convinced me that the winter had set in. Immediately I felt cold; my teeth chattered, and I began to shiver."

Every one knows, although few of us give sufficient weight to the experience, that the mere sight of a fire which has just been lighted, and which has not yet begun to throw out any heat, will make us feel warm, thanks to the idea of heat which it arouses by a natural association.

A man who touches a garment, and is then told that it has been worn by some one suffering from a disease of the skin, will promptly experience uncomfortable sensations, and will imagine he has caught the infection. Medical students are apt to feel symptoms of the diseases they are studying. An illiterate patient, who has his temperature taken by the clinical thermometer and does not know the real use of the instrument, will tell the doctor or nurse that this little operation has done him "a power of good."

Emotion can be induced by spontaneous suggestion. Those who see in others the signs of fear, who note in their companions pale faces and haggard eyes, who see others tremble and take to flight, or who hear some one cry "All is lost" in a terror-stricken voice, will suffer from the contagion of fear. The preferences we show for certain foods are to some extent manifestations of individual temperament; but most of them are simply due to suggestion, and are all the more imperious on that account. The subject declares that he cannot overcome his liking or his disliking; and he is in fact enslaved by it precisely in proportion to the degree to which he believes himself enslaved—but no more. He "cannot bear the smell" of a particular spice; and yet he will go into ecstasies over the flavour of a sauce, containing this very spice, when he does not know that it is one of the ingredients.

To express a sentiment one does not feel, is not always to lie, for he who expresses a sentiment begins to feel it. And by reiterating the expression of the sentiment, one may inflame it to a passion. Like the liar who ends by believing his own falsehoods, we are caught in our own snare. "By talking of love," says Pascal, "we fall in love! 'Tis the easiest thing in the world."

The idea of a movement may give rise to the movement. Sometimes it suffices to see the movement executed by another. Thus, yawning is contagious. If we associate with a person suffering from a habitual nervous movement, we are apt to acquire it ourselves; immoderate

laughter readily spreads through a crowd; the rhythmical gait of our companion on a walk leads us insensibly to keep step with him.

During a conversation we discover that our hand, holding a pencil, is engaged in writing, "mechanically," as we say, i.e. subconsciously, some phrase which was uttered several minutes before; or it is drawing some object which has been within our range of vision, but which we do not even remember having noticed. The auditory image of the words heard or the visual image of the object seen has been transformed into movement. We do, indeed, come across cases of subconscious [automatic] writing which is the outcome neither of the words of a recent conversation nor yet of any series of images actually present to the senses or of recent occurrence. Nevertheless in many of these cases the process can be reconstructed, and we then learn that here also we have to do with a suggestion of which the first phase was subconscious. The hand writes phrases which the subject has not foreseen, which astonish him, which conflict with his conscious tastes and his conscious ideas, and which none the less emanate from the depths of his being. Many cases in which we might have been led to suspect "mediumism," i.e. the operation of a mind other than that of the subject, thus prove reducible to manifestations of such forms of suggestion.

More extensive modifications, such as can only be effected by a considerable amount of work within the organism, are presented by the cases in which the imagination of the mother influences

the foetus. Observers worthy of the utmost confidence, from Darwin to Liébeault, have in this connexion reported definite data, which must be regarded as classical. Darwin records that a child resembled in every feature a girl of the neighbourhood to whom the father had been making love during the mother's pregnancy. Liébeault mentions the case of a vine-dresser who was exactly like a statue in the village church, the statue of the patron saint of the village. During her pregnancy, the man's mother had been obsessed with the idea that this would happen.

It has been possible to formulate certain laws of suggestion. The most fundamental law is the *Law of Concentrated Attention*, which runs as follows: *The idea which tends to realise itself through suggestion is always an idea upon which, consciously or subconsciously, attention is concentrated.*

Another law of enormous practical importance is the *Law of Reversed Effort*. This law is revealed in all its simplicity to every one who is learning to ride a bicycle. When we are at length able to wobble painfully along, should we see a big stone lying in the middle of the road, we know that all our attempts to avoid it serve only to direct our steering-wheel towards the obstacle, upon which it impinges with deadly precision. Thus we seem to search out even the smallest pebbles that are most remote from our proper course. Our desperate tugs at the handle-bar avail us nothing. The stone has attracted our attention, our emotions are aroused, suggestion is at work, and all our

efforts to counteract it serve merely to reinforce it. In like manner, when we have an impulse to laugh at an inappropriate time, or when an inopportune fit of nervousness seizes us, the violent counter-efforts we make do not help us, but serve only to increase our difficulties. Or we try to remember a name, and we have it on the tip of the tongue, but just fail to recall it; then, growing vexed, we make the autosuggestion of lost memory which has already been described. If, in addition, we are so ill-advised as to make vigorous efforts towards recollection, such vague traces of memory as may remain are expunged, and the mind becomes a blank. One who tries strenuously to oppose a passion, intensifies it.

The law that is at work in these cases may be formulated in the following terms: *When an idea imposes itself on the mind to such an extent as to give rise to a suggestion, all the conscious efforts which the subject makes in order to counteract this suggestion are not merely without the desired effect, but they actually run counter to the subject's conscious wishes and tend to intensify the suggestion.*

We may explain what happens in such cases by a physical comparison. Let us suppose that a gas-pipe feeds two burners, A and B. A is shut off, but B is burning. If we try to light A by simply increasing the pressure of the gas, we shall fail; for the tap at A is closed, and all we shall succeed in doing is to increase the intensity of the flame in the burner B. To get the result we desire, we must close the tap at B and open the tap at A. If, for instance, we make an effort to

counteract a feeling of nervousness, we are increasing the pressure of the gas; but if the idea "I am so nervous" continues to dominate the mind, the wrong tap is still open, and all our efforts serve merely to intensify the flame in this quarter. What we must do is, turn off the wrong tap and open the right one, replace the wrong idea "I am so nervous" by the right idea "I am full of confidence." This result will be secured by the methodical use of suggestion, by reflective suggestion.

What will be the nature of this suggestion? We have seen that under certain conditions an idea liberates a force which, through subconscious activity, realises the idea. Thus the idea itself is the key to the mechanism. It follows that autosuggestion can be guided as we please; all that is requisite is to change the idea when it is a bad one, and to reinforce it when it is a good one.

But in practice, the matter is less simple than it sounds. The reader will recall the two laws formulated above, the law of concentrated attention, and the law of reversed effort. The first aim of reflective suggestion must be to neutralise the noxious results of spontaneous suggestion. Now, when we make a vigorous effort to concentrate voluntary attention upon the good idea which we want to substitute for a bad one, what will happen? A reversal of effort, nothing more. The harder we try to think the good idea, the more irresistible will be the assaults of the bad idea. This is what happens in neurasthenics who

sink deeper into the mire thanks to their struggles to extricate themselves; in persons suffering from obsessions who intensify these when they try to dispel them; in the drunkard, whose ardent resolutions to give up drinking seem to lead him irresistibly to the nearest bar. In a word, the two laws conflict.

Even if the only aim of our reflective suggestion should be to uproot an antecedent bad suggestion, the difficulty will remain. We shall do our utmost to concentrate our attention. But in every effort of the kind there are two ideas, that of the aim, and that of the obstacles to be overcome. Both these ideas tend to realise themselves through suggestion, and they will neutralise one another partially or completely.

Coué, therefore, has the best of reasons for drawing the following conclusion: "Above all, the will must not intervene in the practice of autosuggestion. This recommendation is absolutely essential."

Our concentration, therefore, must be an equivalent of voluntary attention, minus effort. One of the primary conditions requisite for such a suspension of effort is muscular relaxation; the body should be at rest (in an armchair or on a bed, for example). In the chapter on Buddhism we learned that for the practice of yoga the Hindus long ago recommended muscular relaxation and the suspension of effort. Bodily relaxation favours mental relaxation. There are, moreover, special times and circumstances in which relaxation of the mind occurs more readily, the most

notable of these being the period just before and just after sleep. At such times there is an inclination to reverie, in which the subconscious breaks through to the surface. Now suggestion to be effective, must be implanted in the subconscious, and such an implantation is rendered easier when an outcropping of the subconscious occurs.

Nevertheless, the mind must not abandon itself wholly to relaxation and reverie, for this would lead us to the very antipodes of the concentration we wish to realise. In such moments of relaxation, the mind must be able to immobilise itself without effort. Whereas in the familiar process of attention the mind must make an effort in order to retain an idea, in concentration the idea must hold the mind, must fascinate it so to speak. Especially apt to induce such fascination are certain constant and monotonous sensations, which engender what may be called a state of very slight hypnosis in which there is no loss of consciousness. The presence of a watch or a clock not far from the ear has a lulling influence. On suitable occasions, we may take advantage of the neighbourhood of a waterfall, a stream, the seashore; or we may, in more modest fashion, turn to account the drip from a water-tap that is imperfectly closed. Or, in a dark room, we may fix the gaze on a luminous point, on the motionless flame of a nightlight, or on the flickering firelight. Everyone who has passed a vigil in a sickroom must be familiar with the hypnotic influence of the last named. For a few minutes or more we

concentrate our gaze upon the flame or the luminous point, and when the eyes are tired out, we allow them to close. It matters little what process is chosen, or what associated processes are employed. The value is not to be found so much in this or that recipe as in the principles of which they are the respective applications. The governing principle is the immobilisation of the attention, either by fixation or by seesaw.

Furthermore, physical procedures are not the only methods for the production of autohypnosis. The attention may be immobilised in other ways than by an outward sensation. Immobilisation may be brought about by a mental image, by an idea. Some can send themselves to sleep by counting, or by telling their beads, this being a sort of inward lulling.

When the attention has been immobilised by some such method, it tends to undergo spontaneous and effortless fixation upon the ideas presented to it. But since this immobilisation can be induced by concentrating the attention on a mental state, why should we not choose (in preference to the bead-telling or to the counting) the very idea which is to be the object of the suggestion? There is, in fact, no reason to the contrary, provided that the idea fulfils the requisite conditions, provided that it holds the attention rather than that the attention holds it. We must be able to think of it mechanically; ere long in spite of ourselves, as if we were obsessed by it; in the same way as that in which we listen to the sound of running water.

A very simple means of securing this is to condense the idea which is to be the object of the suggestion, to sum it up in a brief phrase which can readily be graven on the memory, and to repeat it over and over again like a lullaby. Auto-suggestion thus practised, just before falling asleep or immediately after waking, is peculiarly effective. ✓
Let us add that, to prevent the mind from wandering, it may be well to repeat the phrase aloud, or at least to sketch its pronunciation with lips and tongue as we utter it mentally. This motor accompaniment favours the acquirement of the habit we wish to form ; gives it a certain solidity ; and acts as a leash or leading string whereby, without effort, our thought is guided towards its object.

Experience shows that the daily practice of suggestion for a few minutes every morning and every evening, has a most powerful effect. ✓
The suggestions should be simplified as much as possible for at these times when we are half asleep an effort would be required to follow a complicated train of thought. Nor is it necessary to go into details. We have learned that it is usually sufficient to indicate the end, for the subconscious will discover the means for itself. That is what takes place, for instance, when the subconscious solves a problem for us during the night. (In passing, we may point out that this fact answers the objection of Dubois, who condemned suggestion because he identified the subconscious with automatism.)

Coué recommends us to condense all the desiderated bodily and mental ameliorations into

a single formula, and to repeat this formula twenty times. Of course there is no objection to supplementing these morning and evening suggestions by a more detailed series of suggestions practised at some other time of the day, in a state of concentration lasting from a quarter of an hour to half an hour.

The reader must note that this recommendation to think in effortless fashion is far from being an invitation to intellectual idleness. Those who wish to do a thing well without effort will find that the best preparation is to do it with vim at the outset. When we say that practice makes perfect, we mean that practice makes our work effortless. Those who are most successful in the practice of autosuggestion without external aids are mainly recruited from among persons accustomed to mental work. Here are some examples.

1. A university professor, confined to bed by an attack of influenza, read *Suggestion and Autosuggestion*. Simply by way of experiment, he began to practise autosuggestion, and promptly secured remarkable results. For instance, before falling asleep, he suggested to himself that he would dream of particular persons and places, and the dreams duly appeared. He likewise relieved his symptoms to a degree that surprised him.

2. Monsieur Jacquemin, a chemist at Malzéville, near Nancy, had suffered for a long time from chronic rheumatism. He practised autosuggestion after reading Coué's booklet, and wrote to the author in the following terms: "I have had a

wonderful success in the use of your method on myself. I suffered from rheumatic pains in the legs, so that it was difficult for me to get about. I treated myself by saying several times a day, and at night just before going to sleep : ' There is nothing the matter with me ; I can walk quite well, etc.' I at once began to improve, and in a few days I had completely recovered. I should tell you that I was theoretically convinced of the value of autosuggestion, so that this good result did not come to me as a surprise."

We may add that it is exceptional for anyone to learn the successful use of autosuggestion unaided so rapidly and so easily. Most people are the better for assistance.

This is where induced suggestion, effected through the instrumentality of a suggester distinct from the subject, has its uses. The theory and practice of autosuggestion do not involve the complete abandonment of the old method of heterosuggestion. Nevertheless, the heterosuggestive method undergoes considerable modification. The suggester has now become a guide, an expert adviser in the use of autosuggestion. His aim is to teach the subject to dispense with all alien help. ✓

The first step in the teaching of autosuggestion must be to show the pupil, by simple experiments, how easily an idea can be realised, even though it is far from monopolising the mind. These experiments are something more than mere experiments ; they are also a form of training.

Easy and convincing experiments can be made with Chevreul's pendulum (see above, p. 106). As a first experiment, let the subject take a sheet of blank paper and rule on it a line running from right to left. Now let him take the pendulum—a small plumb-line attached to a little handle such as a pencil, so that the pencil may represent a fishing-rod, and the bob of the pendulum the "fish" attached to the line—and, holding the rod between finger and thumb of one hand with the bob hanging over the line, let him think of the bob as swinging to and fro along the line. If his thought is effortless, a purely imaginative following of the movements along the line, he will find that the pendulum promptly begins to swing in the way thus conceived. In a second experiment, the subject fancies the bob of his pendulum swinging to and fro from himself towards the horizon and back again. In the third experiment, he imagines a circular swing, clockwise or counter-clockwise as the case may be. Each time he will find that the bob obeys the movement of his thought. There may be some advantage in using a bright object, such as a newly minted coin, to serve as the bob, for this will spontaneously capture the attention.

When these exercises have been explained to the pupil, and he has acquired proficiency in them under tuition, he will train himself in them day by day.

Another exercise, somewhat more elaborate, is the following. The pupil has in front of him a vertical placard on which various letters of the

alphabet are drawn or printed in a horizontal row (a newspaper heading will serve the purpose excellently). Holding the handle of the pendulum as before, at an appropriate level, he will think successively of one and another letter on the placard. The pendulum will swing out towards and will tap the letter of which he is thinking.

These exercises suffice. They may, however, be supplemented by the exercises in falling backwards and forwards, which have long been known. The mesmerists explained them as the outcome of "magnetic" attraction. They are described in *Suggestion and Autosuggestion*, pp. 214-216.

Alternative exercises are the exercises in contracture (inability to unclasp the hands) of which a full account is given by Coué in *Self-Mastery through conscious Autosuggestion*. The reader may also consult *Suggestion and Autosuggestion*, pp. 218-222. In the present writer's opinion, these exercises in contracture are unduly reminiscent of authoritative and hypnotic heterosuggestion. But they have a counterbalancing advantage in that they impress the pupil's imagination, and convince him of the reality of the law of reversed effort.

As soon as the pupil has been successful in a few experiments, teacher and pupil have a first sitting for the use of specific suggestions. The pupil sits down, relaxes his muscles, and closes his eyes—not to sleep, but to avoid distraction. The teacher then formulates a suggestion. But it is essential for the pupil to understand that this heterosuggestion is merely a preparation, is no

more than a preliminary to autosuggestion. The pupil is asked to practise autosuggestion every day, the best times being immediately after waking and just before going to sleep.

Suggestion thus practised gives excellent results, of which the reader will find numerous examples in *Suggestion and Autosuggestion*. Here are some additional cases, from more recent experience.

1. Monsieur C., aged thirty-three. Medical examination discloses "otosclerosis, the symptoms of which seem to be influenced by psychical factors." The patient does not hear so well in the evening as in the morning. His hearing is unfavourably affected during fits of mental depression, which are frequent. He is neurasthenic.

The first sitting took place on February 21st. At the second sitting, on March 16th, he reported that there had been marked improvement, especially during the previous week, and above all as regards his nervous trouble and his feelings of depression. "I've never felt so well as during these last few days. I am delighted. I can now hear the ticking of a clock which I could not hear before the treatment began ; and I can hear quite as well in the evening as in the morning." At the third sitting, April 8th, improvement had been maintained. The last three weeks had been most encouraging ; he had been free from depression.

2. Monsieur J., aged fifty-nine, who has been suffering from neurasthenia for two years. Medical examination showed the trouble to be of twofold

causation, "partly due to microbic infection and partly to mental determinants." He has thoughts of suicide; his temples throb during the night; he sleeps badly and is disturbed by nightmares; he is unsteady on his legs; he needs the support of his wife's arm, and that of a stick as well, to enable him to walk.

The first sitting was held on February 4th. On February 18th he was quite steady on his legs. He reported that after the first sitting he had slept until half-past ten, a thing he had not done for twenty years. By February 23rd he was able to walk without assistance, dispensing both with the stick and with his wife's arm. On March 11th he said that he was "perfectly well." For two years he has been taking bromides, but now sleeps soundly and does not need the aid of any drug. He is "in excellent spirits without knowing why."

3. Mademoiselle D., aged thirty-nine, has suffered for several years from a chronic cold in the head. The catarrh comes on every morning, sometimes lasting only a quarter of an hour, but sometimes persisting till evening. Occasionally she will use more than a dozen handkerchiefs in a day. She has consulted fourteen doctors, and has had the middle turbinate bones removed. She sleeps badly.

The first sitting was held on March 30th. On April 6th she reported that for five days after the first sitting she had been free from nasal catarrh, but that there had been a return during the last two days. From the eleventh of April onwards,

stable results were secured. The catarrh had almost disappeared, and the patient slept very well.

4. Madame F., aged forty-six, a painter, suffered from severe neurasthenia. Whenever she thought of anything that distressed her, a pain in the nape of the neck came on ; she suffered from insomnia, and took veronal every night. She could no longer do any artistic work, and found it difficult even to read. All her pleasure in life had vanished. She was sceptical as regards the value of suggestion.

The first sitting took place on December 27th. Four days later the patient reported that her interest in life was reviving, and that, to her surprise, she once more had an inclination to draw. On January 10th she said that she was now able to enjoy the passing moment ; her peace of mind had been restored ; she had much less pain in the head and in the nape of the neck ; she could read with comparative ease ; but she still slept badly. On January 14th, her regular medical adviser, who sees her every day, tells us of his surprise to see the patient laugh merrily after the sittings of autosuggestion. The joy of life has come back to her ; she has renewed courage in the morning when it is time to get up. January 19th : she is drawing once more in a way that contents her ; she feels cheerful and care-free. January 24th : she has not had such a delight in life for a long time ; she keeps them all in good spirits at home ; works well ; for the last three nights she has not taken a sleeping draught, but has slept for five or six hours each night ; she also

takes a nap during the daytime; she is no longer restless when sleep is slow of coming. March 2nd (twelfth sitting): she is amazed at the fertility and ease of her artistic work; she sleeps without drugs; has recovered her natural enthusiasm; she feels herself a "new being."

The foregoing instances will suffice. Many medical practitioners are now willing to admit that suggestion can act in organic cases as well as in functional—indirectly, no doubt, but effectively for all that. Several years ago, Bonjour of Lausanne reported that he had been successful in curing warts by means of hypnotic suggestion. We now know that a similar cure can be achieved by autosuggestion. The cure is easy to explain as due to an action exercised through the vasomotor nerves. The arterioles contract, and this cuts off the food-supply from the cells of the warts, which then dry up and fall off. Again, Louis Rénon has shown how potent autosuggestion can be, for good or for evil, in pulmonary tuberculosis. Remarkable results have been secured in consumptives by the New Nancy School. Who can deny that when autosuggestion restores sleep and appetite and relieves cough, it has done much to help the patient along the road towards recovery?

The possibilities of autosuggestion have not yet been fully explored, but it is obvious that the method opens up the most hopeful perspectives. An especial advantage of autosuggestion is that it is available to all.

CHAPTER SIX

PRACTICAL DIRECTIONS

IN this chapter we propose to summarise for general use the main practical directions which can be deduced even from a cursory knowledge of psychotherapeutics.

A more intelligent understanding of these matters will make people give close attention to the way in which, thanks to indifference or stupidity, undesirable and harmful suggestions are often conveyed to children and to nervous patients.

Those whose business it is to teach, to heal, or to guide others through life, must never forget that thought is the first stage of action, and that our moral and physical conduct is the outcome of the way in which we choose our thoughts.

Young people must be brought up to feel the self-confidence which is the fundamental source of continuous improvement and of energy throughout life.

The first requisite here is kindness, for kindness suffices to make the young responsive to the old and the sick responsive to the hale. Nothing but kindness can heal the worst wounds of mind and body.

We are not thinking of sentiments that are only

skin deep, of an attitude that is purely verbal and is therefore sterile ; we are thinking of true kindness, of a kindness that can be felt and can be read in the eyes.

With kindness in our thoughts and our actions we have the most effective means both for the education of children and for the treatment of those suffering from nervous and other disorders.

We speak of sick people here because we wish to show that, thanks to the multiplicity of psychological methods of treatment, these sufferers, so often disillusioned in the past, need no longer despair of cure.

If they wish to understand their own condition better, they must remember that every human being is continually changing in two different ways. First of all he undergoes throughout life a personal development, owing to which his activity is ever assuming new forms. Secondly, he necessarily participates in the evolution of the species, which is incessantly varying, thanks to the unending changes in the social environment.

The higher human functions, no less than the lower, are subject to perpetual modification. The result is that the perception of reality is not a fixed quality, any more than are the manifestations of our will and our beliefs. They all undergo an evolution parallel with or similar to the evolution experienced by our bodily nature.

We must not compare such a mental evolution to the mechanical movements of the heart or to the mechanical changes which take place in the

kidney, but rather to the changes which take place during foetal development, in the embryo which is undergoing continuous modification during the new formation of the organs which come into existence. In other words, the brain, giving birth to and regulating the functions of both conscious and automatic thought, is not content to realise itself, like a heart or a kidney, in an organ finished once for all, but is ceaselessly reforming itself. Consequently, up to the time of death, the brain presides over a sort of embryonic evolution, and its chief manifestation (which is our consciousness) participates in this evolution.

What neurotic patients have to understand is that their troubles are disturbances of this evolutionary process; their neurosis is due to a modification in the functional development, or to a temporary arrest of that development.

The leading characteristic of the neurosis is that in neurotic patients the evolution of the higher parts of the various functions has been more or less completely arrested. Evolution signifies the perpetual modification of a being in order to secure its adaptation to new conditions; and because they are living conditions, they are in an unceasing flux. This consideration enables us to understand the definition of neurosis often adopted by modern psychologists, following Pierre Janet, who writes: "Neuroses are disturbances of the various functions of the organism, disturbances characterised by an arrest of development without deterioration of function."

The same author speaks somewhere of neurotics

whose mental life remains "hitched up" to some past happening; and he tells us that this attachment must be broken. We have seen that Freud, in like manner, writes that hysterical patients "suffer from reminiscences." Here we have different ways of describing the same fact—an arrest of evolution.

To sum up, in the neuroses there is not, as a rule, any permanent damage to the mental machinery; but certain parts of the machine are working stiffly, and need to be oiled before the whole can function normally. Neurotics need to be constantly reminded of this, for it will save them from the exaggerated alarm which their morbid symptoms are apt to arouse in their minds.

As regards the origin of neuroses, it is generally known that they may be due to various causes, namely to hereditary troubles, to moral and physical errors of education, to infections, and to emotional disturbances.

At the outset of such disorders we note physical troubles of varying intensity, succeeded by psychological disturbances at a later stage.

The commonest of all the less serious neuroses is *neurasthenia*. It is characterised by mental depression and gloom, and by excessive liability to fatigue. The patient is sometimes apathetic; sometimes emotional, anxious, and irritable. Often the condition reacts on the organism, producing such bodily symptoms as palpitation, digestive disorders, etc.; insomnia is also common. If the nervous condition becomes grave, we find that the faculties of intelligence and will are more

seriously impaired than the other faculties of the mind. In such cases we have to do rather with psychasthenia or hysteria than with neurasthenia.

In *psychasthenia*, agitation may be so marked as to lead to disorder of movement; and depression may be so great that the patient is quite unable to perform such simple actions as getting up, walking, and talking. This amounts to saying that the will is especially affected, the technical name for the lack of will power being *abulia*. The patient suffers from an inability to adapt himself to the circumstances of real life.

Hysteria is characterised by a loss of nervous equilibrium. Thus one part of the body may be anaesthetic, while another part may exhibit excessive sensibility. In the moral sphere the patient may be capricious, and may do queer things; groups of ideas have a tendency to be dissociated from the rest of the mind, thus escaping from rational control. In extreme cases, this may go so far as to lead to a doubling of consciousness.

For the relief of these neurotic conditions, we must study the various psychological symptoms, for this will enable us to choose the psychotherapeutic method applicable to the particular case.

Although the neuroses have been extensively studied, their complexity is so great that it is often difficult to decide on the best way of treating them. Psychotherapeutics is not yet an exact science established on laws from which it is possible to deduce with certainty the conditions under which this or that method of psychological treatment can best be utilised.

The specialist who has worked out a system of his own, is apt to regard it as a panacea. The hypnotists want to hypnotise every one; the rational persuasionists use their moralising method upon all their patients, and are foolish enough to declare that suggestive treatment is immoral; psychoanalysts fall into the same pit; and some of the advocates of autosuggestion are no better.

The result is that a great many neurotics, although for a time they may believe themselves to have been cured by whatever method happens to be fashionable, soon find to their great disillusionment that they are really no better. Some of them return to physical methods of treatment; some of them go to Lourdes, and some put themselves into the hands of the Christian Scientists. We are too apt to forget that psychotherapeutics is of very old date; that, in a religious, philosophical, or moral form, psychological treatment has in all ages been applied haphazard for the relief of bodily and mental ailments by those who did not trouble about the classification of diseases. Only within the last twenty-five years has psychotherapeutics developed along scientific lines, thanks to the growth of knowledge concerning psychological phenomena and their laws.

We are not in a position to assert that scientific psychological treatment is effective in all cases of neurosis. But this much is certain, that the new methods can bring about a cure, or can at least give relief, in many cases of long-standing nervous disorder. They also throw much light upon human behaviour.

Although this knowledge, which will be the psychology of to-morrow, is still full of gaps and imperfections, to it, none the less, we must look for a solution of our difficulties in the economic management of the forces of the mind. For the guidance, the canalisation, of these forces when they are aberrant or inadequate, or when they are running to waste, we must have recourse to one of the known methods of psychotherapeutics. Our experience in the treatment of neurotic patients shows that they cannot all be subjected to this or that system chosen in advance and applied to the exclusion of others. Whilst in a great number of neurasthenics rational persuasion in conjunction with physical methods of treatment will work a cure, we know that when psychasthenia is present in one of its manifold forms, the malady will often be refractory to moralisation. To achieve a satisfactory result we must have recourse also to psychoanalysis or to autosuggestion.

As far as hysterical patients are concerned, we believe that the success which Dubois' treatment has in the hands of certain specialists is mainly due to the suggestive power exercised by these practitioners. In hysteria, the most useful treatment is autosuggestion, either alone or in conjunction with psychoanalysis. When duplication of the personality is well marked, the practitioner must not be afraid to have recourse to hypnotism.

Detailed psychotherapeutic indications are beyond the scope of this book. But one point is clear. Although a *collaboration of methods* is

not yet sufficiently employed, the trend of contemporary psychotherapeutics is in this direction. We are convinced that the interest of our patients makes it essential that the joint use of different psychotherapeutic methods should become the rule in the near future.

Similarly, in daily life, when we are simply concerned with the guidance of our moral energies, we shall do well to avail ourselves of the combined resources of the various psychotherapeutic methods. In addition, the traditional moral disciplines may have something to tell us. In the Conclusion there will be more to say anent the conjoined use of the various methods described during the present study, and we shall be able to show that they supplement one another very well. All that we wanted in the present chapter was to show, especially to the sufferers from illness, that they can expect much help from these methods, which, though fairly new, are already well established. In such an epoch as our own, when so many suffer from shattered nerves or from disordered minds, it is comforting to know that they, and indeed all sufferers, have increasing reason to put their trust in the new methods of psychological medication.

CONCLUSION

THE precepts, the methods, and the advice presented in the foregoing pages may have produced in the reader's mind a chaotic impression. Nevertheless, when we look closely into the matter, it is easy to arrange these details, and to deduce from them certain guiding principles. We shall see that most of the doctrines are based upon the same principles, although each envisages them in a different way.

1. One of the most firmly established among such principles is the law of habit, and the need for TRAINING. Exercises must be assiduously practised, daily if possible. The yoga of the Hindus was founded upon the principle of daily training. The Stoics were likewise familiar with the value of regular exercise of the will. Christian monastic rule derived its efficiency from the same law of habit, and the Christians were not afraid to speak of "devotional practices." This principle is one of those on which, with good reason, most modern authors who write upon the "education of the will" specially insist. In the latest form of psychotherapeutics, autosuggestion, stress is also laid upon diligent and daily practice.

2. Although the sages of classical antiquity were inclined to overestimate the importance of

REASON, and indeed to make an exclusive cult of that faculty, the recognition of their error must not lead us to despise reason, for it is, none the less, a valuable aid to the inner discipline.

In the first place it enables us to gain an accurate *knowledge* of ourselves and of things. Knowledge is power. "Know thyself," said the Greek philosophers, and Buddha voiced the same precept. The Stoics tell us that we must distinguish clearly between things in our power and things not in our power, in order to regulate our desires in the light of this distinction, and to avoid unreasonable wishes. Thus, for the philosophers of the Stoic school, an understanding of universal determinism, a recognition of the inexorable interlacement of causes and effects, was one of the first premises of wisdom. We cannot but be interested to note that, in our own day, Dubois founds his therapeutic method of moralisation upon the same principle of determinism. As for the precept "Know thyself," it has never been more highly honoured than since the day when psychoanalysis disclosed the value of throwing light into the most hidden recesses of the subconscious, that thereby we may be delivered from the obscure forces which hold us in thrall.

But our reason has an additional task in this struggle with ourselves. We can use it in the form of the *rational persuasion* which Dubois has organised into a therapeutic system. We shall do well to remember that the Stoics had grasped the importance of this method, for their advice was that we should practise a pitiless analysis,

that we might convince ourselves of the worthlessness of the objects towards which passion was leading us astray.

3. But the best-trained will, the best-regulated intelligence, are not all-powerful. One of the most important contributions of Christianity to human knowledge was its proclamation of their limits. Contemporary science, discovering the subconscious, is exploring and defining these limits. The reader will recall that the law of reversed effort, one of the fundamental laws of autosuggestion, shows that the will is not merely powerless at times, but that in certain circumstances its strength is turned against itself. Owing to the inadequacy of our conscious forces, we need to have recourse to a DISCIPLINE OF THE SUBCONSCIOUS.

We first make the acquaintance of *the subconscious as an obstacle*, and the primary task of psychoanalysis is to enable us to overcome this obstacle by recognising its nature, to get the better of its stubborn resistance. Soon we come to recognise that there is a good genius as well as an evil genius in the subconscious. Though it be true that the subconscious is responsible for many of our blunders, it is also the subconscious which instigates scientific discovery and artistic creation. This leads us to recognise *the subconscious as a force*, supplementary to the force of consciousness. We can learn to make a good use of this force. Suggestion turns it to account, and autosuggestion puts it at every one's disposal. Finally, persons of religious temperament will

incline to regard *the subconscious as a mystical force*, and for them, prayer will play the part which autosuggestion plays for those who look at the matter by the light of science.

The comparison between autosuggestion and prayer is an obvious one. The essential nature of both is the realisation of an idea through work hidden from consciousness; and in prayer and autosuggestion alike we are advised to surrender will and to practise collectedness.¹ Some religiously minded persons have been alarmed at this obvious comparison, and the authors have received letters on the subject. Is it implied, our correspondents have asked, that prayer is to be reduced to a form of autosuggestion? Our answer was that experience taught that prayer and autosuggestion were kindred phenomena, but it did not prove their identity. Those whose temperament inclined them to a religious outlook were entitled to hold that the subconscious consists of strata, the more superficial of these being peculiar to each individual, whereas the deeper strata are cosmical or mystical. Persons who take this view may contend that, while autosuggestion and prayer are doubtless akin, the phenomena differ as regards the level of the subconscious in which they respectively take place.

4. What indisputably emerges from all these considerations is the **FORCE OF THE IDEA**. An idea is able to release subconscious energies, thus realising itself without our knowing how.

¹ See Suggestion and Autosuggestion, pp. 135-138.

Concentration preeminently aims at reinforcing this realisation of the idea. By concentration we understand a peculiar form of attention which, thanks to appropriate training, can be sustained without effort. Concentration was the fundamental element in yoga. Among modern philosophers, Emerson takes the first place as regards the vigour with which he has expressed his trust in concentration and in the force of the idea. According to Christian Science, all evil can be abolished by the power of the idea. The New Thought doctrine advances an analogous claim, but in more moderate terms; and the advocates of this discipline have popularised the gospel of Emerson. Suggestion and autosuggestion transfer the discipline of the idea to a scientific plane.

Turning to consider exercises favourable to concentration, we note that the Hindus were already familiar with the fixation of the gaze upon a luminous point. In Catholic worship, recourse is had to monotonous sensory stimuli, to the persistent reiteration of formulas. To-day, scientific hypnotism employs similar methods.

We find a like agreement as regards the periods of the day most favourable to concentration. Pythagoras and the Stoics advised meditation during the hour after waking; the Christians prescribed morning and evening prayer; the advocates of autosuggestion tell us that we should practise the method immediately before going to sleep and immediately after waking. Light is thrown on the value of this recommendation when we recall that the neighbourhood of sleep means

that the subconscious is near to outcropping ; and that when outcropping of the subconscious occurs, the implantation of ideas that will germinate in the subconscious is easy.

5. Having recognised the limits imposed on the forces of the intelligence and the will, we are led to appeal, not only to the subconscious, but to the FORCES OF THE HEART. Christianity corrected Stoicism by this appeal to sentiment, and we have seen that Dejerine wishes to revise Dubois' rational persuasion in the same way. The psychoanalysts recognise that our strength lies in our instincts and in our affective life. We know that emotion is a valuable aid to suggestion. Practitioners of mind cure and of every form of psychotherapeutics recognise the extreme importance of arousing in their patients a feeling of confidence.

But according to the adherents of the majority of the schools we have been considering, the most potent aid to our forces and the most trustworthy guarantee of our harmony is altruistic sentiment, benevolence, *love*. An essential part of Buddhist teaching is love ; by the Stoics, love was advocated, though more rationally and coldly ; and by the Christians, love was preached with all the fervour of passion. We even find that the advocacy of love is a part of modern psychotherapeutics. The school of the rational persuasionists and the school of the psychoanalysts, markedly divergent though they are in other respects, agree in one point. The disciples of both schools recognise that the neuropath usually suffers from a sort of morbid egoism, and that a reeducation of the love

sentiment is an essential part of cure. "A new road to the old gospel."

At the outset of the present work, we complained that the champions of so many of the doctrines we were considering formulated ends without telling us how to attain them. We now have to ask ourselves whether the indications that have just been given concerning means are both practical and practicable.

We think they are. Still, we must not blink the fact that a good many people are incompetent, unaided, to make a good beginning in the application of these principles, and thus to become the artificers of their own liberation. Pathological instances show this clearly, and scientific psychotherapists do not consider that the sick can be cured without the aid of a specialist. The moralists, on the other hand, seem, in our opinion, to err through their failure to recognise the morbid weaknesses which no amount of excellent precepts will cure.

Nevertheless, when we look into the matter more closely, we see that it is impossible to draw so sharp a distinction between moral methods and psychotherapeutic methods. In fact, the great moral philosophers and the great religious teachers have always recognised the importance of the guide. The sage is the disciple of a master, the Christian has his director. The letter of the precepts must be vivified by individual example, by the living word. But we note that the evolution of modern psychotherapeutics is in the direc-

tion of an endeavour to make the pupil independent of the guide ; one of the first aims of the guide is to enable the pilgrim to dispense with further guidance.

Thus we have to steer our course between two dangers. If we tell our pupils that they can do everything for themselves, not a few of them are likely to be discouraged ere long by failure. If, on the other hand, we represent nervous disorders as the outcome of an inevitable chain of causation and as justifying moral weakness, a good many of our auditors will be only too prone to make excuses for themselves. The moralists will do well to learn from the psychotheraputists that there are pathological conditions which form serious obstacles to self-mastery, and that the first requisite may be that we should clear these obstacles out of the path. On the other hand, the psychotheraputists will do well to keep constantly before their minds the importance of a moral ideal. In this connexion we may requote Foerster's remark : " A lofty conception of life will suffice, in many persons of neuropathic temperament, to keep the nervous disorder latent, for it saves them from the unwholesome effects of numerous caprices."

The individual can do a great deal for himself, but who among us has never felt the need for a guide ? Let us avoid the hardihood of believing ourselves infallible ; and let us be no less careful to avoid, when we have failed, being content with the poor excuse that our nerves were to blame.

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
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